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Abstract 
 
This writing is the result of a practice-as-research project that I have undertaken as a 
poet, performance and sound artist. The works that I have produced dwell 
thematically and formally on themes of broken temporality, abject subjects, waste 
time and spaces, and are a response to the period coincident (London and the UK, 
2010-2017) with this research. The writing is intended to create a context, or map, of 
where and when I made the performances and recordings, the pressures and 
atmospheres they responded to. During this time, broadly welfare-statist senses of 
“public” as polity, institutions and space have contorted under pressure from a 
rapacious neoliberalism and the rise of nativist and racist right-wing politics, 
exemplified by the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union. Both forces are 
hostile to the model of rights-bearing citizenship as the universality embodied in 
“stranger relationality”, which Michael Warner describes as a necessity for a sense of 
public (2002, p.7). This struggle feeds into debates concerning what both "public" 
and “citizen” mean as political concepts.  
 
I use relational aesthetics as an example of a communitarian tendency that 
superficially might seem to be opposed to dominant political tendencies hostile to the 
idea of a universal public. In this, it follows both nativist and neoliberal tendencies; in 
its artistic strategies it also prioritises voluntaristic “engagement” over contemplation. 
In both these matters, it replicates certain neoliberal models of ideal subjecthood, in 
which rights are replaced by privileges. This is, for me, a parallel to the tension 
between the Romantic lumpenprole figure of “artist” and the valorised, 
entrepreneurial “creative worker”. 
 
As a counterbalance, I look at a waste ground fly-tipping site in east London that I 
have called the Bike Cemetery. This place had at one time been occupied by an 
anonymous bricoleur who left an extraordinary mural comprising of collaged detritus 
and text on a wall supporting a motorway embankment. I take the rubbish strewn 
site, the mural and its creator as a constellation in themselves, a manifestation of 
stranger-relationality and the now abjected temporality of social democracy.  
 
In keeping with my approach to my artistic work, I use Walter Benjamin’s concept of 
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allegory (Benjamin, 1998) as a tool for looking at the ways in which ideas can 
present through constellations of images and detritus, making the experience of 
hermeneutic labour almost haptic — a wandering across and through fragments. I 
use materials such as “scalies” (the figures that populate the architects’ renderings 
printed on the hoardings put up around the sites of speculative housing 
developments), UK public order legislation and the history of the temperance 
movement. Central to this mapping which attempts to delineate an emergent form of 
contemporary subjectivity, is an idea of “public”, in the dual and related sense of a 
political collectivity that can be addressed or appealed to and the political/social 
artefacts of public “space” and “services” in a welfare state. This response also 
necessitates, for a vocal and verbal artist such as myself, a consideration of the 
rhetorical structures at play: much that presents as in-vocation in political discourse, 
the “will of the People”, for example, is actually e-vocation — allegory to the 
invocation’s symbol, belonging to the temporality of waste (see Viney, 2016), 
ruptured or halted teleology (Agamben, 2009), the time of addiction, the time of 
performance.  
 
I consider and have developed my work as an artist in relation to these questions: Is 
a performer “being public”? Is the audience an instantiation of the public? Where are 
“we” and what are “we” when (in) public? How can a performance address the 
public-as-public, which is to say, as strangers; what rhetoric, what form of address 
can be used? 
 
Can “public” be in-voked or e-voked by a performer? What part does my voice play 
as a vehicle of “in” or “e” vocation? What appropriate temporality can performance 
occupy or evoke at this time? How are tropes (turns, postures, images) of “national 
abjects” to be used without rendering them as decorative motifs for the creative 
class? 
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Introduction 
This writing is the result of a practice-as-research project that I have undertaken as a 
poet, performance and sound artist. The performances and recordings that I have 
produced, which dwell thematically and formally on themes of broken temporality, 
abject subjects, waste time and spaces, are a response to the period coincident 
(London and the UK, 2010–2017) with this research. It is intended to create a 
context or map of where and when I made the art, and the pressures and 
atmospheres it responded to. I use Walter Benjamin’s concept of allegory as a tool 
for looking at the ways in which ideas can present through patchwork: constellations 
of images and detritus as a mosaic and the hermeneutic labour of decoding as 
almost haptic. Following Benjamin’s argument, I do not present “knowledge” as 
garnered through its transparent and perhaps ahistorical presentation, but through 
the action of piecing it together in time — pacing it out, weaving paths through and 
around it. This research was composed from fragments, still clearly visible, each one 
responding to a discrete institutional deadline. In this way, I believe the approach I 
have adopted is that which Benjamin called a “treatise” (1998, p.28) 
 
As practice-based research (or practice-led research) it was driven by the modalities 
of my practice and the experience of my times. I trace a pattern on the floor — my 
movements crossing and re-crossing various fragments, half-completed projects and 
ruins of projects half-completed then left open to the vicissitudes of accident and 
history. This, like my performances, is an attempt to map out a space of “transfixed 
unrest” (Benjamin, Spencer and Harrington, 1985), the space in which I have been 
living and working along with all others living in this city and through these times.  
 
Over this period, broadly welfare-statist senses of “public” as polity, institutions and 
space have contorted under pressure from a rapacious neoliberalism and the rise of 
nativist and racist right-wing politics. Both forces are hostile to the model of rights-
bearing citizenship as the universality embodied in “stranger relationality” which 
Michael Warner describes as a necessity for a sense of public (2002, p.7). For 
myself, I feel the tension between a Romantic bohemian lumpenprole figure of 
“artist” that belongs to the liberal-democratic imaginary and the entrepreneurial 
worker of the so-called “creative classes” (Florida, 2002) which these changes 
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exacerbate. 
 
Central to this mapping is an idea of “public”, in the dual and related sense of a 
political collectivity that can be addressed or appealed to and the political/social 
artefacts of public “space” and “services” in a welfare state, in which the spaces and 
services are discursively underwritten and legitimised by public as collectivity. This 
response also necessitates considering the rhetorical structures in play: much that 
presents as  
in-vocation in political discourse, the “will of the People”, for example, is actually e-
vocation — a “calling out”, as opposed to an illocutionary act of “calling on”. In 
Benjamin’s terms, this posits evocation as allegory to invocation’s symbol, therefore 
suited to this study as it belongs to the temporality of waste, ruptured or halted 
teleology, the time of addiction, the time of performance.  
 
I have developed my work as an artist in relation to these questions: Is a performer 
“being public”? Is the audience an instantiation of the public? Where are “we” and 
what are “we” when (in) public? How can a performance address the public-as-
public, which is to say, as strangers; what rhetoric, what form of address can be 
used? 
 
Can “public” be in-voked or e-voked by a performer? What part does my voice play 
as a vehicle of “in” or “e” vocation? What appropriate temporality can performance 
occupy or evoke at this time? How are tropes (turns, postures, images) of “national 
abjects” to be used without rendering them as decorative motifs for the creative 
class? 
 
My own perspective on these matters is inevitably formed by the times I have lived 
in; I have, for most of my life, lived in a more-or-less functioning welfare state. It 
provided my education, provided me with subsistence through unemployment and 
disability benefits, kicked down my door on a few occasions and evicted me 
numerous times. It mended my teeth, tested my eyes, arrested me occasionally and 
nearly sent me to prison once. This is the nature of states, including more-or-less 
functioning welfare states. I have come to realise that in the face of an aggressive 
anti-statism (including within government) that operates in the name of “free 
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markets” and an illiberal statism that demands that borders are protected at all costs 
and those deemed undesirable are persecuted, the social democratic welfare state 
must be defended — not least because my own survival has always depended on it. 
The ambivalence I feel towards it is a functional part of the liberal democratic 
settlement, rather than a personal quirk. Part of that ambivalence is my identification 
with those of its wards or products that have been turned into weapons against it by 
much of the media and many politicians: those that Imogen Tyler calls the “national 
abjects” (2013, p.9). These are the usual figures of the tabloid and right-wing 
demonology, council tenants, the long-term unemployed, malingerers, travelers, 
single-parent mothers, asylum seekers, drug addicts, street drinkers, etc. — the so-
called “underclass”, which I have known from my own experience. The argument, 
from the welfare state dismantlers, is that, like a feckless parent, the system has 
indulged these abjects, cosseted them with housing, healthcare etc., neglected 
(market) discipline and so has made them what they are. Further, that the state does 
this deliberately — to have a stable or growing constituency who can be relied upon 
to vote for further enlarging the state — the state itself is, by metonymic contagion, 
abject. I believe that there is something — inadvertently — correct in this charge, 
that the state’s purported “dependents” actually enjoy considerable sovereignty, a 
strange centrality to the state far more profound than that of the market. I argue that 
not only the public — as stranger relationality, as space and as institutions — is in 
danger from the present neoliberal ascendency, but also the private, by which I do 
not mean property, but the specific bourgeois liberal modes of inwardness, of 
privacy, that have also been underwritten by the state. 
 
If […] neoliberal reason is evacuating these ideals and desires from actually 
existing liberal democracies, then from what platform would more ambitious 
democratic projects be launched? How would the desire for more or better 
democracy be kindled from the ash heap of its bourgeois form? Why would 
people want or seek democracy in the absence of even its vaporous liberal 
democratic instantiation? And what in de-democratised subjects and 
subjectivities would yearn for this political regime, a yearning that is neither 
primordial nor cultured by this historical condition (Brown, 2015), p.18). 
 
Whilst I cannot pretend that the welfare state iteration of liberal social democracy 
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was anything close to a utopia, I agree with Wendy Brown’s point that whatever 
kernels of actual (rather than formal) egalitarianism and liberation it contained are in 
danger of being irrevocably lost. Particular subjectivities are not natural phenomena; 
they are formed by the societies that they are part of. In contrast to my anarchist 
beliefs when younger, I now believe that we become subjects both through and 
against power (whatever the source or legitimation of that power is) and liberal 
democratic subjects are just as bound to (and against) it as those subjectivised by 
any other system.  
 
The methodology I have deployed is something immanent in my own approach as an 
artist, which is, in turn, deeply marked by my condition as non-neurotypical. I am 
dyspraxic, which has had a profound effect upon my perceptions of space, time and 
the ways in which I inhabit and conceive of them. I have always been untimely, late, 
too slow; I have always been in the wrong place or placed wrongly in relation to other 
things in space. Neither time nor space have ever presented themselves to me as 
smooth continuums. Space has always been full of obstacles and traps, marked by 
radical discontinuity; time has consisted of an indeterminate present that keeps an 
inchoately threatening future in abeyance until, very suddenly, it no longer does. As 
a performance artist, I predominantly use improvisation as praxis, as a way of 
avoiding the difficulties I inevitably find in preparation. This has, though, made me 
acutely aware of the potential shame inherent in a performance that fails. I associate 
that shame in a failed staging with that which adheres to other forms of ostensibly 
“inadequate” subjection (becoming a subject), therefore to the aforementioned 
national abjects. 
 
Performers that are important to me in developing my work include Brian Catling 
(Fig.1), for his carnivalesque/mythological sense of menace (see Catling, 2005), 
which I try to evoke in performances such as Twat Graffiti (2015) [Disc 3], and his 
way of inhabiting all of a space, pressing uncomfortably close to the audience, which 
I adopted in Root (2015) [Audio Disk 2], a performance which I began by creeping up 
behind the seated audience, scratching at a drum behind their heads. Of the same 
generation as Catling, Alastair MacLennan is also important although the debt is not 
immediately apparent in my own performance work. What I have taken from him is 
the awareness of how performance can poetically respond to political and social 
13 
 
trauma in his immediate environment — for example, in We Owe The Future Nothing 
(2012) [Disk 3]. He started making performance in response to the long colonial and 
civil war in Northern Ireland and the affective climate of Belfast’s streets in the 
1970s, wearing a target on his walk to work at the art college (Fig.2) 
(NationalMuseumsNI, 2014). His estrangement in (and of the) public combined with  
physical grace in an apparently abjected subjectivity and his deadpan absurdism has 
resonated with me. The broader sense of the absurd in Bobby Baker’s performance 
and video work interests me because of her sharp observations on gender and 
bourgeois domesticity and her use of awkward humour that veers strongly on the 
edge of pathos (Fig. 3). The well-defined performance persona that seems in part a 
form of self-parody invites a cosy complicity with the audience, which she then 
periodically undermines by flogging the joke beyond its demise or her thoughts 
taking on a more overtly dark hue, keeping things slightly uncomfortable and the 
target of the joke uncertain.  
 
My music/sound influences include the part-improvised, jaggedly disjointed lyrics of 
the deceased frontman of The Fall, Mark E Smith. Though much of the music is 
purely functional, the perceptual leaps inherent in his diatribes evidence a distinct 
demotic modernist aesthetic of fragmentation. This cut-up quality is also evident in 
dub reggae, notably in the dub producer Adrian Sherwood’s work with the avant-
garde punk-funk outfit, The Pop Group, in the 1980s. Those recordings, with their 
abrupt incursions of apparently extraneous noise and the ambiguity of the spaces 
they made, seemed an appropriate analogue to the political anger and unease of the 
time. For a representative example, Mark Stewart’s voice on the title track on For 
How Much Longer Will We Tolerate Mass Murder? The Pop Group (1980) seems to 
inhabit the aural space, rather than simply being placed in it, fading into the distance 
and then reappearing in disconcerting proximity to the listener, much like Brian 
Catling’s performance persona. This spatial instability has strongly influenced my 
work, in Invocation (2014) [CD 1], for example, where my voice moves through the 
soundscape, rather than being placed in the centre foreground; this has the effect of 
fixing the stereo image by giving it a static focus.  
 
Another abiding influence is 1980’s UK anarcho punk scene in terms of performance, 
specifically by the bands Crass and Flux of Pink Indians in their move towards 
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deconstructing the form of the punk song. Both produced albums, Yes Sir, I will 
(1983) by Crass, The Fucking Cunts are Treating Us Like Pricks (1984) by Flux of 
Pink Indians, also their 7” single Taking a Liberty (1984), pushed the form closer to 
the musique concrete tape experiments of Pierre Schaeffer, or to dub 
deconstructions like those of Lee Scratch Perry or Adrian Sherwood. This was, at the 
time, a turn away from the codes of the subculture without “selling out”. If anything, 
the formal change rendered the ostensible message more uncompromising as it no 
longer entailed playing crowd-pleasing songs for a self-selecting group of 
enthusiasts. I would argue that the gesture was, rather than being a retreat into a 
narrow aesthetic niche, an assertion of publicness of a particular kind. It was a form 
of public as negativity. Opposition was staged, not just to the particular hegemonic 
forces in UK society, but also (it seemed) toward their own audiences and 
themselves. That work cannot (perhaps despite itself) be reduced purely to politics, 
agit-prop or protest, but it presents a staging of the political in Carl Schmitt’s sense of 
marking out a space based on the friend/enemy dichotomy (Schmitt, 2007), p.26). 
This was carried through into the recordings. The listener is positioned to either take 
up the lyric “you” being denounced as themselves and feeling attacked, or to side 
with the band. The songs often combined vocal and verbal registers: shouting, 
screaming, calmly discursive, for example Conflict A Piss in the Ocean  (1986). The 
mix places different subject positions in a crowded and agonistic space, as if at a 
picket line or ill-tempered demonstration. A technique much used by Conflict was to 
edit the vocal so that the usual gaps where the singer would take a breath were 
excised. This gave the impression of a never-ending rant or scream, especially when 
each successive phrase was panned to the opposite speaker (Conflict, 1986). I have 
used digital effects live and on recordings to achieve similar atmosphere to this and 
to dub, for example, in compensationton bankrupsea (2011) [Disk 1], and the 
layered, looped chant that ends Apostrophe for a Citizen (2015) [DVD 1]. In terms of 
non-verbal vocalisation, the improviser and jazz musician Phil Minton’s (2008) 
virtuoso vocalisations are also a point of reference, but perhaps the poet Bob 
Cobbing’s experiments with non-verbal poetics and tape are the closest (Cobbing, 
1983) to what I have aimed at, for instance, in Kkkaaa (2016). 
 
Over the past four years as I have added more conventionally song-like elements to 
my performance, I have developed an interest in the art-song tradition, specifically 
15 
Schubert’s lieder and his settings of Wilhelm Müller’s lyric poetry in the 
Winterreise song cycle (Schubert, 2004)1. This interested me as Schubert seemed, 
specifically in his explicit linkage of domestic-scaled piano music to starkly subjective 
Romantic lyric, to be marking out the territory of an appropriate subjectivity for the 
nascence of the modern bourgeois democratic state. Schubert was also one of the 
first properly independent entrepreneurial composers, according to Ian Bostridge, a 
celebrated singer of the lieder. This cements, for me, the connection between lyric 
poetry, bourgeois democratic subjectivity (valorisation of the private/personal), and 
the artist as cultural entrepreneur. 
In keeping with my approach mirroring the subject (the allegorical), my form will 
reflect this. Emblematic interruptions will pepper the text, the content of which is 
derived from texts improvised in performance or written. These will be differentiated 
by using an image as background and the use of a demi-Gothic font. 
1
 see Root, 2015. Appendix 2 and CD 2; Der Leierman, 2015. CD 2. 
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[Sound of traffic. Crack of beer can opening, hiss of escaping gas] 
This - is for the good dead [sound of pouring beer on pavement] 
Who tucked us in at night - closing the door, softly 
Who gaze, calmly, back at us from the family shrine 
Whose eyes are doubled in the faces of friends, lovers. 
The good dead - who love us,  
Because we're good. 
And we like to be good. 
  
This - [sound of beer being poured on pavement] 
Is for the bad dead - who we don't like to speak of 
Who implore us as we pass, whose voices - 
Are not quite voices, 
Whose language is not quite language - not quite - 
Who we've injured, or allowed to be injured 
Whose reproach is implacable - and infinite 
In their lost-ness to us. 
The bad dead; who we don't like to speak of. 
  
And this [sound of beer poured on pavement] 
Is for [shouts] Hermes! 
Who stole the cattle of the sun, 
Who licks the crumbs from the sacrificial table 
-Who spits on honest labor 
Who casts his benediction on all who thieve their language 
Stumbling on broken tongues  
Between the platform and the train 
Between here, and there 
Between the piss thin rain and the nagging wind 
Between the railings and the gutter. 
For Hermes! Bless us. 
  
And this [sound of beer on pavement] is for us: 
Who await the bailiffs at dawn 
Who work the treadmills of addiction 
Who are, forever, double hearted, double breathed, 
And voiced. 
Who live under assumed names - and 
The assumptions of name; 
Who fabricate our lives to officials - 
And cross our fingers when called to sign. 
Who never spoke a true word… 
For us, too. 
 
16 
Invocation – Prologue 
This prologue is an opening, intended to function just as the invocation that I have 
often used to begin my performances2 — a ritual form of words that will differentiate 
the time and space of the performance from that which surrounds them, through 
interruption. It is an attempt, in Louis Althusser’s useful formulation, to interpellate 
(1971, pp.127–186) audience, as audience, to constitute them as a particular kind of 
subject by hailing them in appropriate terms. Interpellation, as Althusser describes it, 
is an imaginary scene of subject-formation in which a policeman or other figure of 
authority calls out one’s name on the street. In that turning, in that response, one 
accepts the name and the authority of the namer to designate subjects. Arguably (it 
is a policeman, after all), one also accepts the guilt that thinkers such as Nietzsche 
(Nietzsche, 1989) and Judith Butler (Butler, 1995) consider to be essential to the 
formation of the subject. Following  Butler, I see this subject forming as a “trope” 
literally a “figure of speech”. The audience are called upon to see themselves as 
“await[ing] the bailiffs at dawn/working the treadmills of addiction”; this is an attempt 
to place the work — the performance — and the audience it gathers around it, in a 
space of detritus that is in an arrested or disrupted history (see Viney, 2014). It is not 
so much to stop time or create a timeless interlude as it is to identify the event of the 
work and those present with those institutions, things and people that are being 
rendered obsolete by the current iteration of capital, which constitute much of this 
current writing. 
This action is usually accompanied by spitting or pouring super-strong lager on the 
ground to mark out the space in which I will perform (Fig. 4, Fig. 26). I have come to 
think of this as a summoning of the audience and the (imaginary or otherwise) spirits 
surrounding them. The splashing beer also has the effect of keeping the audience at 
an arm’s length distance. 
I used a contrasting form of interpellation in June 2016, the day of the UK’s EU 
referendum. It was an improvised adaptation of a recorded audio piece, KKKaaa3 
2 The text is a transcription from the sound work Invocation (2014), available on Audio Disc 2 and 
online; the full transcription is included in Appendix 1. 
3
 Available on Disc 2 and online. 
17 
 
(see Fig. 9), a non-verbal dub vocalisation created through deconstructing 
components of the accent of my hometown on the unglamorous western airport-and-
prison fringe of London — my “mother tongue”4, as it were. I then reassembled it, 
emphasising what I saw as its most distinctive elements. I described these as 
“glottals like hawking up phlegm, or a kick in the balls; vowels like swinging on a 
rusty gate; consonants like ravens”. The name of the piece comes from the particular 
“a” sound that is croaking and bird-like, and which I grew up hearing, specifically in 
the word “cunt”, used as an expletive. In that dialect, it becomes lengthened into 
“caaaaunt”; hence Kkkaaa. On this particular day, I wanted to use "take back control" 
as a mantra, something to hang my performance on without intending anyone to 
understand what I was saying. Partly because of the disingenuous sentiment, no one 
can "get back" what they'd never had in the first place. The hard "t" in "take" comes 
from the tongue against teeth and almost creates the sensation of spitting. The 
equally hard "k" in that word and the next reminded me of retching perhaps. The "b" 
sound in back propels the consonant out with similar force to the "K", but this work 
climaxes with the root of the tongue rising to the back of the palate, having allowed 
the lips and air to do most of the work at the beginning, a sort of giving out followed 
by an abrupt truncation. This is contrasted by the last word, where breath is pushed 
out from the "c", arrested in mid-flow by the "t" against the roof of the mouth and 
pushed out with a flick of the tongue on the "l". In my accent, however, this "l" is 
more expressed through a slackening and pushing out of the lips into an "oow" 
sound. But nevertheless, there is a satisfactory push-pull in the phrase. A niggardly 
voicing on the first two monosyllables contrasted with a comparative relaxation on 
the last word. 
 
Voice places us; there is no more such a thing as The Voice as there is that other 
popular generalised (and capitalised) abstraction, The Body. It can only ever be a 
particular someone’s voice, emanating from a particular location in space, time and 
biography. In the UK, at least, accent also places the speaker in relation to a class 
as well as geography and history. Accent persists even when words are absent. It is 
one of the things that ties “voice” to our particular identities, however much the words 
                                            
4
 See Ong 2002 on the “mother tongue” and its relation to the international language of Latin from the 
medieval through the Renaissance periods. 
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that we enunciate through it might appeal to universal reason or fraternity. 
Consonants alone are enough to convey an accent. 
 
Mladen Dolar, in A Voice and Nothing More (2006, p.106), describes the split in the 
subject that is necessary for a political order (or at least a liberal political order, 
understood as one that has as its basis a separation between public and private 
spheres) to stand. Recapitulating Giorgio Agamben’s idea of the “state of exception” 
(1998, p.11) that area in which subjects are beyond the law whilst being included in 
it, Dolar suggests that voice is part of zoe, “bare life”, that which all creatures have, 
whilst the word, or language, is a part of bios, the proper way of life, politics, logos, 
law. The citizen of the polis is thus split between a public language and a private 
voice. The politicised bands of the early 1980s maintained this split; arguably 
attempting to collapse the two would have led to a particular form of identity politics. 
This can be seen in Karl Schmitt’s description of the sovereign’s voice. For Schmitt, 
a legal theorist and jurist under the Nazi regime, the Fuhrer's words were law, 
without the need for codification in writing: 
In the person of the Fuhrer, zoe and bios coincide. He represents the unity of 
Volk and its aspirations, its biopolitical ambition and endeavour […] 
(Schmitt,1935 in Dolar, 2006, p.116). 
This coincidence of voice, speaker and words as self-present and equivalent is a 
shared feature of ethnic identities and nationalisms. The dialectic between voice and 
word, or between zoe (bare life) and bios (political life) (Ibid, p. 106) finds an end in 
the exemplary national subject, or for that matter, in the contemporary neoliberal 
subject. Because of this, I wished to literally make my voice spatially indeterminate. I 
wanted to make it multiply, shift position and pitch. I wished to separate it from my 
physical position, and also, from itself to avoid the sort of assumed wholeness that 
the campaigns to leave the EU had attributed to national subjects. 
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Publics — Allegory — Melancholia — Torsion 
 
Every feeling is bound to an a priori object, and the representation of this object 
is its phenomenology (Benjamin, 1993, p.139). 
Performance creates the space of its happening. This space is untimely in the sense 
that performance contains and evokes a different time to that of the everyday (see 
Schechner, 1988, p.6). The stadium where the athlete competes and the places of 
other performances, whether in a gallery, theatre, music venue, or on the street, all 
have one thing in common: they are all what Peter Brook called an “empty space” 
(1968, p.1). This space is set aside from the everyday (Schechner, 1998, p.9). Whilst 
Brook refers to the whole space in which performer and audience are placed as 
empty as a necessary condition for performance to happen, I think that the space 
between performer and audience is the element productive of performance. Whether 
that space is purpose-built and set aside only for that, that “setting aside” still 
happens for as long as the performance has an audience, or, it could be argued, as 
long as the performer is conscious of themselves as “other”. The literal and 
metaphorical gap between the one who performs and those who watch them is what 
makes performance. It does not have to be made physical as a proscenium arch or 
stage with curtains in order fulfil its function. The observed action has, as it were, a 
set of quotation marks around it; there is a sense of “as if”. The space is created 
between someone doing something in front of (we say, “before us”, giving a sense of 
temporal primacy to the intention) others, who watch them doing it. Its “emptiness” is 
a function of that regard, of that focus, which sets the space aside (albeit temporarily, 
in some cases) from whatever other functions that it might fulfil. This space is not, 
first and foremost, architectural, or necessarily temporally located; firstly, it is a kind 
of social space, which Lefebvre has characterised as: 
 
[…] not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, 
it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their 
coexistence and simultaneity — their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. 
It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be 
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reduced to the rank of a simple object. […] Itself the outcome of past actions, 
social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and 
prohibiting yet others (Lefebvre, 1991, p.73). 
Whilst social space is produced, it also produces. The social space that is 
performance is produced by social agents and produces them in turn, as performer 
and audience. There are generally accepted rules; one or more person does 
something, and other people present, watch and listen. 
 
I think that this tense structure could be better described in Walter Benjamin’s terms, 
as a “monad”, or “constellation”. This is his term for a freezing of certain fragments 
(historical, spatial, cultural artefacts) into a pattern or mosaic in which the elements 
are not gathered together in a sublation5, but are held in tension with, and against, 
each other. An opposition is set up, a potentially agonic relation. This can be seen in 
courtrooms, at political rallies, in churches, public executions and monarchical state 
functions as well as very obviously in theatres and clubs. There are noticeable 
differences in these examples, but what they all share is a particular disposition of 
bodies in space that creates a clear division between protagonist (or victim) and 
audience. 
 
A single subject is isolated — individuated, you might say — and set aside from a 
larger group and made subject to their scrutiny. In a sense, this is very similar to the 
process of subject formation that Judith Butler in The Psychic Life of Power (1997, 
p.2) refers to as “subjection”, something that both makes a subject and “makes 
subject”6. A space is opened up in the subject — a gap of self-reflexivity, by virtue of 
which they can treat themselves as material. To develop a subjectivity that will be 
recognisable as such, the individual must repudiate their attachment to a (often 
parental) power that was anterior to them. 
 
Stand-up comedy is an example that most clearly illustrates the agonic nature of this 
                                            
5
 The third term in the dialectic; after thesis and antithesis. Sublation gathers the terms together in 
itself, this gathering transcends their previous opposition. 
6
 See also the “Trope/Torsion” section of this current work for a discussion of Butler’s theory of 
subjection on p.4. 
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relation. The comedian is challenged to “make” the audience laugh; interruptions7 
and heckling from audience members is relatively common and the performer must 
come out on top in these exchanges8; what is at stake is the potential to be publicly 
shamed. People talk of “dying” onstage — having seen it happen, I would say that 
the term is not entirely hyperbolic; it is a form of social death, a catastrophic public 
loss of “face”. Cruelty, or the potential for it, is a necessary part of the entertainment. 
Comedy, in this context, is a fairly explicit power struggle between performer and 
audience. It mobilises the guest/host dynamic in a way that renders it fluid and 
constantly shifting. A variety act may thank the audience for having them, as one 
would to a host, or a comedian will fight the audience to become the host and 
receive the host’s due: they will laugh at her jokes. Performers talk of “losing the 
room”, as if it was part of ongoing hostilities — which in a sense it is. From sacrifice 
to the law court, via public executions and political speeches, the spatial relation (or 
the spatial gap) between performer and audience has existed as a physical 
archetype for political relations between the one and the many, between hospitality 
and hostility — a reified absence that has sometimes been presented as an obstacle 
to be overcome in the name of empowerment, or some kind of communitarian 
apotheosis. 
 
The question which has been guiding me throughout this work has been “what is the 
relation between performer and audience”, and further, what is the relation between 
that audience and the idea of the public?” Obviously, this has necessitated trying to 
decide what I thought a “public” is and how it might be formed by utilising theories 
and histories of the public. As the idea of a public, a “general” public, public services, 
“public opinion” etc. are all thoroughly imbricated in the theory and pieties of liberal 
democracy, the current condition of UK democracy has demanded some 
consideration. 
                                            
7
 Whilst the challenge to the performer is to somehow “win” these exchanges, often by integrating 
them into the act, they — and the heckler — are not part of the act. The heckler is not usually 
challenging the comedian’s position in order to take their place. 
8
 I once saw the usually quick-witted and extremely capable comedian, Simon Munnery, walk offstage 
in the middle of his act after failing to deal with a particularly obtuse heckler who would neither desist 
or engage with his ripostes. In the end, he invited her onto the stage and gave her the microphone in 
a gambit (to make her the explicit focus of the audience) that would likely have shamed someone 
more self-aware (and less drunk). Unfortunately for him, she accepted the offer and rambled 
repetitiously and incoherently, until Munnery walked off. 
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I am treating the category of audience as a subset of the public. In common with the 
public, the strange thing about an audience is that their being is an abstraction of a 
collective, a social imaginary, which means that it is not very easy to meet one9. This 
is clear if one imagines performing to a room full of people, half of whom leave over 
the course of the performance. One can say afterward that the audience got smaller, 
but not that it was only half an audience10. The category “audience” does not have a 
direct relationship with any one — or even half — of its members and can just as 
easily exist as audience with one set of people as with another. 
 
Literary and queer theorist Michael Warner’s definition of the public “as a public of 
discourse” has been important to my thinking on this. Whilst Warner differentiates 
the idea of audience from the idea of a (or The) public, I think that the division is far 
more permeable than Warner allows, to the extent of not always really being there. 
 
[…T]he public, as a people, is thought to include everyone within the field in 
question.[…] A public can also be a second thing: a concrete audience, a crowd 
witnessing itself in visible space, as with a theatrical public. Such a public also 
has a sense of totality, bounded by the event or by the shared physical space. 
A performer onstage knows where her public is, how big it is, where its 
boundaries are, and what the time of its common existence is (Warner, 2002, p. 
65–6). 
For example, the contemporary habit of recording performances, gigs and other such 
events on mobile phones to post them on social media indicates to me that audience 
self-perception extends beyond the walls of the venue and the timescale of a 
discrete event. I don’t think that this self-understanding is so much a new thing as 
the availability of the technology to make and circulate the recordings is. It also bears 
the question of whether there is ever an audience as a group of individuals who feel 
completely bound to that place and moment of performance. 
                                            
9
 This phantasmic being does not mean that either audiences or publics are ineffectual. They are 
powerful organising principles, in speech, art and politics. What it does mean is that there is a gap 
between the audience as an existing collection of individuals and the “audience”. There is no 
continuity between the two, but a chasm that must be leapt. I would describe this as allegorical. 
10
 It could be said that the venue was “half-empty” by the end, but that is not the same thing. 
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What I mean to ask by that is whether the sense of “being there”, or “being part of”, 
is held by audience members (and performers) as an ideal that is often enough fallen 
short of in the face of distraction, or minds wandering elsewhere. For this reason, I 
maintain that an audience is also what Warner calls a public of discourse: “When an 
essay is read aloud as a lecture at a university, for example, the concrete audience 
of hearers understands itself as standing in for a more indefinite audience of 
readers” (2002, p.66). Despite this particular example, Warner makes it clear that he 
is not referring only to written texts. It might be that the punters holding out their 
smart phones to record what is happening are, in this gesture, figuring the ideal, 
attentive audience by proxy. The phones watch intently, catch any nuance, so their 
operators don’t have to. 
 
Warner also introduces another extremely valuable concept in considering both 
liberal democratic states and the public, something which he calls “stranger 
relationality”: “A public might almost be said to be stranger-relationality in a pure 
form, because other ways of organising strangers — nations, races, guilds — have 
manifest positive content” (2002, p.75). And earlier: “Most of the people around us 
belong to our [modern] world not directly, as kin or comrades or in any other relation 
to which we could give a name, but as strangers” (2002, p.7). 
 
Of this indefinite audience of others with whom we must identify or (I prefer the more 
suggestive phrase) stand in for, the most that we can accurately say about them is 
that they, like the larger public, are strangers. If I may take the liberty of suggesting 
another imaginary scenario: you hold a concert or exhibition which no one attends 
except your close family and friends. That is to say, no one attends whose 
relationship to you cannot be qualified in terms other than a "stranger". If no 
strangers came to hear the concert or look at the exhibition, it would be only possible 
to say that it was open to the public (which is to say something about its mode of 
address), not that the public attended. 
 
The tutelary presence of this work overall has been that of the German critic and 
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theorist, Walter Benjamin. I have used and adapted his concept of allegory11 as a 
way of looking at the ways in which ideas can form images around which a public 
can be constructed, such as the billboards around new flats, the 2012 Olympics and 
UK Public Order legislation. What I consider to be important about an allegorical 
approach is that, in contrast to the related idea of the symbol (such as could be said 
to be operative in relational art and communitarian politics), the allegorical does not 
insist on a necessary, and so to speak, organic and immediate relation between 
image/idea and concrete manifestation. In fact, it operates on the assumption of a 
radical void between them. One of the important aspects of this void is that it is 
temporal; there is no chance of reclaiming past national or personal glories, things 
which the symbol is often associated with — the flag, for instance. The things — and 
people — of the world, like stage properties in the Baroque tragic dramas which 
Benjamin used to articulate his ideas on allegory, are reduced to signs referring to 
some other order — or, in the case of the Baroque, its absence. This absence, in our 
current situation, is often filled by the price mechanism, which like a symbol, is taken 
to have a necessary connection to the phenomena it attaches to.  
 
It is important at this point to give some rough working definitions of allegory, before 
dealing with the aspects of Benjamin’s interpretation of it that will be germane to this 
study. The etymology of the term gives us its root, via Latin and Old French, as the 
Greek allēgoria, a compound of allos “other” + agoreuein “speak openly, from agora, 
public place (Barnhart, 1988). That is, to speak other12 with a hidden (or not directly 
apparent) meaning. One of the arguments I will develop in succeeding chapters is 
that the terms “public”, “public space” and “allegory” are not unrelated, that there is 
an unspoken complicity between them. The two terms, symbol and allegory, have 
often been treated as interchangeable, but there are important distinctions to be 
made here. Benjamin quotes Goethe: 
                                            
11
 This is best known from his book The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1998), but it was a lifelong 
concern for him. It also forms a structuring device in his considerations of Baudelaire, Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire (2013), in the fragments that form Central Park (1985), The Arcades Project (2002) and in 
his final work, Theses on the Philosophy of History (2013). 
12
 I think that this element of openness, a public place, is important; also, that the term “public place” 
is not treated as self-evident. Allegory shows or shows itself off; it goes where it can be seen. What it 
does not do is explain itself exactly — the showing might be an index of what is not apparent. 
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There is a great difference between a poet's seeking the particular from the 
general and his seeing the general in the particular. The former gives rise to 
allegory, where the particular serves only as an instance or example of the 
general; the latter, however, is the true nature of poetry: the expression of the 
particular without any thought of, or reference to, the general. Whoever grasps 
the particular in all its vitality also grasps the general, without being aware of it, 
or only becoming aware of it at a late stage (Goethe, quoted in OTG, p. 161). 
In his work on philosophical hermeneutics (Truth and Method), the philosopher 
Hans-Georg Gadamer discusses the symbolic-allegorical dichotomy and the 
assumed relation of the symbol to experience: 
A symbol is the coincidence of sensible appearance and suprasensible 
meaning, and this coincidence is, like the original significance of the Greek 
symbolon and its continuance in the terminology of various religious 
denominations not a subsequent co-ordination, as in the use of signs, but the 
union of two things that belong to each other […] (Gadamer, 2004, p. 64, my 
emphasis). 
This Greek symbolon was a piece of ceramic that was broken in two, the parts then 
given to separate individuals. When the broken parts were reunited along the 
fracture, it could operate as a kind of password, an identifying mark: […A] symbol is 
something which has value not only because of its content, but because it can be 
"produced"— i.e., because it is a document by means of which the members of a 
community recognize one another […]” (Ibid, p. 63, my emphasis). 
 
An example from 2015, which now looks prophetic of much to come, clearly 
illustrates this. It is the photograph tweeted by Labour MP Emily Thornberry whilst 
canvassing in Rochester during the 2014 by- election. The photograph depicted a 
terraced house with three St. George’s cross flags hung from the windows and a 
white van parked in front. It was simply captioned “Image from #Rochester” (Fig. 7). 
After a surreal media outcry, which the art critic Jonathan Jones appositely described 
as being the first time a politician has destroyed their own career by tweeting “[…]an 
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offensively implicit photograph”13, she was sacked from her position in the Shadow 
Cabinet14. The following quote from Labour MP John Mann, approving the sacking of 
Thornberry, gives a good sense of what was felt to be at stake: "[…the tweeted 
image] insults people like me, it insults the people I know — my friends and family — 
Labour voters across the country because white vans, England flags, they're Labour 
values and actually pretty routine Labour values for most of us […]" (Ibid, my 
emphasis). 
 
How either a flag or a van of whatever colour could be said to be a political “value”, 
in preference to something like an explicit commitment to equitable distribution of 
wealth and workers’ ownership of the means of production, is a mystery that was not 
broached during this whole episode15. The picture along with Thornberry’s intentions 
in posting it were interpreted by much of the press as being clear in its intent and 
referents, a view which was adopted as a weapon against Labour by UKIP and the 
Conservative party who were also contesting the by-election. David Cameron 
described the tweet as "completely appalling […] sneering at people who work hard, 
are patriotic and love their country […]". Not to be outdone, Nigel Farage, leader of 
UKIP said "The Labour Party hate the concept of Englishness […]”16.  
 
In my view this absurd episode illustrates the difference between the concept of 
                                            
13
 Jones, J., November 21, 2014 - last update, “The Emily Thornberry Affair Proves It: US-Style 
Culture Wars Have Come To Britain” [Homepage of The Guardian], [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/21/emily-thornberry-tweet-us-style-culture-wars- 
identity [June 2, 2015] 
14
 BBC News, November 21, 2014 - last update, “Labour's Emily Thornberry quits over 'snobby' tweet” 
- BBC News [Homepage of BBC news], [Online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics- 
30139832 [September 15, 2015] 
15
 This rhetorical relationship, common enough in political discourse (and advertising) is a 
synecdoche, a means of representation as described by Kenneth Burke in his Four Master Tropes 
(1969): 
The ‘noblest synecdoche’, the perfect paradigm or prototype for all lesser usages, is found in 
metaphysical doctrines proclaiming the identity of’ ‘microcosm’ and ‘macrocosm.’ In such 
doctrines, where the individual is treated as a replica of the universe, and vice versa, we have 
the ideal synecdoche, since microcosm is related to macrocosm as part to whole, and either 
the whole can represent the part or the part can represent the whole.[…] A similar 
synecdochic form is present in all theories of political representation, where some part of the 
social body (either traditionally established, or elected, or coming into authority by revolution) 
is held to be ‘representative’ of the society as a whole. The pattern is essential to Rousseau's 
theory of the volonté générale, for instance (Burke, 1969, p. 508). 
Burke points out that this also holds true of artistic representation. 
16
 BBC News, November 21, 2014 - last update, “Labour's Emily Thornberry quits over 'snobby' tweet 
- BBC News [Homepage of BBC news], [Online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics- 
30139832 [September 15, 2015]. Obviously, what the hated “concept of Englishness” consists of is 
never specified. 
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symbol and that of allegory in some important ways. Thornberry was held to be guilty 
of knowing what she meant; that working from a position of generalised contempt or 
antipathy for the working class, she sought out those signifiers that, her critics 
asserted, best characterised it. Bringing these things together — the flags, the van 
— in one image was evidence of her ironic intent and the contempt that drove it, 
although it was a photograph of something that existed and not her own fabrication. 
She was held to be plainly engaging in “other-speech”. On the other hand, those like 
Mann would claim that those things were merely the unremarkable and routine 
particularities of working-class life. Thornberry was guilty of an allegorical slur, her 
image embodied a judgement that, because it was considered to operate from a 
universalising perspective, was inauthentic. The assumed irony in her inclusion of 
these figures was then held as evidence of her bad faith; she, the metropolitan visitor 
to middle England, had created her meanings from the top down. 
 
Mann’s equation of working-class life with flags and vans is an assertion of their 
being symbolic; in Gadamer’s formulation, it is their belonging to each other. Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, echoing Goethe, emphasised the symbols’ relationship to lived 
experience, characterised by its necessary partaking "[…] of the reality which it 
renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in 
that unity of which it is the representative […]"(Coleridge, 1852; quoted in Tambling, 
2010, p. 78). 
 
Benjamin compares the allegorist with one of his other recurrent, emblematic figures, 
the collector. Whilst the collector attempts to achieve completion and arranges 
objects in temporal sequence and in relation to their affinities in an attempt to create, 
or recreate, a whole: […] let him discover just a single piece missing, and everything 
he's collected remains a patchwork, which is what things are for allegory from the 
beginning17. I have adopted this “patchwork” as a structuring principle in accord with 
his method of the treatise (Benjamin, 1998, p. 28) — a dance that constantly 
approaches and moves away from its subject, tracing out a space and movement 
that articulates (that is, simultaneously joins and separates) the fragments that it 
                                            
17
 Arcades Project, Benjamin, 2002, p. H4a,1. All references to material found in the Convolutes of the 
Arcades Project will be cited in this way, according to the numerical designation that the editors gave 
them. 
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moves between. 
 
I have used a quotation from Benjamin as an epigraph to this introduction and 
therefore to this work as a whole. It stands as mottos once did when placed on the 
lintel above a door. One enters the space through the frame of the description or 
admonition, under its seal. Beyond it is a patchwork of fragments. There are the 
contrastingly valorised “national” bodies of sleek Olympic athletes and the abjected 
bodies18 of the long-term unemployed. There is the much-maligned form of public 
housing with the shiny (unaffordable) vistas in architects’ visualisations of the future 
city. There is the repetition-compulsion of addiction19 that reaches into the past, set 
next to the sunny future-orientation of the relational citizen. And then, there is the 
place that I have named the Bike Cemetery, the centre of this patchwork that holds it 
together. 
 
Benjamin’s work over his lifetime was in large part concerned with avoiding the 
supposed release of tension in the totalising solution of aufheben. His emphasis, in 
his theory and criticism, was on fragmentation and incompletion. I would argue that 
relational aesthetics aims at sublation, the terms individual and collective are raised, 
gathered and cancelled, not in a notion of “public” so much as in one of “community”. 
 
Invocatio of the public: The concept of evocation, in relation to the concept of the 
public referred to in my title, should be elucidated further. Is the public something 
that is amenable to, or in need of, evocation? The word is now used to describe a 
kind of poetic association often triggered in someone by a particular stimulus, but not 
always, an artwork. A poem or piece of music may evoke a particular place or 
emotion, for example. An event may evoke memories of something from the past. 
Smells and tastes are also powerfully evocative. A famous example is the smell and 
taste of Marcel Proust’s madeleine which led him on to thousands of pages of 
remembrance of his own experiences that he had previously believed to be 
irrevocably lost to him. In all these cases, the act or experience of evocation is to 
                                            
18
 See Tyler, Revolting Bodies (2013). 
19
 As Mariana Valverde points out, the appearance of “addiction” as a recognisable condition has 
been coterminous with liberal democracy, and its discourse traces anxieties around the autonomy of 
the subject that liberal democracy is ostensibly founded upon. See Mariana Valverde Diseases of the 
Will (1998) and Helen Keane’s combatively titled, What’s Wrong With Addiction? (2002). 
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bring something otherwise absent into the present consciousness of those for whom 
it is evoked. It has connotations of a particularly personal and subjective experience. 
This can be a private memory or imaginary, or a particular place, or an affective 
state. 
 
The etymology of the word shows that along with the Latin vocare, meaning “to call”, 
the e prefix is an adaptation of the more common ex — “out”, as in “ex-
communicate” or “ex-pel”. Evocation is the “calling out” into visibility of something 
otherwise hidden or lost, inaccessible. Its historical roots tie it to the ancient magical 
ritual of evocatio20, which is far removed from any contemporary sense of personal 
remembrance or private epiphany. It belonged to the practice of war, as conducted 
by the Roman state. This was a process by which the gods of an enemy would be 
enticed or cajoled out of their shrines in the hostile city to take up new residence in 
Rome. Without the patronage of their resident god or gods, they would be unlikely to 
win in battle. The ancient historian Livy describes it happening circa 396 BCE, at the 
siege of the Etruscan city of Veii. Prior to the final assault, the general Marcus Furius 
Camillus entreated the goddess Juno publicly and out loud to abandon the city and 
return to Rome with the victorious army, where she was promised a new, 
magnificent shrine: 
 
[…] Queen Juno, who now dwellest in Veii, I beseech, that thou wouldst follow 
us, after our victory, to the City which is ours and which will soon be thine, 
where a temple worthy of thy majesty will receive thee (Livy, Roberts, 1905, pp. 
5:21).  
It worked, and the city fell without the protection of the goddess. This process may 
have been aided by the tunnel the Romans had dug beneath its wall, but Livy at 
least was clear on the efficacy of the ritual. He describes the Veientines as unaware 
that “[…] some of the gods had already been invited to their share in the spoils, 
whilst others, called upon in prayer to leave their city, were looking to new abodes in 
                                            
20
 For an erudite discussion of this practice and of the “secret name” of Rome, concealed to protect 
the empire against hostile use of the same ritual, see: Evocatio Numinum of Besieged Cities (1868) 
by the pseudonymous “W”. 
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the temples of their foes […]” (Ibid, p. 5:21). After the successful conclusion of the 
siege, there was a plenitude of massacre and plunder; one assumes that Juno was 
amongst the trophies paraded through the streets of Rome in the triumphal 
procession, to be deposited in her new temple built with the spoils. She was called 
out and away from an assumed periphery to the centre. 
 
Evocatio, or as it is now, evocation, has theft or misappropriation as part of its 
history. It certainly has its roots in struggles over power. It can be seen in the 
medieval practice of “translation” of the relics of saints — stealing them from one 
state or city to take them to another, which acquired the blessings that their presence 
conferred, and not coincidentally, the money from eager pilgrims that they attracted. 
The modern period has not lost its desire to capture the numinous as a trophy, 
though it is not now housed within human remains. The Louvre, the Hermitage, the 
British Museum and many other art galleries of international repute, are stocked with 
the spoils of victory, carried back from outposts of empire, sieges and battlefields. 
Walter Benjamin used this image of the victor’s “triumphal procession” bearing the 
plunder of “cultural treasures” (1992, p. 256) to describe a particular version of 
history (and by extension, the idea of historical progress itself). 
 
I would argue that the aura of the numinous that surrounded gods and goddesses, 
the relics of saints and more latterly works of art21 that made them all targets for 
abduction or theft, has to some large extent come to surround the idea of the public. 
By that I mean the idea of the public as something different from an aggregate of 
individuals — an idea that is taken to legitimise the workings of democracy as it is 
supposedly on its behalf and through its mandate that governments operate. This 
aura possessed by artworks and ritual objects was described by Walter Benjamin as: 
“’a unique phenomenon of a distance however close it may be’" (2013, n.243). 
Elsewhere, he equated this spatial distance with a temporal remoteness that draws 
the beholder away in fruitless pursuit22. The idea of the public is surrounded by such 
a nimbus, infinitely distant and yet perpetually present as a horizon, for example, the 
second world war invoked as civic togetherness and self-sacrifice as a parallel to 
                                            
21
 See Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (2013) and Celeste 
Olalquiaga’s The Artificial Kingdom: A Treasury of the Kitsch Experience (1998) for more on the aura 
and the work of art. 
22
 See Benjamin’s Some Motifs in Baudelaire. 
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leaving the EU. 
 
The government and state machinery of liberal democracies, such as the UK, 
purportedly gain legitimacy from the vox populi (see Dolar, 2006) that is manifested 
through elections and constantly refreshed through ubiquitous public opinion polls 
that vindicate or decry particular policies or parties. However, this public, with its 
opinion, does not exist prior to or independently of these exercises that supposedly 
capture and present it. Democratic political discourse has always been a struggle 
over the nature of what constitutes the public good, but less obvious have been 
attempts to designate who, or what, that public is. 
 
E-voke, or in-voke? It is useful to contrast this evocation with an apparently related 
term. Invocation and evocation both have the same component vocare, meaning to 
call. Voice is present in both, implying someone doing the calling, for, or in front of, 
others. Submerged in the word is the ghost of a physical situation in which speech 
happened. That is to say, the ghost of a social situation lingers in both. In his Orality 
and Literacy (2002), Walter J. Ong contends that the practice of writing — and even 
more so the printed word — profoundly affects our relationship to language, and 
therefore, the world and others in it. Ong plausibly claims that oral cultures, as 
opposed to what he calls “typographic and chirographic” (Ong, 2002, p. 33) cultures 
cannot perceive the word as anything other than sound, inseparable from both the 
voice that speaks them and the situation in which they are spoken. For the vast 
majority of human history, people have had no means of recording and replaying 
sound, so the hearing of words has meant, by necessity, being in close physical 
proximity to the speaker. Words are not divorced from the context of their speaking 
in oral cultures, in the way that they are for those with a long practice of reading. For 
us, reading (and writing), words have become “signs”; this has become possible 
through the visible marks we use to create them (Ibid, pp. 73–5). The letters stand in 
for a sound — the word — which, in its turn, is also a substitute for the thing that it 
denotes. I find Ong’s argument intriguing and persuasive. My own experience as 
someone with dyspraxia (which meant that I couldn’t read or write until I was nine) 
led me to think of words very differently than as being merely signs or labels, though 
I recognise that my experience is still vastly divergent from that of someone living in 
an oral-based culture. Where I disagree with Ong is that I believe that the original 
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speech situation remains as a deep stratum within language; even in a typographic 
culture, it has not been entirely eroded by internalisation of the technologies of 
writing and printing. These strata are available for use; they seem to constitute actual 
bodies, real entities that are invoked within them. 
 
This speech situation can sometimes be re-presented in a reified form as a 
recouping of something lost to modernity, such as in the conventions of lyric poetry, 
which assumes a speaker directly communicating with a listener whilst eliding the 
mechanisms of publishing market and the printed page itself (see Warner 2002, pp. 
79–82); or the current vogue for “intimate” performance art and theatre, which is 
predicated on a re-instatement of social intimacy that has purportedly been lost. 
 
To invoke is to "call upon". To evoke is to "call out" (of hiding, concealment). Invoking 
the power of God, a document or law, is to call upon something which is a 
continuous force that may be held in abeyance at that particular place and time until 
invoked. To evoke a place, time or emotion is to call something out. Whether out of 
hiding, or amnesia, or distance in time and space, the object of evocation is 
otherwise inaccessible. There is a disparity between the two in terms of power. Both 
the power of that which is called out or upon, and the power exercised by the one 
who does the calling. The continuous presence and potency of the law that can be 
evoked, for example, is a different matter to the tenuous stuff of memory. In both 
cases, the act requires mastery of a form. In the case of invocation, it is the form of 
words, such as that used by a police officer in arresting someone, or a priest 
performing a marriage ceremony. 
 
Invocation implies an instantaneous effect from a force at hand. The judge 
sentences the accused, and from that moment they are consigned to the workings of 
the penal system. The priest declares the couple married, and they suddenly are. 
The availability of the power invoked is such that it is immediately there. Evocation 
implies distance or depth; the evoked comes from far away, from another city to 
Rome, from deep in a personal unconscious memory. As Walter Benjamin described 
it, the aura is the sense of distance. 
 
Evoking “the public” is something no one can do with certitude or unquestionable 
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authority, but for it to work — be plausible — it must present itself as an invocation23, 
a process that requires both certitude and authority. The invocation of the public 
assumes that they are at hand, presently existing and available to be called upon. 
But as the etymology of allegory suggests, “speaking other” in public, to or as the 
public, is unavoidable; even more so when speaking for the public. 
 
In the prologue to his forbiddingly dense book, The Origin of German Tragic Drama24 
(1998).  Benjamin implicitly defends the way that his text seems to circle its 
ostensible subject, not least with his 29-page methodological prologue, returning to it 
after forays into apparently other territories, such as melancholia and alchemy. 
Adopting the same approach on the treatise as a form, I will trace out what he 
described as a constellation. This is a series of fragments that are articulated — by 
which I mean both joined and held apart in tension — by a series of trajectories that 
repeatedly pass over the same ground, starting and ending at slightly different 
points. These take the form of dance steps that in their paths and pauses mark out 
the space of their presentation, this ground being a real site — a piece of waste 
ground that I call the Bike Cemetery — and the fragments of images and recent UK 
history which I associate with it. As Benjamin puts it, a treatise does not so much 
proffer a proof, or advance an argument, as mark out a territory. It establishes a field 
of enquiry, a topic. The Bike Cemetery is marked; a stranger came at some point 
long ago and left behind texts and collaged images on a wall. A constellation was 
formed from these texts and images: the rubbish that was dumped there, the sound 
of traffic from the nearby motorway and the absence and unknowability of the 
bricoleur. 
 
In a work devoted to the critique of ideas of naïve self-presence and self-similarity, a 
unified structure would perhaps seem to be short-sighted at best, and at worst to 
invalidate its own thesis through its form. I have long had a fascination for pictorial 
emblem  books from the sixteenth and seventeenth century, combinations of 
                                            
23
 A tiresome and disingenuous construction that has recently come back into vogue is “The People” 
(capitalised). The results of the recent election in America and the referendum in the UK were 
apparently unambiguous victories for “The People”. 
24
 This book was itself written as Benjamin’s Habilitation dissertation, a necessary part of gaining a 
professorship in the German university system. He didn’t pass; in fact, his examiners at Frankfurt 
“advised him to withdraw it from consideration rather than face the ignominy of an official rejection” 
(Gilloch, 2002). 
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mysterious images (see Fig.6, Fig. 15) purportedly elucidated by text spiky with 
references to classical literature and the Bible25. They belong to the category of 
allegory26, and so require some hermeneutic labour to decode — if they can be 
decoded at all. Geffrey Whitney, the author of a late sixteenth-century English 
emblem book Whitney’s Choice of Emblemes, gives the etymology and meaning of 
the term emblem thus: 
 
Which worde being […] in Englishe as To set in, or to put in: properlie ment by 
suche figures, or workes as are wroughte in plate, or in stones in the 
pavementes, or on the waules, or suche like, for the adorning of the place: 
havinge some wittie devise expressed with cunning woorkemanship, 
somethinge obscure to be perceived at the first, whereby, when with further 
consideration it is understood, it maie the greater delighte the behoulder. 
(Whitney, 1586. Original emphasis and spelling.) 
 
The word denotes something apparently heterogenous, both in facture and meaning 
to the setting, or ground, into which it is put. 
 
Bainard Cowan, in a paper on Benjamin’s use of allegory, described the 
characteristics of a treatise: 
                                            
25
 John Manning, in The Emblem (2002) points out that at all times and places these books varied 
widely in format as relates to the quantity of text, whether verse or prose, whether a brief motto or 
caption was used and in fact whether an image was always necessarily present or not (Manning, 
2002, pp. 18–21). The supposed originator of the genre, Andrea Alcatio, produced a manuscript of 
poems with no illustrations at all and no apparent desire for there to be any (Manning, 2002, p. 48). 
There was variety in terms of subject, as well. Emblems could be pagan or classical in their tendency, 
devotional, or erotic. 
26
 As Manning points out, the emblem book is itself so various in form that there is no adequate 
definition to be founded on grounds their specific content so much as a particular hermeneutic attitude 
— that the world must be deciphered. Seventeenth-century poet Francis Quarles articulated what was 
a widespread view of the matter in a foreword to his Quarle’s Emblemes: 
Embleme is but a silent parable. […] Before the knowledge of letters God was known by 
Hieroglyphicks: And indeed, what are the Heavens, the Earth, nay every Creature, but 
Hieroglyphicks and Emblemes of His Glory? (Quarles, 1658) 
There is also, perhaps a sense that deciphering these hieroglyphics required a measure of contempt 
for the perceptible world. Quarle’s Invocation at the beginning of the book exhorts his (and the 
reader’s) soul to: 
Cast off these dangling plummets, that so clog  
Thy laboring heart, which gropes in this dark fog  
Of dungeon-earth; let flesh and blood forbear  
To stop thy flight, till this base world appear 
A thin blew Landskip […] (Quarles, 1658) 
Through the means of the text and images to so transcend the world and flesh that it appears as itself 
an image. 
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Treatises are especially adapted to represent truth because they lack 
conclusiveness; they "treat of" a subject. Their method is not proof but 
representation. Method itself, within the form of the treatise, is not a privileged 
path to truth but something approaching a ritual form: it is "continually making 
new beginnings" in contemplating its object, thus resembling the multi-levelled 
method27 of allegorical interpretation (Cowan, 1981). 
The phrase “something approaching a ritual form” is both appropriate and resonant. 
It gestures to a sense that ritual is something that must be repeated, whether under 
pressure of individual, internal, compulsion or public ceremonial demands. It begins 
again in each iteration, whilst its form maintains the connection with previous 
iterations by which it must be recognised. In many senses it creates a link across 
time; this is especially clear in commemorative rituals such as Remembrance 
Sunday or the Thanksgiving meal in the United States. It also literally creates its own 
space; if there is not a space given in which it happens, such as a church for 
example. The movements and gestures of those officiating or participating 
demarcate the space of its happening, as in the old English tradition of “beating the 
bounds”, or “Gang days”, where a procession of parishioners led by their vicar visited 
in succession the boundary markers of the parish, reading prayers or preaching on 
the way. This regular return via circumnavigation investigates and establishes the 
boundaries of the topos (place); it demarcates; it is not coincidental, I believe, that 
we get the term “topic” — the subject, the bone of contention — from “place”28. 
 
In describing why he has not succumbed to the impetus towards “system” in 
theoretical (he uses the related, but not identical, term “philosophical”) writing, 
Benjamin uses a spatial simile, the manner in which a mosaic creates its image: 
 
                                            
27
 The “multiple levels” here referred to by Cowan in Benjamin’s work are not as strictly formalised 
as those applied in the medieval Church for scriptural interpretation, which are enumerated by 
Angus Fletcher as 1: literal; the letter 2: allegory; what you understand 3: moral; what you should do 
4: anagogy; prophecy, eschatology. Sometimes there were more, but this was the basic scheme 
(Fletcher 2006). Fletcher also points out that these can ultimately be reduced to two — 1: the literal 
(by no means straightforward itself); 2: every other level. 
28
 In: R.K. BARNHART, ed, Chambers Dictionary of Etymology. London: Chambers, 1988. 
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Just as mosaics preserve their majesty despite their fragmentation into 
capricious particles, so philosophical contemplation is not lacking in 
momentum. Both are made up of the distinct and the disparate; and nothing 
could bear more powerful testimony to the transcendent force of the sacred 
image and the truth itself. The value of fragments of thought is all the greater 
the less direct their relationship to the underlying idea, and the brilliance of the 
representation depends as much on this value as the brilliance of the mosaic 
does on the quality of the glass paste (OGT, 1998, pp. 28–9). 
Benjamin’s insight points to something vital that is at play in the necessity for the 
reader to articulate the fragments: seeing them as totality whilst they are 
simultaneously held apart in tension, as with the experience of regarding a mosaic. 
That is, the necessity of this hermeneutic labour is important, as an integral part of 
the experience of “meaning”. He uses a tellingly somatic (and performative) 
metaphor for this — “[…t]ruth, [is] bodied forth in the dance of represented ideas 
[…]”(Ibid, p. 29, my emphasis). In fact, he insists on reading and thought, not entirely 
figuratively, as embodied experience, that of moving away and returning (to the 
original object), of “pausing for breath” (Ibid, p. 28). 
 
"Representation"29, in Benjamin's estimation, was the proper method for the 
philosophical treatise. That is, rather than presenting its subject in such a way that it 
can be grasped (in an important sense a-historically) as present in its completeness, 
the treatise form makes a series of approaches or feints towards it, coming 
constantly back to its subject before moving away again along another line of 
thought30. It interrupts itself, pauses, just as a dance might, and in this patterned 
movement creates varying figures. 
 
Benjamin maintained that the method itself represented31 “truth” (admittedly, a 
troublesome concept), in that truth cannot exist apart from its representation. It 
represents itself and cannot be contemplated (does not present) outside this 
                                            
29
 The German for this is darstellung, which can mean, variously, picture, account, portrayal and 
performance.  
30
 Method is a digression. Representation as digression — such is the methodological nature of the 
treatise (OGT, p. 28). 
31
 Or “bodies forth”; it performs. 
37 
 
representation. Benjamin defines truth as that which, unlike knowledge, cannot be 
accumulated or exchanged. Knowledge could be described as an array of empirical 
facts, a list of verifiable statements about a subject: “For knowledge, method is a way 
of acquiring its object — even by creating it in the consciousness; for truth it is self-
representation, and is therefore immanent in it as form” (OGT, 1998, pp. 29-30). 
  
This is intended as Truth32 in the Platonist sense33. He states that: “[…]the object of 
knowledge is not identical with the truth […and this was…] one of the profoundest 
intentions of philosophy in its original form, the Platonic theory of ideas” (OGT, 30). 
The task of the philosopher, according to Benjamin, shared with the artist a 
commitment to representation (of the world of ideas) (Ibid, p. 32).  
 
The idea (for example, an artistic genre such as Trauerspeil is an idea in this sense, 
as is the term public) is revealed as a configuration of fragments that are gathered 
together by concepts, “[…] ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and 
exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the 
configuration of these elements” (Ibid, p.34). The concept acts as a halfway point 
between idea and the disparate “concrete elements” which it gathers up. 
 
Here, we return to the image of the mosaic. This configuration is described as a 
“constellation”, as stars are arranged into the signs of the zodiac:  
Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars. This means, in the first place, 
that they are neither their concepts nor their laws (Ibid, p. 34).  
There is no direct, causal relationship between the idea that is the constellation of 
                                            
32
 Although Benjamin does not capitalise the work, he does briefly discuss the practise of capitalising 
abstract nouns, which he claims was an innovation of German letters in the seventeenth century: 
[It is] the disjunctive, atomizing principle of the allegorical approach which is asserted here. 
[…] In its individual parts fragmented language has ceased merely to serve the process of 
communication, and as a new-born object acquires a dignity equal to that of gods, rivers, 
virtues and similar natural forms which fuse into the allegorical (OGT, p. 208). 
Abstract entities were given the status of proper names, and to that extent, physical being. Truth is 
bodied forth in the arrangement of fragments. 
33
 There is not the scope here for a digression into Platonism, suffice it to say that what Benjamin 
describes here as truth, or elsewhere “the idea”, is obviously not of the same order as a positivistic 
ranging of facts, nor is it what we might call a theory. I think that the images that Benjamin uses make 
it clear that truth is more of an embodied experience, like the pattern of a dance for the dancers. 
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Orion, for example, and the stars that make it up. The red supergiant star Betelgeuse 
that demarcates the position of Orion’s shoulder is not changed in any way by its 
placement within the figure of a huntsman as opposed to, say, the fish-tailed goat of 
Capricorn. 
 
The root of our word “topic”, meaning subject or bone of contention, is the Greek 
topos; meaning “place”. An agonic element still ghosts the word, such as is 
described by Walter J. Ong in Orality and Literacy (2002) as a characteristic element 
of oral cultures.  
 
Writing fosters abstractions that disengage knowledge from the arena where 
human beings struggle with one another. It separates the knower from the 
known. By keeping knowledge embedded in the human lifeworld, orality 
situates knowledge within a context of struggle (Ong, 2002, p. 43). 
The subject of discussion was, first of all, the place in which the discussion was to 
occur. Thereafter, it became merged with the subject itself. The discussion, the thing 
to be argued, contended, was also a place, a patch of ground to be contested34 — a 
topic upon which at least one of the contenders would endeavour to stand their 
ground. Ong maintains that writing, or the interiorisation of writing into modes of 
thought, abstracts the contending parties from the somatic, from face-to-face 
confrontation, both on and for, physical, rather than abstract ground. I will trace and 
retrace my steps across the ground of the Bike Cemetery, which is the territory on 
which I have chosen to stand. I have stated that I think that Ong overstates the 
erasure of the original contextual elements within speech by writing and print. They 
remain within the words, the tropes they form (trope; meaning “to turn”, something 
that only a body in space can do) as a residue of ancient rhetorical practice. 
 
One could stage this topos thusly: 
 
And what does it mean to stand, just as I am figuratively standing before you now, 
                                            
34
 Commonly used arguments in Roman rhetoric were loci communes, or “common-places”. We still 
unflatteringly describe an argument or turn of phrase as “commonplace”. See Ibid, pp. 107–8. 
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dear reader? Perhaps more than figuratively, our language, even in written form, 
contains strata comprising of an imaginary speech situation, an imaginary origin. Do I 
stand before you? Did I get here first, or did we arrive at the same time? The word for 
sign once referred to a banner, an emblematic image that soldiers followed (Ibid, pp. 
73–4). Perhaps you have been here, waiting for me to arrive, which finally I did, at the 
right time; that is, the time that you turned this page or scrolled down the screen. Do 
we coincide? That is unlikely; I must have written for you to read, I may be somewhere 
else entirely by now. These are “my words”, presented under the seal of my name, but 
have I left them behind like discarded objects, or do I still speak in them? This implies 
that these letters hold my voice, or rather, that these letters evoke some internal 
voice of your own. My voice is gone from me the moment that I speak; it exhausts 
itself in its saying. My arrival is untimely, then, and yet I arrive on time, just as you 
read this. I speak, now, whilst you hear it from somewhere else, yet before you. This 
disjointed and untimely place35 that I wish to tempt you away to is our present, 
between the heaps of dead commodities and the endless traffic, where someone has 
at some other time, left messages to no one. 
 
There is a question I must explore, a thesis that I must justify. That is why we meet 
here. In writing “you”, as I have, I am obviously alluding to one of those strata 
belonging to a situation of face to face speech. As if you were here, as if I were. At the 
same time, “you” will understand that it is a generality. “We” work together on that 
assumption. As I stand here before you and these signs that I have placed here evoke 
your internal voice to speak my words, I am not addressing “you”. You may put down 
these pages or turn off the computer and leave it for someone else to continue 
reading. “You” will still be there to be addressed36, and I will continue to do so. We 
work together on that assumption. If “you” felt that I addressed myself to you in your 
particularity this would be an entirely different kind of text entirely. My stance would 
be quite different, my gestures more specific and less extravagant; we would be 
nearer, after all, and things would not need to be signalled so emphatically. 
Transforming things into signs is both what allegory does — its technique — and what 
it is about — its content (Cowan, 1981). The singular debasement of things through 
their signification, something characteristic of seventeenth-century allegory, 
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 See: Agamben, What is the Contemporary? (2009). 
36
 This point comes from Warner, 2002, p. 64. 
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corresponds to the singular debasement of things through their price as commodities 
(Benjamin, 2002, p. 22). 
 
Melancholia: As Bainard Cowan puts it, for Benjamin, allegory  
[…] is pre-eminently a kind of experience. A paraphrase of his exposition might 
begin by stating that allegory arises from an apprehension of the world as no 
longer permanent, as passing out of being: a sense of its transitoriness, an 
intimation of mortality […] (Cowan, 1981).  
It is a mode of expression that springs from crisis whilst also expressing the crisis 
that could reasonably be called “history”. Fletcher describes the outcome of the 
process that entails first, recognition of the world as fragmented, and then a brooding 
attention directed upon the fragments: […] allegory is a mix of making and reading37 
combined in one mode, its nature is to produce a ruminative self-reflexivity (Fletcher, 
2006).  
 
It might make sense to say that rather than specifically arising from a sense of crisis, 
allegorical consciousness becomes aware of itself as such at times of crisis. In other 
times, meaning might seem to be easily accessible; those meanings generated 
seem to fit the objects they are attached to easily, as if the join was invisible. The 
mode of interpretation, or rather the legitimating structure of ideas towards which it 
tends, changes: the “[…] system of interpretation keeps on changing its court of 
appeal, usually slowly, but at times fast” (Ibid). The crisis that gives rise to allegorical 
consciousness is, in itself, allegorical, concerning as it does the attribution of 
meaning through validating structures of power, whether conscious or not: “Allegory 
becomes appropriate where the question of how to read, and the necessity of doing 
so, becomes prominent” (Tambling, 2009, p.101, my emphasis). 
 
Benjamin stresses the importance of melancholy to this consciousness that sees a 
radical rupture between world and the meanings conventionally ascribed to it. This 
chasm, whilst it has probably always existed, becomes urgently explicit at certain 
                                            
37
 “Reading” here should be understood in a sense that is applicable to all mediums and phenomena, 
not just texts. 
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times38 of political upheaval and crisis. In the case of German Baroque Trauerspiel, 
he attributes their allegorical nature to the effects of the Protestant Reformation39. 
The influence of Lutheranism which had an “antinomic” relationship to the everyday 
world (Ibid, p.138), led to a melancholy in the playwrights of the mourning plays. The 
repudiation of the previously-held value of good works to individual salvation, which 
must now be achieved via personal faith alone, led to a situation where, according to 
Samuel Weber: 
[…] human being and society [are placed] in a situation that is as intolerable as 
it is insoluble: it exalts the situation of the individual while subjecting that 
individual to an uncertain destiny, alone before God, unable to influence the 
future by action, dependent upon a faith whose status remains fundamentally 
opaque (2004). 
The “works” denigrated included, of course, the rites of the Catholic Church which 
assisted towards salvation but also provided “[…] a guarantee of an orderly, 
transparent relationship of immanence to transcendence […]” (Ibid), a link which 
mediated between the acts of an individual and their meaning. This meaning — 
existing in the hereafter — was assumed to be eternal and unchangeable, unlike 
secular meanings which were subject to history, change and decay. Left to their own 
devices, with no longer any direct connection between themselves (either individually 
or collectively) and the divine except the single, slender and mysterious thread of 
faith, the subject was trapped in a world fallen into fragments and arbitrary 
meanings. Rather than sharing some of the divine nature, at least in potential, the 
human was as much an animal doomed to decay and death as any other. 
Melancholy “[…]is the most genuinely creaturely of the contemplative impulses […]” 
(OGT, 1995, p.146), trapped in a situation that is, in Weber’s phrase, “unworkable”, 
yet must nonetheless be worked. 
 
Benjamin describes the melancholic loss of attachments to the everyday as 
something that leads the sufferer to see the usual accoutrements of active life — 
                                            
38
 OGT itself was written by Benjamin in the late 1920s, the period of hyper-inflation of the currency 
and attempted putsches by both fascist and communist groups against the Weimar government. 
39
 Like the term “tragic” in present day usage — and with greater justification — the word Trauerspiel 
was applied in the seventeenth century to dramas and to historical events alike” (OGT, p. 63). 
42 
 
white vans or flags, for example — as becoming mysteriously emblematic in the 
Baroque period: “[…] the most simple object appears to be a symbol of some 
enigmatic wisdom because it lacks any natural, creative relationship to us […]” 
(OGT, 1998, p.140); one is tempted to say almost like a stage property, or a 
commodity for that matter40. 
 
I believe it is not going too far to assert that there is a contemporary parallel to the 
affective situation of (to use an anachronism) widespread depressive illness related 
to the Reformation emphasis on an ultimately unquantifiable and individualised 
personal faith as the sole means of salvation as Benjamin described it. This is an 
affective attitude that, borrowing a phrase from David Smail, Mark Fisher describes 
in an essay from 2014 as “magical voluntarism”41, a faith that is the inverted form 
and purported remedy for the depression that is becoming increasingly prevalent in 
the contemporary UK42 and further afield. This is, it seems clear to me, the result of 
the current economic and social upheaval. 
[…‘M]agical voluntarism’ — the belief that it is within every individual’s power to 
make themselves whatever they want to be — is the dominant ideology and 
unofficial religion of contemporary capitalist society, pushed by reality TV 
‘experts’ and business gurus as much as by politicians. Magical voluntarism is 
both an effect and a cause of the currently historically low level of class 
consciousness. It is the flipside of depression — whose underlying conviction is 
that we are all uniquely responsible for our own misery and therefore deserve it 
(Fisher, 2014). 
Fisher points out that the inculcation of this “magical voluntarism” is also the aim of 
numerous schemes, some run directly by the Department of Work and Pensions and 
others by out-sourced providers, aimed at unemployed and under-employed benefit 
claimants in the UK (see also Friedli, Stearn, 2015). These schemes are purportedly 
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 See Tambling, 2009, pp. 103–4 for a brief discussion of Marx and allegory in the theory of 
alienation and the commodity. 
41
 Fisher describes Smail as “[…] a therapist, but one who makes the question of power central to his 
practice […]” (Fisher, 2014). 
42
 According to the Chief Medical Officer of the UK’s Annual Report in 2014, the press release 
detailing which has the questionable title “Employment is Good for Mental Health”, “working days” lost 
to the economy (the default unit of measurement it seems, for so much and ever more) was up 24% 
since 2009 (Department of Health, 2014). 
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aimed at creating a state of “job readiness” in their recipients, described by Friedli 
and Stearne as “[…] a good but not particular attitude to work in the abstract and a 
capacity for adaptability that has no object” (Ibid). The foregoing description gives an 
idea of what is required from job-seekers; because the work being prepared for is 
abstract, the subject must be willing to submit to becoming infinitely adaptable 
(“adaptability that has no object”) in order to accommodate themselves to whatever 
the market may require, whenever it may require it and for however long. 
 
“The aim is not a job, but the generic skill, attribute or disposition of employability” 
(Friedli, Stearn, 2015). A lack of work becomes treated as the result of a personal 
moral failing of the subject, something deficient in their make-up, rather than the 
result of the vagaries of late capitalism, thus neatly depoliticising the issue43. The 
jobless are lacking in those “[…] valued characteristics familiar from positive 
psychology, the wellbeing industry and public health — ‘conﬁdence, optimism, self-
efﬁcacy, aspiration’ […]” and will be taught to demonstrate them. The last quality in 
the list that Friedli and Stearn provide — “aspiration” is worth some examination. 
Like faith, it requires no visible outward signs but does impose a particular 
temporality. 
 
David Cameron's stated wish (or aspiration) to build an "aspiration nation" can be 
placed on the same level as his predecessor Tony Blair's mission of securing 
"opportunity for all"44; both have the look of justification by faith. Aspiration and 
opportunity are not goods that can be distributed or re-distributed; they denote more 
a generalised ambition that people are provided with (or bullied into) what in 
themselves are generalised ambitions. Unleashing aspiration means very little more 
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 In a series of first-hand accounts from individuals dealing with the DWP’s demands for particular 
affect and the use of the psy-disciplines to inculcate it, the following best encapsulates its full, sinister 
implications: 
My ‘advisor’ said I needed to see a psychologist because I was tearful and anxious after 
having my JSA cut for 4 weeks despite having a young child to look after by myself. When I 
said I did not trust anyone who ﬁnds it acceptable to starve others as a punishment, he told 
me that I was paranoid and again, needed to see a psychologist. (Buckner, M. Quoted in 
Friedli, Stearn, 2015). 
44
 From a speech in 2002 (Blair 2002) as a more or less random example; the phrase, or very near 
equivalents, was very popular with New Labour. In this context, an ambition to distribute “opportunity” 
is to be seen as a corrective to previous Labour policies which concentrated on “equality of outcome”. 
As Norman Fairclough pointed out in his study of New Labour language: 
[T]he meaning of 'social justice' has also shifted through the omission of 'equality' in the sense 
of equality of outcomes (entailing redistribution of wealth), and its substitution by 'fairness' and 
'inclusion' (Fairclough, 2002, p. 46). 
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than inculcating, not a particular moral orientation in itself, but a particular moral 
orientation to that orientation. In other words, Cameron's intent was to encourage 
people to aspire to aspiration. The constant mantra of "not yet", "wait", leads to an 
attenuation of the present that renders it merely an anteroom for a future state that is 
perpetually deferred. It is in no way surprising that debt becomes an instrument of 
aspiration, via mortgages, student loans45, etc. 
 
This moral orientation (that aspiration is, in itself, good) has the virtue of being both 
free to the government and impossible to measure, except insofar as it can operate 
as a retroactive justification for stark inequalities of wealth or power. It is useful to be 
able to blame the condition of those who have little or nothing on their lack of 
aspiration. The sense of the allegorical should not seem alien or excessively archaic 
to us as inhabitants of the twenty-first century. In a 1939 discussion of the place of 
allegory in Baudelaire’s lyric poetry, Benjamin described the dispensation that we 
continue to live under as the “debasement” of commodities (and life, more generally) 
under the price mechanism. 
 
I chose this question about public and audience — or perhaps it found me — to help 
articulate my response to the body of artwork and theory that has been called the 
“relational turn”46; work that seems to valorise anything above the creation of a 
shared sense of conviviality between artist and audience. I disliked this work and the 
rhetoric around it before I could fully articulate why. Undoubtedly, the fact that my 
own performance work has relied on setting up a level of antagonism between 
myself and the audience was a large factor in this, but it was also a political disquiet. 
It seems to me that this emphasis on relationality only recognises one form of it — 
that of conviviality. That this relationality is supposed to stand for something larger 
than itself is clear not only from the claims that Bourriaud and others make for it, it is 
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 If regarded from any other angle apart from an unspoken or perhaps unconscious conflation of debt 
and aspiration, Cameron’s recent response to Jeremy Corbyn at Prime Minister’s Questions on 20th 
January 2016 would be nonsensical. In response to a question from Corbyn about the abolition of 
maintenance grants for the poorest university students, thereby obliging them to take loans for that 
component, Cameron responded “We are uncapping aspiration […]” (Watt, 2016). 
46
 This turn was given a name and theorised by the curator Nicholas Bourriaud, in his book Relational 
Aesthetics (1998). There have been many critiques, the most astute, I think, being Clare Bishop’s 
Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics (2004). Her more recent book, Artificial Hells (2013) has been 
less useful, though it contains some telling points aimed at art as a (cheaper) replacement for social 
work, as it seems to proceed from the premise that there can and should be a properly participatory 
communitarian art, just on different terms to what already exists. 
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also apparent in the smallness of the relations that are used to manifest those 
claims. 
 
It further seems to me that this conforms with strains of communitarian47 thought that 
exist currently in the discourse of both left and right in the UK and elsewhere. These 
often claim to be a solution to the alienating effects of either the welfare state or the 
depredations and destruction wreaked by untrammelled free markets. Sometimes 
they claim to be a solution to both. What these strains of thought do not recognise is 
the value of an idea of the public (as opposed to community) as an arena for 
conflicts over collective interests. This would also allow for conflict over what counts 
as a collective interest. 
 
In relatively recent times in the UK, Margaret Thatcher notoriously pronounced that 
there is “[…] no such thing as society […] There are individual men and women, and 
there are families”48. A Labour Home Secretary echoed the sentiment a decade or so 
later, although he (probably) thought that he was disagreeing: “[…T]here is no such 
‘thing’ as society […] because society is not a ‘thing’ external to our experiences and 
responsibilities. It is us, all of us” (Jack Straw, 1998, cited in: Rose, 2000). 
 
Straw’s comments should be seen in the context of New Labour’s project of 
responsibilisation. This term is used by the urban geographer Mike Raco (2007) to 
denote governmental moves to counteract the perceived tendency of the welfare 
state to allow citizens to delegate responsibility for the consequences of their own 
actions to the state, which will, like an over-indulgent parent, insulate them from 
them49. More recently still, there has been the late and unlamented “Big Society” 
initiative of the Conservative/Lib-Dem coalition in 2010, which was to fill in the gaps 
swinging government cuts created in public services by tapping into an assumed 
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 See: Driver, Martell, New Labour’s Communitarianisms (1997); also Rose, 2000. The idea seems to 
me to be currently used as a panacea for the ambiguities and potential for conflict inherent in the idea 
of “public”. 
48
 That Thatcher is often selectively quoted, leaving out the later part of the statement, in which she 
says, “It's our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour” (my emphasis) is 
not the point here. I am not trying to put Thatcher on trial for valorising selfishness, I am interested in 
the fact that her (what you could call nominalist) position is shared by many who might believe that 
they are in absolute opposition to her ideas. 
49
 The most notorious and arguably influential articulation of this idea on the Right came from Charles 
Murray and his concept of the “underclass” (see Murray,1996). 
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reservoir of untapped voluntaristic fervour. David Cameron’s once-favourite thinker, 
Philip Blond, a communitarian who was one of the inspirations for the Big Society, 
explicitly sets community against the welfare state: 
 
The welfare state nationalised society because it replaced mutual communities 
with passive fragmented individuals whose most sustaining relationship was not 
with his or her neighbour or his or her community but with a distant and 
determining centre. Moreover, that state relationship was profoundly 
individuating — unilateral entitlement individuated and replaced bilateral 
relationship (Blond, 2009). 
In this way, and without irony, in David Cameron’s use of this critique, the citizen was 
supposedly “freed” of the shackles of the state by being forced to provide local public 
services for themselves. It seems to me that this version of society denigrates or 
dispenses with the Commons, in the sense of collectively owned resources which, 
whilst by no means perfect, the post-1945 settlement provided a sense of having in 
common. This latter is an assumption of shared desires or aspirations, in the way 
you might say to a new acquaintance “we have a lot in common” without meaning 
that you share a bank account, housing or healthcare provision with them. The 
“distant centre” that Blond denigrates allowed for conflict and a disparity of values 
and aspirations in the population insofar as resources were allocated on the basis of 
right, rather than as discretionary awards in return for good behaviour. Blond sets the 
rights-bearing citizen of the welfare state against the relational subject of community. 
It seems to me that this relational/communitarian turn in art and politics is an attempt 
to turn the stranger into someone with determinate content. The anonymous stranger 
who is the audience, or the rights-bearing citizen who is the public, is to be rendered 
both responsible and knowable. 
 
This is made clear in the treatment of UK claimants of unemployment and sickness 
benefits. Over the past twenty-five years or so, the conditionality of benefits to the 
unemployed and sick has become increasingly stringent, as what was (and still is) a 
right of citizens to access a collectivised fund becomes dependent on demonstrating 
appropriate personal attitudes and behaviours. This places both large negative 
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restrictions and extraordinary positive duties on people who have not broken any 
law. 
 
As Angus Fletcher points out in his essay Allegory Without Ideas (2006), the 
allegorical approach is very well suited to expression of notions both of and about 
power, in any given time: […Allegory] permits the iconic rendering of power relations 
(Fletcher, 2006). This is because allegorical vision requires a sense of overlaid strata 
of signification — one may even call them hierarchies50— that are to be traversed by 
what he calls “daemonic”51 entities, also ideas of secrecy, arcane meanings in 
observable phenomena that are hidden to all except initiates of action from a 
distance. The sense that a power is given legitimacy by its relation to some universal 
essence or idea tucked away in the realm of archetypes is obviously tempting to 
those that hold that power as, for example, justification for discretionary wars in the 
service of spreading freedom and democracy. 
 
The so-called “War on Terror”52 (now just closing its fourteenth year) has furnished 
numerous contemporary examples of this mode of vision, which in the guise of 
counter-terrorism has shaped and permeated domestic and international politics. 
The prosecution of a war against a particular technique (terror) which has conflated it 
with a particular idea (in this case, a particular interpretation of Islam) seems ideally 
suited to the projection of a ramifying structure of correspondences (the difficulty of 
pinning down how “radicalisation” is meant to happen, for one) and conspiracies 
(whether by those who attack “The West” or those who ostensibly defend it). These 
structures are traversed by those that can read below the surfaces of things, who are 
alert to hidden patterns and meanings, spies and conspirators53. The Platonic sense 
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 For instance, in the four levels (or more) in the medieval technique of interpreting texts. 
51
 “Daemons […] share this major characteristic of allegorical agents, the fact that they 
compartmentalize function. If we were to meet an allegorical character in real life, we would say of him 
that he was obsessed with only one idea, or that he had an absolutely one-track mind, or that his life 
was patterned according to absolutely rigid habits from which he never allowed himself to vary. It 
would seem that he was driven by some hidden, private force[..]” Fletcher explores this idea in his 
seminal book Allegory (Fletcher, 2012) and also in his more recent paper, Allegory Without Ideas. 
52
 Capitalisation, as before (see footnote 7). “Terror” becomes personified, in order to set “War” upon 
it. However, it has been remarkably difficult to decide who properly personifies “Terror”, and what to 
do about them. 
53
 Benjamin claimed the political atmosphere of Paris was reflected in Baudelaire’s allegorical project: 
Sudden sorties, secret-mongering, surprise decisions belong to the raison d'etat of the 
Second Empire and were characteristic of Napoleon III. They constitute the decisive gestus in 
Baudelaire's theoretical utterances (Benjamin, 1985). 
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of allegory that Fletcher describes as having been dominant would, for example, 
manifest Justice or Peace in a certain way; for example, the woman wearing a 
spiked crown on the top of the Old Bailey in London, who holds a pair of scales in 
one hand and a sword in the other, or the winged woman standing on top of a globe 
holding in one hand an olive crown for victory and a palm leaf for peace on the Spa 
Green war memorial in north London (Fig.8). Both examples are personifications of 
abstract ideals that exist in a perfect realm somewhere beyond time and space, 
where Justice and Peace are always contextless and unchanging. This profane, 
particularised, time-bound and wearing-out world was in a constant process of 
realising those ideals to a greater or lesser extent at any given moment, such as the 
figure on the Spa Green memorial reassuring us that the ending of World War 1 was 
a victory for peace (the resemblance to Nike, the ancient Greek figure of victory, is 
marked). 
 
What Fletcher calls “Allegory Without Ideas” in his essay would relate power, rather 
than to a transcendent source — the Prince, God, Nation, the People — to 
something closer to what scholars following Michel Foucault would call 
“governmentality” (See Foucault, 1991), in which “things” are governed: 
 
One governs things.[…] I do not think this is a matter of opposing things to 
men, but rather of showing that what government has to do with is not territory 
but rather a sort of complex composed of men and things. The things with 
which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in 
their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are 
wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the, territory with its specific qualities, 
climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things, 
customs, habits, Ways of acting and thinking etc. […] (Foucault, 1991, p.93). 
Governmentality is rule by a variety of tactics across a variety of scales, rather than 
law handed down from a centre. Foucault differentiates it from other models of rule 
which place the monarch in a transcendent position in relation to the ruled and the 
ends of government (brutally put, to stay in power) to be equally separate (Ibid, 
p.91). This is certainly not to say that powers will not rhetorically utilise one or other 
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of those hypostases when necessary, but that the actual practice of governing is 
closer to what Nikolas Rose describes as a series of “translations”: 
In the dynamics of translation, alignments are forged between the objectives of 
authorities wishing to govern and the personal projects of those organizations, 
groups and individuals who are the subjects of government. It is through 
translation processes of various sorts that linkages are assembled between 
political agencies, public bodies, economic, legal, medical, social and technical 
authorities, and the aspirations, judgements and ambitions of formally 
autonomous entities, be these firms, factories, pressure groups, families or 
individuals (2004, p. 48). 
Trope/Torsion 
One cannot counterpose subjectivity to power, because subjectification occurs 
in the element of power […] (Ibid, pp. 54–5). 
 
Cognitive structures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the 
body (Bourdieu, 1994). 
We do not spontaneously appear as subjects at birth; as Judith Butler describes it, 
we are born into (both through and against) power. Our nativity is not an event gone 
through once and for all, but a constant subjection (in both the sense of becoming- 
subject and the sense of being-subject-to) as Butler calls it (1997, p.2) in The 
Psychic Life of Power (1997). She suggests that the process of subjection is, first of 
all, grounded in power. That is, the power that we begin our lives dependent upon, 
parental or otherwise, benign or otherwise, (hopefully) provides food, warmth, shelter 
and (perhaps) comfort. We are, in a very real sense, at its mercy and subordinate 
ourselves to it for survival. As part of the condition of becoming a subject, 
subordination implies being in a mandatory submission (Ibid, p.7). 
 
The infant cannot discriminate. They form attachments to those who give food, 
comfort or warmth in order to survive. They cannot judge those to whom they are 
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situation where they have the potential to make one suffer deservedly. It 
requires the consciousness of wrong in the shamed137 
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 See Appendix 1 for the transcript of the performance. In shame, I see myself as an other. I become 
aware of the surface of my body, perhaps through blushing, as if I was outside looking at myself 
through the eyes of an ideal other (Ahmed 2014; 106), one that comes from the recognition of, or love 
from another, or others.  
 
Through love, an ideal self is produced as a self that belongs to a community; the ideal is a 
proximate ‘we’. If we feel shame, we feel shame because we have failed to approximate ‘an 
ideal’ that has been given to us through the practices of love. What is exposed in shame is 
the failure of love, as a failure that in turn exposes or shows our love. (Ahmed 2014; 106. My 
emphasis). 
 
This is especially forceful in the context of an improvised performance, where those concrete others 
who are watching can have no clear idea of what I am going to do or say, and therefore no clear way 
of knowing exactly where, when, or how I may fail, though it might well be clear retrospectively. The 
other whose gaze I will not meet is gifted with the capacity to see into me, at what I am thinking. 
 
This “proximate we” is shot through with ambivalence, as the product of love must be; as our early 
passionate attachment to power must be. As the psychoanalyst and writer Adam Phillips succinctly 
puts it:  “If someone can satisfy us, they can frustrate us; and if someone can frustrate us we always 
believe they can satisfy us.” (Phillips 2015). I am not describing this mechanism in order to reduce the 
dynamics inherent in performance to the result quirks of personal psychology. The proximate we is 
collective, social, right from the start. The ambivalent business of attraction-repulsion between 
performer and audience is starkly manifested in stand-up comedy. The comedian Stewart Lee, in his 
How I Escaped My Certain Fate (2010), gives a very clear sense of this.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A FIGURE OF SPEECH 
 
Imagine a contortionist, bent double…this is where we start. Their head stuck between their  
knees and their spine describing a taut, backward loop. Looking at them, the human pretzel, 
it's impossible not to imagine the fearful strain of the muscles and tendons that ordinarily hold  
the body upright to face the world - being bent - bending themselves - the wrong way, or the  
right way, but too far. 
 
And you might think that it's not right - why should a human being do that to themselves?  
Head under their own buttocks or pressed into their own crotch. The first thought - speaking  
for myself, perhaps - is that I am witnessing some especially strenuous kind of autoerotic act.  
I repeat: this is where we - we all start. 
 
50 
 
attached; in fact, Butler maintains that the subordination and dependence that gives 
rise to these attachments must be denied for the subject to form54. They must be 
repudiated if one is to “live one’s own life” as the cliché has it. Butler describes the 
[…] adult sense of humiliation when confronted with the earliest objects of 
love—parents, guardians, siblings, and so on—the sense of belated indignation 
in which one claims, "I couldn't possibly love such a person." The utterance 
concedes the possibility it denies, establishing the "I" as predicated upon that 
foreclosure […] (Butler, 1997, p. 8). 
I therefore become a subject who “lives his own life” by repressing the dependence 
and the power that formed me and my ancient desire for it, without which (desire, 
dependence, repression) there would be no “I”. I “turn back on” (Ibid, p.4–5) myself, 
on the power and my desire for powerlessness. The subject is formed through this 
turning. The form this power takes is relentlessly marked by a figure of turning, a 
turning back upon oneself or even a turning on oneself (Butler, 1997, p. 3, original 
emphasis). 
 
The power that Butler refers to here is the power of conscience55, the power that can 
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 It is certainly clear that a state of “dependency” in individuals, whether on a drug or state benefits 
(though strangely not on employers or private landlords) is considered in contemporary political 
discourse an evil that is either a cause or result of inadequate subject formation. It goes without 
saying that the degree of vehemence with which the formative power is repudiated will alter at 
different times and places. Different forms of self-understanding (which is to say, self-formation) have 
operated under other instantiations of governmentality. Rose lists some: 
[…M]embers of a flock to be led, as children to be coddled and educated, as a human 
resource to be exploited, as members of a population to be managed, as legal subjects with 
rights, as responsible citizens of an interdependent society, as autonomous individuals with 
our own illimitable aspirations, as value-driven members of a moral community […] (Rose, 
2004, p. 41) 
The current form of liberalism in the UK seems to highly prioritise the autonomous, entrepreneurial 
self who actualises through making (market) choices. 
55
 Butler cites Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche,1989) throughout this work. Especially 
important is his emphasis on conscience as 
[…] the condition of the possibility of the subject, but the condition of the possibility of fiction, 
fabrication, and transfiguration. […B]ad conscience fabricates the soul, that expanse of 
interior psychic space (Butler, 1997, p. 67). 
In Nietzsche’s version of deep prehistory, the conscience is the fount of all subjectivity. It is the 
product of a violently coerced repression of natural, animal-like freedom that delighted in cruelty and 
inflicting pain. This delight in inflicting pain on others did not go away but simply, as conscience, 
became a delight in self torture (Nietzsche, 1989, pp. 84–8), almost as an artistic impulse to give form. 
Nietzsche emphasises the creative aspect of it. It is this self-forming torture in which we recoil from 
ourselves and are created by that recoil that Butler maintains comes into play when we repudiate our 
love of the power that formed us. 
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shame us. She asks: “if submission is a condition of subjection […] What is the 
psychic form that power takes?” (Ibid, p. 2). Conscience, specifically bad conscience, 
is the mechanism that creates us through “[…] a psychic habit of self-beratement” 
(Ibid, p. 22). Self-reflexivity is the fruit of conscience’s rendering of the self as an 
object to be examined56 and — certainly — tortured. Two related, but different 
emotions are instrumental here: guilt and shame. Guilt57 arises from specific 
infractions of internal(ised) or external rules; shame concerns itself with the self as a 
whole; it is a relation to the whole self58; it does not require a specific infraction on 
which to operate. The foreclosure of desire is what the self is built on — “living one’s 
own life”. 
 
Butler points out a logical difficulty with this: if bad conscience is the force that 
subjects us, and prior to this subjection there can be no “I” or “us”, who does the 
conscience that tortures into subjection belong to? She develops this difficulty into a 
figure, literally and in the sense of “figure of speech”. 
[…W]e seek to account for how the subject comes to be. That this figure is itself 
a "turn" is, rhetorically, performatively spectacular; "turn" translates the Greek 
sense of "trope." Thus the trope of the turn both indicates and exemplifies the 
tropological status of the gesture (Butler, 1997, p.4). 
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 Foucault gives a compelling picture of the penitentiary as a machine for producing subjects of (and 
to) conscience through (coerced) self-examination in Discipline and Punish: 
The legal punishment bears upon an act; the punitive technique on a life; it falls to this 
punitive technique, therefore, to reconstitute all the sordid detail of a life in the form of 
knowledge, to fill in the gaps of that knowledge and to act upon it by a practice of compulsion. 
It is a biographical knowledge and a technique for correcting individual lives. (Foucault, 1995, 
p. 252)  
57
 Butler relies heavily on Nietzsche’s conception of guilt first as debt rather than conscious willed 
wrongdoing: 
[…] the major moral concept Schuld [guilt] has its origin in the very material concept 
Schulden [debts][…].(Nietzsche, 1989, pp. 62–3) 
He cites the practice of allowing a creditor to remove an equivalent part of a delinquent debtor’s body 
in lieu of payment, stressing that the payment is the pleasure to be had from causing suffering and 
also the extraordinary fact that such calculations of equivalence were considered possible (see also 
Butler, 2014). 
58
 Sara Ahmed argues that emotions do not have specific referents, but their identification involves 
particular relations to the self. Whilst guilt identifies an action (or inaction) as “bad”: 
In shame, more than my action is at stake: the badness of an action is transferred to me, such 
that I feel myself to be bad and to have been ‘found’ or ‘found out’ as bad by others. Shame in 
this way is bound up with self-recognition [,,,] (Ahmed, 2014). 
One would not, ordinarily feel ashamed of just a part of oneself. 
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Trope, as figure of speech (we should perhaps take “figure” quite literally59) is also a 
form of “other speech”. In traditional rhetoric, trope denoted a turning away of the 
speech or language from its expected direction60. Sara Ahmed, too, characterises 
the action of shame as provoking a turning away and back to oneself, and also 
points out that this is literally what shamed subjects do with their bodies: 
 
In shame, I feel myself to be bad, and hence to expel the badness, I have to expel 
myself from myself […]. In shame, the subject’s movement back into itself is 
simultaneously a turning away from itself. In shame, the subject may have nowhere 
to turn (Ahmed, 2014, p.104)61 
 
The website “etymologyonline” also lists a highly suggestive cognate for trope as the 
"[…] Sanskrit trapate 'is ashamed, confused,' properly 'turns away in shame' […]" 
(Harper, 2016). In this context we are presently discussing it, the witness of the 
shame-provoked turn whose witnessing the shameful tries to evade is product of a 
particular relation to ourselves. 
 
                                            
59
 There is also a fascinating strand of work by literary scholars, based around the discursive 
structures of thought and production of the self. These mostly build upon Kenneth Burke’s 
enumeration of what he called four “master tropes” in rhetoric (Burke, 1969) that he thought all other 
tropes could be reduced to: metaphor, metonymy, synechdoche, irony. See Tropic Constructions of 
the Self (Leveille, 2010), for discussion of these in contemporary forms of subjection. For a 
provocative discussion of literary “troping” as defense mechanism against the death drive manifested 
in literal meaning, see Bloom, 1975, pp. 90–3. 
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 As figure, though, it can also denote adherence to precisely the expected course. Trope has also 
come to mean particular defining features of genre. In his introduction to Tropics of Discourse (1978) 
Hayden White gives this etymology: 
It comes into modern Indo-European languages by way oitropus, which in Classical Latin 
meant "metaphor" or "figure of speech" and in Late Latin, especially as applied to music 
theory, "mood" or "measure." All of these meanings, sedimented in the early English word 
trope, capture the force of the concept that modern English intends by the word style […] 
(White, 1978, p. 2, original emphasis). 
“Style”, to be recognisable as such, relies on iterability. Such also is the business of self-making. 
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 There are clear parallels in all this with Julia Kristeva’s theory of the abject as illustrated in her the 
anecdote of the milk cream: 
Along with sight-clouding dizziness, nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates me 
from the mother and father who proffer it. ‘I’ want none of that element, sign of their desire; ‘I’ 
do not want to listen, ‘I’ do not assimilate it, ‘I’ expel it. But since the food is not an ‘other’ for 
‘me,’ who am only in their desire, I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the 
same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3, original 
emphasis). 
However, I concur with Imogen Tyler’s estimate of Kristeva’s application of the concept: that whilst 
useful, she uses abjection in such a way that it becomes a kind of universal structure of subjection 
that effectively de-politicises the particular ways that certain things and people become abjected (and 
others simultaneously subjected) in particular ways at particular times (see Tyler, 2013, pp. 29–33). 
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Here, I would like to draw attention to the material that I have placed in appendix 1, a 
transcription of my performance Apostrophe to a Citizen (2015). In the notes to the 
transcript of this improvised performance, I noted that I did not look at my audience 
directly when formulating what next to say to them. This might be due to the 
pressure of their expectation, the fear of a pause turning into completely drying. It 
could also be related to an emotion that I believe is intimately connected to 
performance — shame, or the potential for it. The ashamed do not meet the eyes of 
those who witness (and thereby are instrumental in) their shame. […] Shame is 
being exposed to someone in a situation where they have the potential to make one 
suffer deservedly. It requires the consciousness of wrong in the shamed62.  
 
Relational Aesthetics 
 
Rendering responsible and knowable has been the hallmark of the attitude of 
relational art to its audience. The artist Carsten Höller was responsible for a 
supremely vacuous installation, Test Site (2006), at the Tate Modern in London — a 
set of helter-skelters extruded down from the upper floors into the cavernous Turbine 
Hall. The slides were open to the public to use, but if one didn't there wasn't much to 
see — just other people having a "slide experience". Mark Windsor, in a paper about 
Test Site, in which Nicolas Bourriaud63 is predictably invoked, has this to say about 
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 See Appendix 1 for the transcript of the performance. In shame, I see myself as an other. I become 
aware of the surface of my body, perhaps through blushing, as if I was outside looking at myself 
through the eyes of an ideal other (Ahmed, 2014, p. 106), one that comes from the recognition of, or 
love from another, or others. 
Through love, an ideal self is produced as a self that belongs to a community; the ideal is a 
proximate ‘we’. If we feel shame, we feel shame because we have failed to approximate ‘an ideal’ that 
has been given to us through the practices of love. What is exposed in shame is the failure of love, as 
a failure that in turn exposes or shows our love. (Ahmed, 2014, p. 106, my emphasis). 
This is especially forceful in the context of an improvised performance, where those concrete 
others who are watching can have no clear idea of what I am going to do or say, and therefore no 
clear way of knowing exactly where, when, or how I may fail, though it might well be clear 
retrospectively. The other whose gaze I will not meet is gifted with the capacity to see into me, at what 
I am thinking. 
This “proximate we” is shot through with ambivalence, as the product of love must be; as our 
early passionate attachment to power must be. As the psychoanalyst and writer Adam Phillips 
succinctly puts it: “If someone can satisfy us, they can frustrate us; and if someone can frustrate us 
we always believe they can satisfy us” (Phillips, 2015). I am not describing this mechanism in order to 
reduce the dynamics inherent in performance to the result quirks of personal psychology. The 
proximate “we” is collective, social, right from the start. The ambivalent business of attraction-
repulsion between performer and audience is starkly manifested in stand-up comedy. The comedian 
Stewart Lee, in his How I Escaped My Certain Fate (2010), gives a very clear sense of this. 
63
 Nicholas Bourriaud, curator and theorist. He coined of the term “relational aesthetics”, with his book 
Relational Aesthetics (1998). This had considerable influence for the succeeding ten years, and I 
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what using the slides does to the relationship between artwork and audience: 
"Experienced from within, the visitor is both the performer and the audience"64. The 
disorientation that comes from sliding down a spiralling tube is a powerful effect, no 
doubt, and also easier to achieve than something that might stimulate a critical 
assessment of the work or provide much-needed distance. It seemed to me that 
precisely this sense of being a performer in one’s own drama, facilitated by the work, 
leads to a certain complicity with the account the work gives of itself. The users of 
the slide in this model are busy experiencing themselves having an experience, 
which leaves little space to stand outside it and assess what sort of experience is 
proffered. It is undoubtedly abrupt and intense enough to stand apart as an event, 
but beyond that, who knows. 
 
Interactivity is offered in place of critical intelligence; the audience become part of the 
artwork. This is what Windsor and Bourriaud believe that an un-alienated artwork 
should offer, albeit in this case limited to the choice of submitting to gravity, or not. 
Windsor allows that though it is possible to appreciate the slides from the 
perspective of a non-participant, this maintains a subject-object division and 
therefore renders the observer “passive” (Ibid). In this scheme, to interact is held to 
be active; being active is valorised. Its obvious antonym is redolent of distance, 
perhaps, or contemplation. Contemplation, not being active, is assumed to be 
passive, and passive is bad. I would argue that citizens of societies dominated by 
transnational capitalism mediated through new technologies and instrumentalised in 
a sort of “responsibilisation”65 imposed online, in work and as a strategy of self- 
monitoring within the welfare state, have far too much interaction, as opposed to too 
much opportunity to be passive. 
 
The assumption of mere passivity in those who observe is a persistent idea. The 
most often avowed antecedent in modern times for this position is the Situationist 
International, and specifically, in Guy Debord’s manifesto, Society of the Spectacle 
                                                                                                                                        
believe still does, though few people use that term anymore. 
64
 Windsor, Art of Interaction: A Theoretical Examination of Carsten Höller’s Test Site (2011). 
65
 This term comes from the geographer Mike Raco (2007). I think that it encapsulates various 
contemporary currents, from public health to benefits and in work — performance review and 
purportedly more “horizontal” management structures. Subjects are to be made responsible for their 
health, their work or lack of it — even, as Raco suggests — the amount of crime in their 
neighbourhood. 
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(1967). Debord posited that late capitalism creates a society of simulacra or 
spectacle, and that subjects alienated from real relation, or experience of life and 
others, are rendered mere passive observers of the fractured dance of commodities 
and manufactured erlebnis. Whilst I have considerable sympathy with Debord’s 
thesis, I find it hard to accept the suggestion that there is a possible unmediated or 
un-alienated mode of life. The positing of false consciousness to explain the lack of a 
revolution is a perennial position on the political left (although the concept is also 
sometimes employed on the right) and it does have superficial explanatory force. 
How else to explain that vast numbers of people in liberal democracies vote against 
what seem to be their best material interests? But I am uneasy attributing truth — or 
untruth, for that matter — to experience. 
 
It could seem that relational art is the least “auratic” possible, to use Benjamin’s 
term66. There is no apparent art object beyond the participants’ experience and the 
aesthetic experience (such as it is) is almost indistinguishable from what we could 
call everyday life — talking, eating, standing around. The feature of the aura that 
Benjamin makes much of is its air of distance; relational artworks do not set much 
store in distance — one could call them over-friendly or banal. I would contend, 
however, that the aura does not vanish from these instances, but moves up a level, 
so to speak. It hovers like a nimbus over the event, evoking a lost, Edenic, scene of 
“community”, or “democracy”, a small fragment of which is recouped by the artwork. 
As Claire Bishop commented in her first critique of relational aesthetics: 
[In Bourriaud’s scheme…] all relations that permit “dialogue” are automatically 
assumed to be democratic and therefore good. But what does “democracy” 
really mean in this context? If relational art produces human relations, then the 
next logical question to ask is what types of relations are being produced, for 
whom, and why? (Bishop, 2004). 
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 It is undeniable that Benjamin varied wildly in how he saw the aura — as something both human 
liberation and the artwork (Benjamin saw the two as related) could well do without in The Work of Art 
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction and The Author as Producer, to a source of the “historical 
index” which could redeem past moments from ruling class domination in Theses on the Philosophy of 
History, to some mixed elements of collective memory and commodification in Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire. For myself, I believe that the aura can no more be dispensed with than nostalgia (a 
recurrent theme within modern culture) can be. 
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The placing of emphasis on the creation of social relations rather than objects, and 
the desire (which is nothing new, after all) to make artwork that cannot be absorbed 
into the circulation of commodities, is an attempt to recapture some idea of a “truer”, 
less mediated, experience. 
 
The Romantic contrast between individual and society which informs artistic role-
playing and its mercantile system, has become truly null and void. Only a 
"transversalist" conception of creative operations — lessening the figure of the 
author in favour of that of the artist-cum operator — may describe the "mutation" 
under way […] (Bourriaud, 1998, p.93). This could be seen as an attack on a 
bourgeois form of privacy and private experience, as exemplified in the reified 
privacy of the lyric form or easel painting. It could be an attempt to meld life and art 
in an antithesis of gallery art, the hieratic aloofness of which stands as an analogue 
to its role in ornamenting the institution of private property. However, I think that it 
actually re-inscribes a form of privacy in what is public. It introduces a form of private 
sociality — a dinner party, say — as an image of the public, as its apotheosis. In its 
emphasis on conviviality — let alone the self-selecting nature of the participants, who 
are already gallery/exhibition visitors — I would argue that it excludes the stranger, 
not by erecting barriers to participation (although they are implicitly there), but by 
attempting to turn the stranger into something else: a familiar person. 
 
Bourriaud’s “microtopias” do not live up to the name, at least in part because of their 
specificity, their located-ness. Utopia, as is often mentioned, literally means “no- 
place”. Relational works, in insisting on their ephemerality and spatial boundedness, 
are very specific places and times. The collapsing of a (or any) Utopian ideal into a 
specific temporal and spatial location denies exactly the universality that many 
Utopias are predicated on; unless, of course, that those present in the space and 
time of the work consider the model and their embodiment of it to be the universal. It 
belongs to those individuals who enjoy the atmosphere of conviviality at that time. 
 
Whereas, according to Adorno, some (high) art might have contained the universal 
or the masses as a repressed content (such as in lyric poetry); relational works seem 
to promote themselves and the constituency they create as the mass, writ small (no 
doubt in sans serif without punctuation), with no surplus — an extension of the idea 
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that the gathering equals the work. It is a kind of literal mindedness that cannot 
conceive of the idea of the public (or society) as a thing separate (that is, as an idea 
or a demand) from those determinate individuals who happen to be there. It is a form 
of positivism that collapses society back into the individuals and groups who are 
present — or representative, just as the administrator at Berkeley (discussed in the 
previous chapter) designated the homeless in Peoples’ Park as insufficiently 
representative to be public. It denies the social imaginary of the public as something 
open and estranged — an abstract universality, in other words — and replaces it 
with a determinate content. 
 
This content is often described as “community”, which has become a defining trope 
in contemporary UK politics with its connotations of physical co-presence, personal 
familiarity, a specific and bounded spatial location. The “public”, in contrast, can be 
presented as too large and diffuse. The term is now often stretched in ways that 
cannot actually refer to co-presence or bounded space, although It relies on that 
connotation for its affective (and possibly moral) force: for example, the “business 
community” or the “Muslim community”. 
 
In the UK, the New Labour Government’s “Sustainable Communities” initiative67 and 
the Liberal/Tory coalition’s late and unlamented “Big Society”68 initiative arguably 
share a political ideology, albeit not backed by equal levels of financial commitment. 
Both governments have expressed their intention of combating — through an 
emphasis on “community” — what they characterise as the anomie and social 
fragmentation that is created by the stranger orientation (in Michael Warner’s 
phrase) of either the welfare state or globalised markets. In the contemporary 
political imaginary, communities seem to be pitched against the content-less nature 
— or universality — of the public, and the purportedly faceless profligacy of the 
public sector.69 One could be charitable and say that these ideas were well-
                                            
67
 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future 2003. See: 
Raco Securing Sustainable Communities 2007 for a critique. 
68
 David Cameron, Our Big Society Agenda, 2010. 
69
 For a description of the political right’s critique of bureaucracy — supposedly one of the defining 
features of the public sector, with its “red tape” etc.— see David Graeber The Utopia of Rules: On 
Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, 2015. 
Graeber notes that in this critique, only the public sector has “bureaucrats”, whilst the private sector 
has “managers”, although increasingly their function is the same. 
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intentioned, at least by some. It was possibly an attempt to “empower” the individual 
with a sense of their own agency. However, in effect what it did (and does) is to 
remove any sense of breathing room for the individual (or any privacy) because 
everything — including the public sphere — is now part of the private individual. 
Private and public are now collapsed together in this scheme and it would be hard to 
say which it is more damaging to, an open public sphere (and a universal welfare 
state) or the privacy of the individual. This is obviously useful for a political project 
that wishes to create individuals who act as their own administrators within a society-
as-market. It is a form of responsibilisation.  
 
One could relate this to the term “relational citizenship”, coined by theorist Nikolas 
Rose, which was devised not with reference to Bourriaud’s artistic movement, but I 
think that it has applicability there in terms of what the version of sociality it valorises 
as its work. As summarised by Mike Raco in his discussion of New Labour’s 
Sustainable Communities, it describes the citizen and the community invoked by the 
term as  
[…] politically, socially and economically active and self-reliant. They are ‘non- 
dependent’ on the state, and provide for themselves through private-sector 
(market) provision (Raco, 2007). 
Differences between different groups are recognised and given certain rewards and 
penalties. […T]hese differences are increasingly spatialised through divisive policy 
agendas which seek to control the presence and absence of particular types of 
citizens in particular places at particular times. 
 
I would argue that whilst moving beyond conventions of display and contemplation 
that are historically formed by (and possibly, in their turn, informed) conceptions of 
liberalism70 — a sense of privacy, private contemplation and all the links to private 
property and subjectivity that is a private property, the object with all its links to 
commodification etc. — the relational work, as an experience, manifests a kind of 
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 Habermas describes the origins of the Public as lying in the sense of audience who use their 
judgement: In seventeenth-century France le public meant the lecteurs, spectateurs, and auditeurs as 
the addressees and consumers, and the critics of art and literature […]” (Habermas, 1991, p. 31) 
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neoliberalism. 
 
The Bike Cemetery: The work as a whole needed a centre; for this, I chose a site 
that I have called The Bike Cemetery, a piece of “waste ground” in Hackney Wick, 
east London. I first came upon it in 2002 when it was full of the cannibalised frames 
of bicycles that (I assume) were stolen nearby, and then stripped of any useful or 
saleable parts. It was also full of other rubbish. Some were in bin bags, but the 
ground was also thick with strange, disparate objects, pieces of clothing, deflated 
footballs, broken dolls and tools, beer cans, old magazines, plastic toys and 
thousands of dead batteries. All of these were trodden in, tangled in the roots and 
vegetation that had grown around them. Like the rest of the area at the time, it had 
been used for casual fly-tipping. I once found an entire street there blocked by 20 or 
30 large sacks of lentils that had, for unknown reasons, been thrown from the back 
of a lorry. They stayed there for some weeks, getting rained on; eventually some of 
the lentils germinated, sending green sprouts through the brown paper sacks. Stolen 
cars were regularly driven there and torched. By some obscure law of physics, their 
blackened carcasses would attract other detritus. Old mattresses would be stuffed 
into the passenger compartments, pallets piled onto their roofs and brightly-coloured 
plastic bags of household rubbish stuffed anywhere they would go. In time — and 
nothing dumped there would be quickly cleared — these would develop into small 
Alps of obsolescence. Then the pyromaniacs would come, usually at night but once 
or twice in broad daylight — though no one ever saw them at their work — and the 
whole thing would have a second immolation. Empty warehouses were regularly 
used to host free parties and the streets would fill at strange hours with people 
enjoying (or not) the effects of whatever stimulants were on offer. 
 
My own time, the time of this study, the fruits of which are presented here, has been 
deeply marked by a sense of a world “passing out of being”. The structures of the 
welfare state in the UK — within which I grew up (and the institutions of which I have 
been educated in), have been subjected to legislative attacks since the Thatcher 
government of 197971 — seem at the current time to be braced for the coup de grâce 
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 I began my doctoral study in 2010, the year that the Conservative-LibDem governing coalition was 
formed in the UK. In 2015, a Conservative government was elected, albeit with a very small majority 
in the House of Commons. The work which they have undertaken, with apparent relish and dizzying 
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which will be delivered in the names of “flexibility”72, “consumer choice”73, 
“efficiency”, “competition” and “modernisation”74. This process is evident even in the 
physical environment. Many cities in the across the world and in the UK, including 
my own, London, are being rapidly re-shaped to service the demands of the 
international trade in residential property as speculative investment. 
 
Obviously, the streets have always been, to some extent, canyons of condensed 
money, along with other things. Now exchange value is explicit (See Minton, 2009, 
pp. 41–58). Whilst Jeremy Tambling wrote, concerning allegory and the city, that the 
chaos of signs within the city render a single univocal meaning impossible to achieve 
(2009, p. 100) it has seemed that it, like so much else, is being re-made beneath the 
sign of commodity. This is evident not just with the accelerating proliferation of estate 
agents’ “for sale” or “to let” stuck outside. Blocks of private apartments clad with 
bright plastic and wood are replacing local authority housing, usually with retail 
                                                                                                                                        
speed, has been a combination of the sort characterised by Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell as “roll-
back neoliberalism […]preoccupied with the active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian- 
welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (broadly defined)[…]” with “roll-out […]construction and 
consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations” (Peck, 
Tickell, 2002). The previous New Labour governments of 1997–2010 were slower in their work and 
seemed, for the most part, to concentrate on the “roll-out” phase — perhaps from a collective belief 
(combined with a world-wide economic boom) that the achievements of the Thatcher years were 
irreversible. 
72
 In a very prescient short essay from 1992, Gilles Deleuze sketches the defining differences 
between what he calls the “society of control” that he saw as superseding the older “societies of 
discipline” that Foucault described, with their localised and enclosed disciplinary sites such as school, 
prison, barracks, family home etc. “Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a 
modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or 
like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point” (Deleuze, 1992). Control needs flexibility 
as a necessary condition, both for its governmental technologies and for those who are subjected (in 
both senses of the word) to and by them. 
73
 In a telling passage in a book that discusses the changing nature of administration and ownership 
of the UKs cities, Anna Minton interviews an un-named manager of a town centre Business 
Improvement District (these districts are part of a process that is transferring control over urban 
spaces from elected local governments to business interests. who reshape and run things for their 
own gain). This manager is remarkably candid: “’Bugger democracy. Customer focus is not 
democratic. […] The citizen is a customer and the aim is to respond best to the needs of the 
customer. The second it becomes involved with politics, it becomes diluted down and the pure vision 
of the customer is lost’” (Minton, 2009, pp. 55–6). 
74
 I consider this last, “modernisation”, to be of great significance. The rhetorical imposition of a 
temporality that consigns particular ideologies or areas of social and political practice to the realm of 
the obsolescent is a necessary prior step to legislative and procedural change that renders that 
obsolescence actual and ostensibly necessary. New Labour lavishly used the term “modernisation”, 
along with “reform”; for example: 
[…A]s Gordon Brown put it in his speech on the Government's spending review in July 
1998, 'all new resources should be conditional on the implementation of essential reforms: 
money, but only in return for modernisation'. ('Modernisation' represents highly contentious 
changes such as welfare reform as if they were purely technical and value-free updatings) 
(Fairclough, 2000, p. 39–40). 
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spaces on the ground floor. Owen Hatherley has pithily dubbed this style75 
“Pseudomodernism”, which is “[…] a modernism of concealment, a stylistic shell left 
after all the original social and moral ideas have been stripped out”76. These are 
interspersed with “iconic” buildings; that is, ones that function as their own trademark 
or logo77. 
 
In keeping with this remaking of the pattern of ownership and use, the population are 
to be remade. As Nikolas Rose, following Michel Foucault, has pointed out 
[…] there is no such thing as ‘the governed’, only multiple objectifications of 
those over whom government is to be exercised, and whose characteristics 
government must harness and instrumentalize (p.40). 
As can be seen in public order legislation and the punitive actions of the Department 
of Work and Pensions towards the disabled and unemployed, in the growth of zero 
hours contracts and agency work, the subject form that is being constructed and 
instrumentalised is that of the autonomous utility-seeker that seeks markets through 
which to actualise themselves. The imposition of this neoliberal model has lent 
impetus to a new populist right that is ostensibly reacting to the economic terror, 
dislocation and precarity that it has inflicted on populations unable to adapt to its 
demands. They seek to root subject-hood in the supposedly stable soil of nation, 
ethnicity and (enormously disingenuously) class78. 
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 It should be apparent that style, in architecture as in other things, is the constellation of fragments 
— capitals and columns, pediments, roof and window shape and proportion — that embody an idea, 
whether Classical, Baroque, Gothic, or Modern. 
76
 The passage goes on to say what Hatherley (correctly) sees as having been excised: “But while the 
modernism of council estates, comprehensive schools, ‘plate glass universities’, co-operatives and 
libraries was driven to a large degree by socialist commitments and egalitarian politics, these 
entertainment centres, luxury flats, city academies and idea stores were driven by exclusivity, tourism 
and the politics of ‘aspiration’” (Hatherley, 2010) 
77
 Leslie Sklair describes the function of the “iconic” building as a form of advertisement for 
transnational capitalism itself: “[…]the point of the images of iconic architecture is to persuade people 
to buy (both in the sense of consume and in the sense of give credence to) the buildings and spaces 
and lifestyles and, in some cases, the architects they represent.[…] Iconicity works and persists 
because the buildings in which it inheres are built by architects and teams of others to symbolize 
something (possibly several things) apart from the programme (functions) of the building itself” (Sklair, 
2006). The architectural critic Owen Hatherley seems to be getting at the same thing, that icons “[…] 
appear to have been designed from the outside in, shapes and logos waiting around for appropriate 
functions to be conjured out of them” (Hatherley, 2010). 
78
 It seems to me that the new right, or alt-right, version of class is stripped of any objective 
relationship to economic position and relation to the means of production. It is remade as a form of 
“cultural identity”; an irony that is apparently lost on members of the self-same constituency that rail 
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IF YOU LIVED HERE, YOU’D BE HOME NOW (see Fig.5)
They are everywhere in the city, now. Carefully lit, styled, coiffured and laminated against 
the weather, dust and traffic haze. They gaze out on the street with the air of smug  
self-congratulation worn by people who arrived just in time to install themselves in the  
best seats, or present themselves as aloof, looking slightly askance, hermetically sealed  
in the display of their own immaculate aspiring.   
Behind them, screened off by the few inches of plywood and styrene sheeting,  
from which the pressure of the futurity they embody projects them towards those who are  
condemned to the present, are the ruins; recently gutted dwellings, mounded rubble, earth 
movers and cranes. 
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The Public and the Negative 
The public is a kind of social totality. Its most common sense is that of the 
people in general. It might be the people organized as the nation, the 
commonwealth, the city, the state, or some other community. It might be very 
general, as in Christendom or humanity. But in each case, the public, as a 
people, is thought to include everyone within the field in question (Warner, 
2002, p. 65, my emphasis) 
Michael Warner, in Publics and Counterpublics (2002), emphasises the generality of 
public discourse (that is, discourse that is meant to appeal to an audience of 
indeterminate strangers). He asserts that 
 
[w]e've become capable of recognizing ourselves as strangers even when we 
know each other. Declaiming this essay to a group of intimates, I could still be 
heard as addressing a public (Ibid, p.74). 
Whilst I think that this is a correct assessment of the situation, I don't feel that 
Warner goes far enough to investigate how this public manifests in those that are 
addressed. We are invited to recognise ourselves as strangers, certainly, but how far 
does this recognition go, and what does it mean? He rightly says that he could read 
his chapter out to his friends and through the rhetoric and register of it, they would 
receive it as an address to a public — this in despite of everyone present knowing 
one another. There is a current identification at work here: "we are, on this occasion, 
the public being addressed"; there is also a simultaneous dis, or de- identification: "of 
course, we, here, are not the public being addressed. That public is elsewhere, 
because that public, even if us, are strangers". There is a turning, a troping, both 
towards and away from identification. To turn in any direction, one must have a body; 
that is to say that one must be situated, particular and bounded. The movement is 
from a bounded particularity towards universality, and a recoil. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
the most loudly against “identity politics” when subaltern groups insist on their own rights being 
respected. 
 
63 
 
The reasons for this are several: first amongst them is the fact that it is a group of 
intimates being addressed, known both to each other and to the speaker. I do not 
believe that “public” as a category is reducible to a known quantity of identifiable 
subjects. I believe that the reduction of it to such a model, like that which is 
increasingly available via the aggregation of personal data on the internet, is 
dangerous to both privacy and to any sense of political equality. I think that the 
stranger-relation, or estrangement, protects both privacy and political equality. 
As Warner rightly says, a public is definable as being made up of strangers and our 
hypothetical group are not strangers. Another reason might be a sense that whilst 
that sort of thing appeals to the public, those in the room have the taste or critical 
facilities to see through it, or at any rate, to believe that they do. In this rather elitist 
posture, the public is definable through its uncritical acceptance of appeals to their 
love of the vulgar and trite. What this argues is that the public is definable by its 
lowest common denominator. Another is specificity; this is an extension of the 
"stranger-relationality" argument. The public is no one in particular because it is 
assumed to be everyone who qualifies as a "one". Like an audience, individual 
members of the public can stop listening or be disqualified from membership in some 
way (we shall need to return to this matter) but the public will remain as the public. 
So, Warner's group of friends can listen to his speech or essay read out to them and 
receive it as if they were the public, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that they 
are not. This will be because (in variable proportions) they know each other and the 
speaker, because they are less gullible and because they know themselves to be 
specific individuals. It is the first and last of these reasons that concern me here: the 
middle one, cynicism, can be seen as in part a reaction to them. 
 
It is not in the least far-fetched to say that this simultaneous identification and dis- 
identification is shared by all who participate in publics. Participation in a universality 
(however bounded) does violence to one’s particularity. Equally, separating oneself 
from that universal — a necessary act if one is to be a self — is also violent. It is this 
violent wrenching from particular to universal and back and the performance of dis- 
identification that defines participation in the abstract universal79. The negation of the 
                                            
79
 See earlier section, Trope/Torsion, for a discussion of this modality in terms of Judith Butler’s theory 
of subjection as arising both through and against “power”. 
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whole that is required for individual being, as being, has a strong relationship to the 
structuring of a public. The public — general or otherwise — as the recipient, 
creation and object of public discourse, cannot have me as a part of it. This equally 
applies to any other determinate individual that is addressed. They cannot be 
addressed as themselves in their own particularity because that would be the 
register of privacy, as in a letter between friends. Individuals must, to some extent, 
see themselves as stand-ins or place holders for the public that exists elsewhere; 
over there, outside the room, so to speak. So, in order for a public to be public, it 
cannot include me, or you, for that matter, dear reader. 
 
This is evident in the qualifying terms set before it — the "general" or "wider" publics. 
This generalising, this imaginary averaging-out of specifics leads to the discursive 
creation of a generic "average person" who can be presumed to be emblematic of 
the (wider or general) public. It is from here that the careful choosing of focus group 
participants or poll respondents, and the weighting of their opinions according to how 
far they are representative of a wider group, comes. Of course, as has often been 
said, it is impossible to meet an "average" person because the average is a 
statistical artefact, so this means of imagining the positive content of the public in the 
form of its exemplary member cannot give it a solid form. I would argue that the 
universally shared aspect inherent in the concept of publicness is negation. A public 
is constituted by the performed dis-identification from that group that is common to 
all its members. 
 
The negativity through which the individual subtracts themselves from the category 
of public creates one of the defining features of that category: its “else-ness”. The 
public is always “somewhere” else and “someone” else. This is not to say that there 
actually is any particular individual existing who is “really” part of the public, though 
the possibility has been a staple of both counter-cultural and reactionary rhetoric, for 
differing ends. Publics, in this sense, are the creation of both a mode of address and 
also by the acts of identification and dis-identification performed by those who are 
invited to see themselves as being addressed. 
 
I would argue that the constant chain of deferral that places the content of the public 
as somewhere and someone else also makes publics into things that are evoked 
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rather than invoked. As was previously discussed, invocatio was the ritual by which 
the local gods of Ancient Rome’s enemies were tempted to desert their temples and 
come to Rome with the conquering army. That which is invoked, say God, or a law, 
the power to marry or arrest, must be assumed to be continuously at hand, even if in 
abeyance locally, until called upon by a person who is suitably qualified. In the case 
of the public, this could, for example, be a newspaper columnist or a politician 
making a speech. Evocation, on the other hand, is a “calling out”, rather than a 
“calling on”. That which needs to be coaxed or charmed from concealment — 
whether hidden by time or distance — has a very different relation to the particular 
here and now than that which is available to be called upon in the way that electricity 
is, when one inserts a plug into a wall socket. That which is evocative comes and 
goes, just as a poor radio signal (in the pre-digital days) would fade in and out of 
presence into noise and vice versa. This, of course, does not preclude the rhetorical 
invocation of general, wider, other, forms of public, and its opinions or interest as if it 
had opinions, or interest as such, by those whose business it is to invoke. 
 
Slavoj Žižek has discussed this negation as, in itself, a manifestation of the universal 
reason that forms the basic premise of the limited government espoused by liberal 
regimes (2008, p. 140–158). In a complex section, he follows the argument of 
Immanuel Kant’s brief essay, What Is Enlightenment? (1784) in its inversion of the 
common sense definitions of public and private that renders what would usually be 
seen as the public role of subjects — priest, police — as being essentially private, 
because they partake in a particular determinate identity, and perform a particular 
defined duty80, from which they cannot demur. Žižek deals with this logic in the 
context of national and ethnic cultures and identities, the superlative contemporary 
examples of assumed parochialism81. 
                                            
80
 Interestingly, Kant describes the public use of reason in similar terms to Warner as something 
disseminated through the written word. He differentiates between a priest’s congregation, which he 
describes as “however large it is, is never any more than a domestic gathering” and “the real public 
(i.e. the world at large)”, which the priest can address “as a scholar […] through his writings”. The real 
public is mediated through print. The idea of the individual subtracted from their specific social 
determinations is easier to support when modelled on the anonymous populace of readers and writers 
who form the republic of letters. 
81
 The widespread response to the protests and actions of the Black Lives Matter movement in the US 
and UK from conservative liberals (“liberal” in the UK and European sense) has been the retort “No. 
All lives matter”. This attempted put-down is meant to demonstrate the assumed narrow sectional 
interests of the protesters, who cannot see beyond their ethnic identification. The fact that law 
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The basic opposition here is that between the collective and the individual: 
culture is by definition collective and particular, parochial, exclusive of other 
cultures, while-next paradox — it is the individual who is universal, the site of 
universality, insofar as she extricates herself from and elevates herself above 
her particular culture (2008, p.141). 
According to Žižek, Kant argues that the private “is not one's individual as opposed 
to communal ties, but the very communal-institutional order of one's particular 
identification […]” (Ibid, p. 143). In this sense, those who fastidiously subtract 
themselves from, say, a newspaper leader writer’s appeal to “hard-working Britons” 
or the Leave campaign in the recent UK-EU referendum’s appeal to “British values” 
and “British sovereignty” can reasonably see themselves as doing so in the name of 
universal European values, rights, tolerance, etc. or world citizenship. The subject of 
these universalities asserts themselves through these rights as an individual in 
opposition to the particularities of their specific lifeworld. At the same time, there 
cannot be any individual outside of some particularised lifeworld. 
 
It is, as Žižek rightly points out, easy to point out that these universal rights are 
partial and predicated on a subject who is a default white, male property owner and 
they can be, and are, used to provide cover for wholesale exploitation and 
oppression; the patchy record and dubious motivations for the spate of “humanitarian 
interventions” by Western states in the Middle East are clear evidence of this. What 
is interesting here is that he suggests that the self-recognition of subjects as 
“contingent embodiments of abstract-universal notions” (Ibid, p. 149), such as being 
the possessor of an abstract capacity for labour as being functions of an abstract 
price mechanism, has been a necessary corollary to the development of the subject 
of universal rights. This description of the contemporary liberal self clearly parallels 
Benjamin’s description of what he sees as the allegorical “debasement” of the 
commodity under the price mechanism82. The universality of transnational capitalism, 
argues Žižek, is genuinely for itself and not a pretext for particular interests, but 
                                                                                                                                        
enforcement and regimes of incarceration do not seem to see beyond it either is sidestepped, in the 
name of universality. 
82
 The singular debasement of things through their signification, something characteristic of 
seventeenth-century allegory, corresponds to the singular debasement of things through their price as 
commodities. 
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“directly actual as universality, as the negative force of mediating and destroying all 
particular content” (2008, p. 156, my emphasis)83. 
 
In the quote that I have placed at the head of this section, Michael Warner defines a 
public as a “kind of social totality”, possessing some form of unanimity, at least in 
terms of identifying themselves with the public in question.  
 
In contrast to seeing individual subjects’ withdrawal from the assumed universality of 
the public as a retreat into a particular and private identity, Žižek posits this 
withdrawal as itself the “true universality”. This “I-am-not-that” is in fact not a rejection 
of the universality that the public might embody or represent, something which can 
be achieved with greater or lesser degrees of passion or distaste as a pragmatic 
action or radical gesture, but a manifestation of the actual universal that 
constitutes a public. The public is what exists, whilst no one feels that they actually 
belong to it. In fact, I will argue that this existence — as stranger relationality — is 
predicated on this not-personally-belonging. We do not choose not to be public, as if 
it were a thing with an independent existence from our choosing. It is in this very 
capacity to choose that the categories “private” and “public” are brought into being. 
 
A striking performative negation of a proffered universality occurred in London on the 
occasion of ex-Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher’s (publicly funded and state, in all 
but name) funeral in 2013. About 300 protesters turned their backs on the coffin as it 
passed on a gun carriage along the procession route to St. Paul’s cathedral (see Fig. 
10). This was intended as an explicit rejection of the construction of a public in 
mourning that the government and large swathes of the press had been 
promulgating. The organiser of this action stated that 
 
[w]e will show the world that Britain is not all united in grief and that we are 
turning our backs on Thatcherism84. 
                                            
83
 The point being made here is clearly demonstrable in the effectively identikit style of architecture 
that has come to dominate new build housing and office developments in cities worldwide. 
 
84
 Rebecca Lush [event organizer], from Facebook page for the protest, available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/events/555029311185031/?active_tab=highlights Updated: April 17, 2013; 
accessed: August 31, 2016. 
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The “turning our backs” line seems, on the face of it, to be jarringly literal-minded — 
almost juvenile. But the whole funeral, along with the media and parliamentary 
eulogies delivered in Thatcher’s honour, can be seen as an attempt to crystalise and 
anchor a sense of an integrated public and a shared reading of national and political 
history around this one particular body. Bodies are important, here. Claude Lefort 
has argued that the dissolution of the “corporeality of the social” (Lefort, 1986, p. 
303) in universal suffrage is a hallmark of democracies. This corporeality was 
dissolved with the removal of monarchs who received their mandate from the divine 
and provided a model for the integrity and order of the social. They were literally a 
“head of state” whose body modelled and contained the rest of society. For Lefort, 
universal suffrage dissolved this body and its (hierarchical) order into a horizontal 
sequence of discrete numbers. 
The danger of numbers is greater than the danger of an intervention by the 
masses on the political scene; the idea of number as such is opposed to the 
substance of society. Number breaks down unity, destroys identity (Ibid, p. 
303). 
Whilst the UK is a constitutional democracy rather than a republic, the monarchy 
has, for the main part, assiduously avoided any overt political position; aside from 
the obviously political position that holds that there should be a monarchy. The 
sacral body of the monarch, a vertical point that anchors the horizontal spread of 
history, society and institutions whilst linking the heavenly order to the earthly, is 
rather less emphasised as a trope in societies that pride themselves as 
democracies, whether monarchies or not. In fact, as Benedict Anderson pointed out, 
the nation form in some ways compensates for the loss of the divine dispensation 
that gave shape to the world, history, society and individuals’ place within it. 
 
That is not to say, however, that such societies no longer have need to wrap some 
part of themselves in a sacral mantle in which to present themselves to themselves. 
In many cases, the nation form itself will take the place of the monarch and the 
divine order that they symbolised. Symbols such as flags or sites such as war 
memorials may be used; often the bodies of national heroes, such as Olympic 
athletes or reality TV stars, will take their place as the emblematic link between 
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individual, history and public. 
 
Arguably, the decision to give Thatcher a funeral procession through central London, 
to mute the bells in Westminster, provide a gun salute at London Bridge, as well as a 
military escort in full regalia and ceremony at St. Paul’s cathedral was an attempt to 
cement her significance in twentieth-century UK history. In so doing, it aimed to 
position her as a quasi-royal personage85 (unusually for a Prime Minister’s funeral, 
the queen herself attended), a national ancestor in her capacity as the founder of 
“Thatcherism” — the ideology that locally took her name. It was also transparently 
intended to legitimate the ideology and actions of the Tory-led coalition government 
of the time by tying it to this construction as essentially “British”. This ideology, then, 
was to be equated with the nation through the figure of Thatcher; the parallels 
between the “ceremonial” Thatcher funeral and the state funeral of wartime Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill were not accidental. Churchill was granted a state funeral 
in recognition of his role leading the government during a world war, this war, and its 
associated clichés such as the “Blitz spirit” is often invoked as a foundational event 
for the modern UK, a parable of national sacrifice, courage and endurance, leading 
to the vanquishing of an undeniable evil. The comparisons were an invitation to see 
Thatcher’s period in office in a similar light, as a period of struggle against morally 
bankrupt adversaries in order to found a new and better dispensation. This was not 
only due to the victory over Argentina in the relatively insignificant 1982 Falklands 
War, but also events like the 1984–85 strike by the National Union of Mineworkers, 
which arguably inaugurated several decades of decline in the power of organised 
labour 86. 
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 The columnist Peter Oborne made a perceptive point at the time in The Daily Telegraph: that the 
deliberate blurring of the categories of “state” and “ceremonial” funeral and the presence of the Queen 
undermined the separation between the “executive and ceremonial functions” in the British state. I do 
not believe that this undermining was a “mistake”, but rather it was entirely deliberate. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/9984619/Margaret-Thatcher- This-is-a-
state-funeral-and-thats-a-mistake.html Last updated: April 10, 2013; accessed: August 31, 2016. 
86
 A typical example of this view would be from Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement in front of 
Downing Street immediately after her death. Cameron states that Thatcher didn’t “just lead our 
country; she saved our country” going on to say that she “took a country that was on its knees and 
made Britain stand tall again”. He uses the word “battle” repeatedly, listing the purported enemies 
that she defeated (apparently single-handed): 
taking on the union barons, privatising industry […] rescuing our economy, letting people 
buy their council homes, winning the Falklands war, strengthening our defences and 
helping to win the cold war. 
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The protesters’ turn was, in the most literal sense possible, a trope. Apart from the 
physical turn away from the proffered version of national history and politics it 
proffered, it was also tropic in the rhetorical sense of a change in direction of thought 
or argument, wrought through a figure of speech. It could not have functioned as a 
performative act from a distance. Being physically present amongst the crowds was 
necessary to it. As Žižek has pointed out, the universal manifests in the negative 
through particular being — as particular as individuals in the crowd at a staged 
national event. The action presented a critical modulation of the British public as a 
body united in grief for the loss of a national saviour that the funeral attempted to 
stage. The back-turners turned the supposed unanimity of the event into a setting to 
stage the political, as opposed to politics; which is, in Carl Schmitt’s definition, that 
which precedes politics and in fact makes any particular politics possible: the friend-
enemy distinction (Schmitt, 2007, p.26). The demonstration asserted that a national 
public is not definable as a shared sentiment or content, but — insofar as it is 
democratic — as an agonistic space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOsLYBq1g_8, Updated: April 8, 2013; 
accessed: August 31, 2016. 
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The Bike Cemetery 
Fragments which seem inconsequential may be the most precious for the 
purpose of oblique representation (Gilloch, 2002, p.68). 
 
DISFIGMENT BANKRUPSEA87 
 
It is a mere crumb of land less than a mile from the east London site of the 2012 
Olympics, that arena of victorious national becoming. It is demarcated — you might 
say cut adrift — by a busy main road and a slip road and overpass for the M11. Even 
the most shameless speculative builder of starter homes, or entry-level buy-to-let 
flats would find it difficult to sell the kind of intimacy with the traffic that it has. It is a 
spindly coppice with ghosts of plastic bags rustling in its branches. As far as I know it 
lacks a name, so I have called it the Bike Cemetery because when I first came 
across it in 2001, it was full of the stripped carcasses of bicycles which I assumed 
were stolen somewhere nearby and cannibalised on the site. 
 
I have described it as the sort of place you might find yourself at first light on a 
Monday morning in the thin drizzle, wondering how you got there and knowing that 
you were meant to be somewhere else — perhaps muttering “not again”. I have 
returned there on a number of occasions in the intervening years, though it might be 
true to say that a part of me has never left it. The space has occupied my 
imagination, becoming for me at various times an entrance to the underworld, the 
grove of the Erinyes88, the unacknowledged centre of the city or the Omphalos of the 
state. It has provided me with a topic. That is to say, it has given me a place to 
stand, or ground to defend — a virtual point from which (or perhaps through which) I 
have tried to survey the present time. The mosaic of the wall, its fragments of image 
and text spread out like pages of an emblem book (see Fig. 11) has cohered into a 
series of images. 
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 Text on the wall of the Bike Cemetery. 
88
 Both Bike Cemetery and the grove share a quality of not so much being untouched as untouchable. 
In Sophocles’ play, the grove is forbidden to casual wanderers but it remains unclear as to whether 
this is for fear of polluting the place, or that their trespass should spread the pollution beyond its 
bounds. In the case of the Bike Cemetery, although I have visited many times of day and night and 
seen obvious traces of transient human presence, I have only on one occasion met, or even seen, 
other people there — two teenaged boys who said they were looking for a lost dog. 
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This sense of the untimely, the missed appointment, that I have said the site evokes 
is of some importance here. I would not say that it is simply my — perhaps 
illegitimately subjective — projection or a poetic flight of fancy. The nagging, but 
unspecific “not again” belongs, I assert, to that erfahrung of the festival days that 
Benjamin wrote of as “places of recollection”, holidays which are entered on the 
calendar as “blank spaces” (Benjamin, 2013, p. 184); times out of time. As such, this 
vague bad conscience (for want of a better phrase) of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time is, itself, quite literally a sense out of time, or out of this time (the full 
ambiguity of the this I have just used should be noted, as should the great deal of 
work it does). 
Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of 
the individual past combine with material of the collective past. The rituals with 
their ceremonies, their festivals […] kept producing the amalgamation of these 
two elements of memory over and over again. They triggered recollection at 
certain times and remained handles of memory for a lifetime (Ibid, 2013, p.159). 
I suggest that this is a very familiar feeling to many people. Every Christmas (the last 
remaining major public holiday in the UK), one cannot avoid thinking of previous 
Christmases, who they were spent with — family histories and historic rows. For a 
large part of the population it provides a still point of remembrance, to be relished or 
dreaded, or both. 
 
The Bike Cemetery could be called a “blank space” on the map of the city89. Its 
intimate proximity to traffic has — so far — spared it the attentions of developers. It 
shares this quality of apparent blankness with all other pieces of what was called 
“waste ground” in my childhood. They were, and still are, an inevitable by-product of 
the fluctuations of industry and commerce, blank spaces left by failed factories, or 
situated in the interstices between parcels of land given over to newer enterprises. 
The term still has value, though perhaps “brownfield” is used more often now — a 
term used by planners and developers to differentiate it from “green” land 
                                            
89
 Also, as it is neither park or farmland, it has been spared the herbicides and pesticides that have 
decimated insect and animal species, no matter what other poisons have leached into it over years of 
industry in Hackney Wick. 
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(purportedly untouched) and designates it as already used, perhaps used up and 
likely contaminated by that use90. It is worth noting that whilst brownfield has an 
implication of future (the province of developers and planners) use in it, waste 
ground instead emphasises its present state as “waste”, the current persistence of its 
un-utility. This persistence is what William Viney called in his book, Waste: A 
Philosophy of Things (2014), the “tardy but unresolved, ‘already-and-not-yet’ of 
wastetime” (Viney, 2014, p. 11); already gone (from use) and yet persisting, waste 
performs a perpetual valediction on the threshold of non-existence, but never passes 
over it.  
 
I choose to continue to use the term familiar from my childhood for what I consider to 
be its greater resonance so it is appropriate to unpack it somewhat. First, to consider 
the terms separately: “waste”, like rubbish, is an unwanted by-product of a process; it 
comes afterwards and represents that afterwards in the present. It is also a term that 
refuses to enumerate its content. It blankets what it indicates in summary dismissal. 
To stand accused of talking rubbish is to be told that there is no significance to your 
words; few inquire as to the specific constitution of a landfill — beyond its capacities 
as, for example, a methane extraction facility or recycling point. Rubbish remains 
itself insofar as it is not recycled, returned as useful material to the system that 
produced it as waste. As itself, rubbish has no issue, but remains stubbornly present 
nonetheless, so it is usually shovelled away to an unseen location. As a verb, waste 
demarcates the gratuitous, spendthrift act: wasting time, energy or money, to use the 
most common examples. It is also sometimes used as a colloquial euphemism for 
the act of killing in its literal sense. This works both ways — the null time of waiting 
for a train or bus is time that one “kills”. It denotes a profligate act which denies 
resources to more productive uses by consuming them. The connotations of the 
“ground” part of the conjunction are various; it is what we all have as our support, 
courtesy of gravity, and to speak of being or feeling “grounded” is to evoke an 
experience of being solid, rooted, not floating around, unmoored. Ground is a base 
where one starts from when metaphorically building thought or argument — as is 
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 As contamination can necessitate the expense of cleaning the land up to make it fit for other 
purposes, “greenfield” sites for development have often been more sought after by developers; 
however, restrictions on building on green sites and inducements such as relaxation of local planning 
laws have made development on brownfield sites, especially in cities, more attractive to developers in 
the UK. 
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obviously necessary with a literal building — “from the ground up”. Ground is also an 
origin referring back to an assumed beginning. 
 
This impression is in part due to its having been used as a casual dump. From when 
I first visited up until sometime in 2011, the ground was thickly sown with bin bags 
containing clothes and other objects (see Fig. 12) that I assumed were unsold and 
unwanted items from the very large unauthorised Sunday market that had sprung up 
on the site of an abandoned dog racing track to the east. 
A burnt boot…crushed cans…ashes…bin bag, spilling its guts…burnt 
plastic…soles detached…from shoes…ashes…roof tiles…single rubber 
glove…over the mounded and overgrown rubble…sparks of new, blue off-
licence bags leap out against the leaves…the green and the brown…and 
the traffic on the road beyond flickers between the trees91. 
Waste can seem timeless, or, perhaps more accurately, untimely. As Giorgio 
Agamben writes in a very useful essay What Is the Contemporary? (2009) “Those 
who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither 
perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are thus in this 
sense irrelevant […]” (2009, p.40). Obviously, Agamben is here discussing human 
subjects, whilst the things of waste have no volition. What he means is that the 
intentions that subjects have, the schemes and plans — even the repetitive rituals of 
daily life — tie them to their times, that is, their times92, the times of their intentions, 
just as the driver of a car does not necessarily notice the margins of the road they 
drive upon. The road, too, is to most intents and purposes invisible unless there is a 
pothole. Intent carries subjects across the chasm of the present, their eyes firmly 
fixed on the horizons, near or far, of their ends. This tying together through time, of 
intent and consummation, is the valorised place of Nietzsche’s “animal with the right 
to make promises”93. However, we promising animals do not achieve this purely 
through individual will bolstered by self-inflicted cruelties as Nietzsche thought (Ibid) 
— we are accompanied by objects in our patterning and parcelling out of our times. 
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 From Return to the Bike Cemetery (2015). Audio Disk 2 and online. 
92
 Agamben points out that the term saeculum, often used to mean “age” or “century” originally 
designated the span of an individual’s lifetime (Ibid, p.42). 
93
 See book 2 of Ecce Homo (1989) for Nietzsche’s brilliant dissection of conscience. 
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The tube of toothpaste measures out a certain anticipated number of nights, a tank 
of petrol or pouch of tobacco contain a certain expected mileage or amount of days 
punctuated by cigarette breaks; a pair of shoes promises a certain amount of 
comfortable walking. As William Viney puts it in his book, Waste: A Philosophy of 
Things (2014), we live "codependent temporalities, neither entirely human nor non- 
human" (Viney, 2014, p. 184). If this is accepted as a reasonable assertion, then it is 
worth considering what the constant cycle of obsolescence in consumer goods does 
to our times. 
 
Various times, abandoned or exhausted, are contained within the things of waste. 
Like tradition, they persist in dereliction, no matter how the apostles of “progress” (of 
the technological kind at least) trumpet that the world is beginning to march in unison 
towards a brightly liberal democratic future, synchronised by the drum beat of 
perpetual innovation in shiny machines.94 Viney discusses the "matter out of place" 
approach (derived from Mary Douglas95 — often applied to dirt or rubbish) and briefly 
dismisses it. To him, assigning matter to space as its proper domain, as Douglas 
does, ignores the element of time. He describes the ways in which objects structure 
our time through their usefulness in aiding the fulfilment of our intentions. 
 
He calls the temporality contained in them "use time" (Viney, 2014, p.7), which we 
perceive in objects, and that when it expires with the utility it contains, consigns the 
object (for us) to a "was". Their trajectory through time (through our histories) has 
halted, interrupted. It is this "was" that lends allegory its charge, according to 
Benjamin. The gods and their attributes, the emblematic objects in their telling 
juxtapositions, have come too late; their contemporaneously speaking presence (as 
if there ever was such a thing) has been left back in the time of their use when they 
spoke to those who were complicit with them in that time. Their hollowed-out 
persistence, severed from the former life-world that they were part of, like stage 
properties, was what made them available to allegory. 
                                            
94
 For an analysis of techno-utopian ideas that reflexively link liberal democracy with consumer 
capitalism and the ways in which they have played out, see Evgeny Morozov The Net Delusion: How 
Not to Liberate the World (2011). 
95
 Famously in Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (2002). 
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That which is touched by the allegorical intention is torn from the context of 
life's interconnections: it is simultaneously shattered and conserved. Allegory 
attaches itself to the rubble (Trümmer). It offers the image of transfixed unrest. 
(Benjamin, Spencer et. al., 1985) 
It would certainly be true to say that dereliction and rubble, if left as such, are both 
"shattered", as remains of buildings and preserved as rubble, if a further use is not 
found for it (see Fig. 13, Fig. 14). It remains as the shell of the use value and time 
that it used to possess, like the dead batteries that the soil of the Bike Cemetery is 
thickly sown with — a properly profane aufheben. 
[…W]hen newness became a fetish, history itself became a manifestation of the 
commodity form (Buck-Morss, 1991, p. 82). 
The Bike Cemetery also attracted a writer and bricoleur. The wall of the overpass 
was liberally graffitied. The texts, constructed from single words or short phrases, 
heavy on repetition and play, were not the usual genres — not political slogans, 
football chants, sexual slander or biblical quotations. Neither were they the stylised 
tags of graffiti artists that mark territory or conduct rivalry with other writers or crews 
of writers. There were portmanteau words, a stuttering repetition of syllables and an 
obsessive chant repeatedly scrawled through the middle of the wall — “Wolf Vanish”. 
This compulsion to repeat evidenced in some of the inscriptions has been mirrored 
by my own periodic returns to the site96. 
 
This was interspersed with collaged printed matter, predominantly magazine pages 
with images of animals, adverts and fashion photographs from the late 1980s and 
very early 1990s, Monopoly money and food packaging, and some porn, though not 
nearly as much as might be expected. Judging from the dates on the magazine 
pages, the work was done sometime around 1991. I believe the entire wall was the 
work of one person due to the handwriting of the graffiti, the thematic consistency, 
and the fact that the same paint was used to write and stick the images to the wall. 
 
                                            
96
 see Apostrophe for a Citizen on Disc 1 and appendix 3, compensationton bankrupsea on Disc 1 
and Return to the Bike Cemetery on Audio Disc 2 for examples of my re-hearsing the texts from the 
wall. 
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I have often wondered about this person, who they were, and why they created the 
bricolage along the wall. To start with, I decided that their actual identity was 
unimportant because it was the work they had left that mattered. Later, I came 
around to the similar (though no means identical) viewpoint that it was anonymity 
itself that was important. The writer and site both became a clear manifestation of a 
stranger-relationality that I believe is a necessary condition for the liberal democratic 
state, as I have known it. For me, that is as important to the work as the site in which 
it was made and seen — I will not go so far as to say “where it was displayed”, 
because I can have no idea whether display was the motivation of its maker. I have 
no idea whether it was aimed at an audience or not; if it was, there is no way to tell 
who they were and what part in their economies of display it was meant to play. 
 
In his book Publics and Counterpublics, Michael Warner points out that the 
contemporary world is unique in that “[…m]ost of the people around us belong to our 
world not directly, as kin or comrades or in any other relation to which we could give 
a name, but as strangers” (2002, p. 7). This is what he elsewhere refers to as 
“stranger relationality”97. This form of relationality is one of the defining features of 
modern liberal democratic societies. It is based upon a certain reserve, and an idea 
of the individual as an entity in possession of a private, closed individuality. The way 
that the phenomenon of is conceptualised traffic can demonstrate this. 
 
The Bike Cemetery is islanded and penetrated by the noise of traffic; the roar and 
rumble there is unremitting. It almost seems to create an arena or bare stage in 
which the sound can clearly manifest. Omnipresent though it ordinarily is throughout 
the city, it is rarely consciously acknowledged. I am writing this now, a few miles 
away, in a room within a building that fronts onto a relatively well-traversed road. The 
council has installed speed bumps to calm what was a regular danger to the children 
attending the school along here, but should I choose to, I can still tell the time of day 
simply by listening to its rhythms, its slight variations in speed and larger variations of 
density — sirens during rush hour and weekend nights. It is unusual in the city, 
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 “A public might almost be said to be stranger-relationality in a pure form, because other ways of 
organizing strangers — nations, religions, races, guilds — have manifest positive content” (Ibid, p. 75, 
my emphasis). 
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however, to be in what is woodland, threadbare though it is, filled with that roar98. 
The wall that supports the motorway slip road at its edge also provides a support for 
the inscriptions and imagery found there. Road and writing share the same physical 
foundation: the transit of the stranger. 
 
What we call "traffic" is actually composed of particular individuals in their vehicles 
whose identity can be known only to the proper authorities, masked as they are by 
windscreens and a carapace of steel like rioters, looters, or riot police. Subsumed 
into the collective noun, traffic, these individuals and their cars nonetheless have, as 
individuals, no direct relationship to it. Any one of them can leave the stream of traffic 
and get out of their vehicle to stand at the kerb and watch the traffic pass, 
unchanged and unchanging, without them. 
 
It is commonplace to excuse some lateness or non-arrival by saying that one was 
caught in traffic. Never that one was part of that traffic jam. This is, on the surface, 
simply the disavowal that both creates and responds to the problem that pursuit of 
individual utility leads to results incompatible with collective good, the so-called 
tragedy of the commons — those "externalities" that much classic economics 
ignores. If those in the traffic jam had travelled instead on public transport, thus 
reducing the volume of vehicles trying to use the roads, they would all get to their 
destinations faster, although no single individual would. We can say what this 
disavowal highlights is that "other people" are the problem, or that individualised 
solutions do not solve collective problems; in fact, they may make the problem 
harder to see as a collective one. But whilst this is true, that disavowal also 
demonstrates the clear — and I would say, allegorical — gap between "traffic" as 
abstract idea and the experience of any individual driver or passenger. Traffic has its 
own rules, its own destinations, or lack of them, as it clogs the roads and introduces 
a caesura, or hiccup, into the smooth teleology of the journey; in its roar and 
imposed stasis it represents another aspect of the waste time of modernity. 
 
As Susan Buck-Morss puts it in The Dialectics of Seeing (1991), her companion and 
manual to Benjamin’s unfinished Arcades Project, the coming of the railways in the 
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 See Appendix 1, Invocation. 
 
79 
 
nineteenth century provided a new metaphor for history and progress: 
Railroads were the referent, and progress the sign, as spatial movement 
became so wedded to the concept of historical movement that these could no 
longer be distinguished (Buck-Morss, 1991, p.91). 
Now we have super-fast internet as the sign and panacea for fears of falling into 
obsolescence, whilst we also still have projects like the HS2 high-speed rail line 
which David Cameron promoted by happily combining the literal train with a 
metaphorical race; both are predicated on speed: 
I think if we want to be in the front rank of countries, if we want to be a winner in 
what I call the global race, then we've got to have a really fast and efficient 
transport infrastructure99. 
Cameron has never made clear what “winning” this “global race” would look like, only 
that in order to do so, the UK population needs to work harder and have the means 
to do it faster; but the teleological inclination is clear. 
 
So how does the transit of the stranger manifest? In his essay, On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin observed that despite his being a resolutely modern 
and urban poet, the perpetual street crowd of unknown passers- by in Paris was not 
directly represented in Baudelaire’s poems, “[…] but it is imprinted on his creativity 
as a hidden figure” (2013, p.165). In explaining this strange observation, he outlines 
a theory of modern experience and what he describes as its atrophy — the full and 
elaborate details of which, though both fascinating and provocative, are beyond the 
scope of this essay. For my purposes here, I concentrate on Benjamin’s distinction 
between two different types of experience and their differing relations to temporality. 
One form is described as collective and continuous across time (erfahrung), whilst 
the other is individualised and episodic (erlebnis). There is no precise equivalent for 
these two terms in English, but David Ferris provides a very helpful analogy: “An 
appreciation of the distinction [between erfahrung and erlebnis] can be gained in 
English if experience (in the sense of what is handed on from one person to the next) 
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 David Cameron, 2013, quoted in the Evening Standard. 
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is contrasted with experiences” (2008, p.111). I think that this works well — to say 
that someone has “experience” is to say something about knowledge and 
competencies developed over time, some form of wisdom that is more than the sum 
total of disparate “experiences”. The first sense, which should be identified with 
“experience” — erfahrung — is 
[…] less the product of facts firmly anchored in memory than of a convergence 
in memory of accumulated and frequently unconscious data. (Benjamin, 2013, 
p.157) 
It is a form that links individual and collective experience across time, but not in the 
sense of a conscious chronology; in an important sense, it could be said to be 
opposed to chronology understood as a linear sequence of events. Benjamin 
equates it with the blank spaces on the calendar that marked holidays, heterogenous 
elements caught, like fossils or flies in amber, in the orderly parade of numbered 
work days. It also exists in the form of stories and hand crafts (what were known 
under the medieval Guild system as “mysteries” handed down from master to 
apprentice); also “craft” as a metaphor for skills and knowings developed over long 
generations of practice. The frustrated desire for this might explain the recent 
preponderance of shops and products billed as “artisanal” — e.g. artisan coffee 
shops, artisan bakeries, micro-breweries — in gentrifying areas of London. 
Benjamin gives the example of a newspaper as the epitome of modern experience. 
Prioritising the current and recent, it gives disjointed facts and figures; even its layout 
reinforces the presentation of each item as essentially discrete. It boils down to 
information given about “some various things that have (just) happened” (Ibid, 
pp.158–9); the purpose of which is to maintain an apparent separation between 
events described in the news items and the life of the reader, rendering their 
personal experience essentially inward and individualised. 
The current vogue for online petitions “shared” across social media
100
 in reaction to 
individual stories often demanding apologies from, or the sacking of, various public 
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 See www.change.org for a sample. On May 19, 2016 the home page displays petitions to save the 
BBC’s recipe online archive from closure (187,035 supporters), to appoint Steve Lewis MBA — the 
“Peoples’ Taxman” — head of the board of HMRC (152,046 supporters), allowing couples of all 
orientations to enter Civil Partnerships (69,488 supporters). 
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figures attests to the effect and affect of contemporary news consumption. The 
frequently cited engine for this — the expression of personal (or personalised, 
complete with email address and a space to leave an optional comment) outrage — 
is a narcissistic form of identity politics. Whilst I do not subscribe to this view, I 
believe that this form places far too much emphasis on individual experiences 
(usually of prejudice and oppression) of subjects as a currency in debate. This can 
have the effect — and often does on the internet and social media — of reducing 
systematic inequality and exploitation to a discussion about experiences, including 
the policing of who has the right to speak of these things on the grounds of their 
experience. I think this can come dangerously close to not so much bringing of what 
was previously relegated to the private out into the public sphere — which is a 
necessary part of struggle for rights and recognition — as reconfiguring the public 
sphere as simply an extension of the private one. 
This individualised and self-contained experience is what Benjamin calls erlebnis, 
literally meaning to “live through” or “be alive at the time of”. It has strong 
connotations of first-hand witnessing. It also, as Georg Gadamer pointed out, has a 
close relationship with the Romantic conception of the symbolic — a luminous self- 
contained moment charged with significance101. It was a term of some importance to 
later nineteenth-102 and early twentieth-century philosophy103 — and retains 
considerable cachet in the early twenty-first century104 — as the production and 
marketing of “experiences” is believed by some to be the next logical step for 
consumer capitalism in the West 105 as the service economy becomes overcrowded 
and manufacturing is outsourced. Some of the apostles of this new economy 
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 In contrast to the abstractness of understanding and the particularity of perception or 
representation, this concept implies a connection with totality, with infinity (Gadamer, 2004, p. 55). 
Also, see the previous chapter for a discussion of the symbol versus allegory. 
102
Gadamer states that the word erlebnis was a relatively late coinage in German, coming into wider 
usage around 1870, tellingly through its use in autobiographies and biographies where emphasis 
would be placed on experiences deemed formative for the subject’s later development (see Gadamer, 
2004, p.53). 
103
 Benjamin cites Wilhelm Dilthey, author of Experience and Poetry (1905) and also the father of 
archetypal analysis, Karl Jung. 
104
 See Pine, G. (1998). The “Creative Class” booster Richard Florida also makes much of what he 
asserts as his affluent subjects’ strong preference for “experiences” over other goods: 
On many fronts, the Creative Class lifestyle comes down to a passionate quest for 
experience. The ideal […] is to “live the life” — a creative life packed full of intense, high- 
quality, multidimensional experiences (Florida, 2002, p.166). 
105
 Universities, for example, now compete to offer the best “student experience”. The Times Higher 
Educational Supplement publishes a “Student Experience” league table. 
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describe it like this: 
An experience occurs when a company intentionally uses services as the 
stage, and goods as props, to engage individual customers in a way that 
creates a memorable event. Commodities are fungible, goods tangible, 
services intangible, and experiences memorable. (Pine, Gilmore, 1998, original 
emphasis.) 
The article quoted above reinforces the point in presenting a table setting out the 
specific qualities desired variously of commodities, raw materials, manufactured 
goods, services and experiences which places “personal” as a key attribute of 
experiences, just after “memorable”. Richard Florida, the promoter of the so-called 
“Creative Classes”, adds another attribute he claims as essential to his favoured 
demographic: that those experiences are “authentic” (2002, pp.187, 228–9). 
Authenticity plays an important part in contemporary life for many; it entails the 
application to experience of the category of truth. This is clearly a very difficult thing 
to pin down, and Florida, by his own admission, does not manage it very 
successfully. 
 
Steven Poole, writing in the London Review of Books blog, describes the disgust felt 
by some urban coffee drinkers when it was discovered that a supposedly 
“independent” chain of coffee shops, Harris + Hoole, was in fact almost half owned 
by the supermarket chain Tesco, so not strictly independent at all. Poole quotes the 
outraged owner of a rival coffee shop who says Tesco’s bashfulness about their part 
ownership of the chain that they kept quiet is because “they know it doesn’t match 
with artisan values they are trying to make money out of”. This leads Poole to quite 
reasonably wonder if this rival business owner wasn’t also trying to make money out 
of these same values106. Celeste Olaquiaga, in her book The Artificial Kingdom: a 
Treasury of Kitsch Experience, describes the experience of authenticity thus: 
A true fetish, authenticity stands for an era where the perception of things was 
more direct, mainly because it lacked both the complicating dimension of 
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 Poole, Get Your Authentic Hot Water Here (2013). Available at: 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/01/09/steven-poole/get-your-authentic-hot-water-here/comment-page-  
1/ Last updated: January 9, 2013; accessed May 22, 2016. 
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capital, […] and the process of mechanical reproduction, in which the 
proliferation of copies unintentionally enhances the values of immediacy and 
originality (1998, p.16). 
She goes on to make the important point that “authenticity”, rather than a timeless 
value of the object (“timelessness” presumed to inhere in pre-modern times) is an 
historical experience; it “takes place in the historical interaction between subject and 
experience” (Ibid, p. 17). 
 
Interestingly, in relation to Baudelaire’s absent crowd, Richard Florida also extols 
what he calls “a good street scene” packed with “many ethnic groups”, “various ages, 
conditions and sizes” and lastly “many people of exotic appearance” (Florida, 2002, 
p.186). All of this is picturesque background that is consciously experienced, as grist 
to the creatives’ mill; Florida also recommends that it can be utilised as a unique 
selling point for the city or district that can display it. It is, in estate-agent speak, the 
valorisation of a mixture of the “trendy” and “edgy”107 that is used to market areas to 
aspirational young owner-occupiers. For example, a recent development in east 
London has the following sentence in its promotional brochure: 
Vibrantly raw and street-level cool, it's undeniably one of the most exciting 
places in London to call home108. 
The developer, Telford Home’s appreciation of this vibrancy, rawness and coolness 
doesn’t seem to extend as far as allowing any of the local population to intrude into 
shot in the video produced to promote it, however. This will be further discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
This brings us back, albeit circuitously, to Benjamin and his discussion of the 
absence of the crowd in Baudelaire. The crowd is not explicitly evoked as a crowd, 
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 This usually translates as “visible poverty nearby”. It is sometimes conjoined with “vibrant”, which 
means “high percentage of people of colour in the area”. People of colour can be either “vibrant” or 
“edgy”. 
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 Text taken from the brochure for the “Vibe Dalston” development from a section headed “Discover 
the Cool of the East”. The brochure is available at: 
http://www.telfordhomes.london/microsites/vibe/brochure/index.html#p=1 Last update: 2013; 
accessed June 10, 2014. 
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or the experience of one in his poetry because it did not become part of the chronicle 
of his experience. It could not be summoned out of memory as part of the catalogue 
of daily events. This is because it did not consciously register; it slipped under 
Baudelaire's defences, so to speak. Benjamin suggests that there are two types of 
memory corresponding to the two forms of experience already outlined. Citing Freud, 
he suggests that individual consciousness preserves its own integrity, not by being 
open to external stimuli — he refers to these as “shocks” and emphasises that 
modern urban societies generate increasing amounts of them109 — but by “parrying” 
them; deflecting their force into the conscious mind and memory. If not parried, they 
lodge in the unconscious. 
The first type of memory, following Proust, he calls memoire volontaire; this is the 
ordinary act of remembering something, its vital characteristic is that “the information 
which it gives about the past retains no trace of it” (Benjamin, 2013, p.158); that is, 
the information is nothing more than information and contains nothing of the 
experience. This corresponds to erlebnis — experience as personal and discrete, 
aptly demonstrated by the example of reading the newspaper. The shock experience 
is parried, and the stimulus enters the chronicle within consciousness of “things that 
have happened”. 
Benjamin draws a parallel between this and photography110 — both the act of taking 
a photograph and that of looking at photographs — citing Proust’s comment that his 
voluntary recollections of Venice resembled nothing more than a set of photographs 
(Ibid, p.187). This makes me think more of holiday postcards than the “artistic” 
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 This was by no means an unusual notion at the time. On the reactionary side, Max Nordau, the 
author of the extremely popular book, Degeneration (1892), attempts to explain and denigrate much 
of European high culture of his period on the grounds that it was a direct result of the individual 
pathologies of artists and writers. Amongst the various things that he assigned as enabling conditions 
for the spread of this “degeneracy” was the “fatigue” caused by rapid urbanisation and technological 
change in Europeans of the nineteenth century. 
All its conditions of life have, in this period of time, experienced a revolution unexampled in 
the history of the world. Humanity can point to no century in which the inventions which 
penetrate so deeply, so tyrannically, into the life of every individual are crowded so thick as in 
ours. (Nordau, 1895, p.37) 
110
 Benjamin enumerates a vocabulary of modern gestures that he claims started with the invention of 
the match, in which a quick gesture replaces a complicated process “[…] the countless movements of 
switching, inserting, pressing, and the like […]” (Ibid, p.174). He describes the ease with which a 
photograph can be taken — simply a tiny gesture with the finger on the shutter button, fixing a 
moment as part of the archive — as being fundamentally related to the dominant place of erlebnis as 
an understanding of experience. This tendency towards economy of movement has by no means 
decelerated — how many more processes the even more cursory gesture of swiping and tapping the 
screen on a smart phone can set in motion? 
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variety of photograph that might be put on exhibition for its own sake; the postcard 
pretends to no status other than an index of the place by representing a distinctive 
(or as distinctive as can be managed) aspect of it, and the purchaser’s presence 
there — “I was here and this is what I saw”. The postcard is a souvenir; elsewhere, 
Benjamin argues that 
The souvenir is the relic secularized. […] The relic derives from the corpse, the 
souvenir from deceased experience (Erfahrung) which calls itself 
euphemistically "Erlebnis” (1985)111. 
As in many other places, Benjamin implies a connection with ritual — this one relates 
the souvenir, via the relic (a skull, finger or bone fragment, allegedly once part of a 
saint) back to religious practice and by implication with the temporal-spatial practices 
of the pilgrimage. The saint’s relic was believed to retain some trace of the numinous 
that they either embodied or were imbued with in life by a process of sacred 
contagion. Touching, or even just looking upon a fragment of them would cure 
sickness and save the souls of those who did so. As a commodified memory, the 
souvenir represents the shell of an experience that is taken for (or as) the thing itself. 
[…O]nly what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has 
not happened to the subject as an experience, can become a component of the 
memoire involontaire (Benjamin, 2013, pp. 160–1). 
The second form of memory is memoire involontaire — that which was contained in 
the Proustian madeleine. This is material which is not blocked by the conscious 
mind, or not sufficiently, and so does not become like the entries in the chronicle of 
memory which are available to be consciously retrieved at will but lacking in content 
the way that a photograph lacks it. This past does not belong strictly to individual 
experience in the sense that biographical memory does — accents and modes of 
speaking, frequently unconsciously employed, display some of the strata of this 
collective past. 
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 From Central Park (Benjamin, 1985), a text that like Some motifs in Baudelaire, was originally 
intended to be part of Benjamin’s unfinished book on Baudelaire. 
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It is erfahrung, the handed-down wisdom of the collective — that modern industrial 
society was rapidly eroding in the late 1930s, the decade in which Benjamin was 
describing this ongoing erosion in Baudelaire’s mid-nineteenth century. The process 
has not ceased since. Yet, if I can plausibly assert that it is still ongoing, then it has 
taken upwards of a century and a half and is still incomplete. What is this rapid and 
long-standing process, this perpetual churn that, for all its apparent rapidity, has not 
yet completed? One answer might be that it is the ceaseless production of novelty, 
whether in commodities or experiences, rapid obsolescence and the constant “[…] 
shock of the new, and its incessant repetition” (Buck-Morss, 1991, p.191). 
Or perhaps, it might make as much sense to ask what it is that is perpetually 
vanishing, yet persists in that disappearance? (see Fig. 15)112. Although that 
question has the irritating triteness of a riddle, it can be reasonably answered as “this 
present moment”. Time weighs heavily on both production and consumption. 
The opposition between clearly remembered facts and this unconscious 
convergence is of importance here. Benjamin’s argument, as it relates to what he 
describes in this essay and elsewhere113 as “tradition”, is what properly constitutes 
experience. Put simply, tradition is the accumulated practice of generations, that 
which is sometimes called wisdom and is also passed down in the form of craft skills 
and stories. It is this which links the individual to the collective. Benjamin illustrated 
this point with a discussion of the effects of unskilled factory labour under the 
influence of Fordist industrial discipline. The worker needs to perform only one 
movement, which is repeated ad infinitum. There is no need for long experience or 
nuanced understanding of the work process. The effect of this denigration is even 
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 Emblem of Kairos, or occasion. In the best tradition of the early modern emblematists, I have 
chosen to accompany the image with a text for the same emblem from a different source that has a 
slightly different emphasis to the one that accompanies this particular engraving: 
[…] Who are you? — I am the moment of seized opportunity that governs all. — Why do 
you stand on points? — I am always whirling about. — Why do you have winged sandals 
on your feet? — The fickle breeze bears me in all directions. — Tell us, what is the reason 
for the sharp razor in your right hand? — This sign indicates that I am keener than any 
cutting edge. — Why is there a lock of hair on your brow? — So that I may be seized as I 
run towards you. — But come, tell us now, why ever is the back of your head bald? — So 
that if any person once lets me depart on my winged feet, I may not thereafter be caught by 
having my hair seized. […] I should warn all, it is an open portico that holds me. 
Translation: Glasgow Emblem Project. Available at: 
http://www.emblems.arts.gla.ac.uk/alciato/emblem.php?id=FALc121 . Accessed: May 29, 2016. 
113
 See also ‘The Storyteller’ in Illuminations (Benjamin 2013), the same volume as the Baudelaire 
essay. 
87 
 
clearer in our current age — that of the so-called “gig economy”, of casualisation and 
insecure temporary contracts forced upon workers in the name of flexibility. For the 
small number of workers who can develop the specialised forms of social and 
cultural capital required in certain narrow and oversubscribed sectors, this much 
touted “freedom” can work well114. For the vast numbers of semi- and unskilled 
workers thereby forced into precarity, it merely transfers what were previously the 
risks and responsibilities of the employer — tax, insurance, holiday and sick pay, etc. 
— onto the new-minted “freelancer”. For the majority under this system, there can be 
no “experience”, only a series of disjointed “experiences” corresponding to each 
separate contract or placement. As there are no fixed hours, there are no holidays 
(or time-and-a-half), either. 
Continuing with the example he gives of the production line worker, the shocks are 
the repetitive choreography demanded by the machine, each iteration as near 
identical to the last as possible, but not developing from it. 
Perhaps the special achievement of shock defence may be seen in its function 
of assigning to an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost 
of the integrity of its contents. This would be a peak achievement of the 
intellect; it would turn the incident into a moment that has been lived (Erlebnis) 
(Benjamin, 2013, p.163). 
 
[…T]he period in which publics have acquired the full significance of popular 
sovereignty and the bourgeois public sphere also happens, perhaps not by 
coincidence, to be the period in which the lyric — now understood as timeless 
overheard self-communion — displaces all other poetic genres […] It is now 
thought of simply as poetry (Warner, 2002, p.82, my emphasis). 
It is arguably a drastic misreading to treat the texts left on the wall as a form of lyric 
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 This would be the “creative class” much lauded by Richard Florida in his book, The Rise of the 
Creative Class: And How Its Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (2002). 
Though not its only advocate (there was an earlier UK pamphlet by Charles Leadbeater and Kate 
Oakley in 1999), Florida’s work has had a great deal of influence through this discourse on national 
and local government policy, allocation of resources and planning decisions in Europe and the US. 
Whilst the influence of these ideas and their public advocacy has rather diminished since the great 
crash of 2008, they are still clearly used — though less by government and more by corporate 
interests (specifically property developers). 
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poetry, but I confess that the habit of doing so is near insurmountable for myself and 
others as it is deeply ingrained in culture. Once it became clear to me that the wall 
was the work of one person, questions of what spurred them to make such a thing 
seemed to automatically arise. It is interesting to me that those questions would be 
qualitatively different if it appeared to be the work of more than one person. A dual 
production, for example, would tend to make me consider the work primarily as the 
result and expression of the dynamic between the producers. In short, the work 
would be the result of a set of social conflicts and compromises. This is also 
unavoidably the case with any work by a single individual and is actually part of the 
point I am making. The foregrounding of the interpersonal is, by extension, the 
foregrounding of the social in the work of production. The socially embedded nature 
of creation is something that the standard understanding of the lyric subject 
eschews, although it might be argued that the more the social is disavowed in the 
lyric voice, the more that it is present as an unspoken excess. My misreading of the 
BC texts as lyric has the justification of the misreading or misdirection that is an 
integral part of the lyric voice. My reading of them as inscriptions that mark out or 
claim a territory is part of the same wilful misreading. The lyric voice as we have 
come to understand it, is that of the individual subtracted from their particular 
context, including the context of speech (yet is built into our reception of the form that 
we still hear a “voice”). Their addressee is uncertain, but the success of the poet or 
poem relies on the reader feeling that they are being addressed in their bounded 
particularity by another. The fact that these texts are manifested scrawled across a 
wall — in the manner that taggers, councils and emperors mark out territory — 
seems to militate against a reading that emphasises the personal effusion. Adorno’s 
comments concerning that which is repressed and yet inescapable in the lyric are 
interesting: 
It is commonly said that a perfect lyric poem must possess totality or 
universality, must provide the whole within the bounds of the poem and the 
infinite within the poem's finitude. […I]n every lyric poem the historical 
relationship of the subject to objectivity, of the individual to society, must have 
found its precipitate in the medium of a subjective spirit thrown back upon itself. 
The less the work thematises the relationship of "I" and society, the more 
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spontaneously it crystallizes of its own accord in the poem, the more complete 
this process of precipitation will be (1991, p.42). 
Like a conversation held next to a busy road, the words we speak, the way we speak 
them, is a result of the pressure of the collective that rush past. Using simpler, more 
easily decipherable words and raising our voices in order to be heard against the 
roar still expresses, whether we want it or not, the presence of the traffic. The very 
autonomous interiority that Adorno describes as being expressed in the lyric “thrown 
back on itself” is itself a product of that same society. It expresses that especially in 
its autonomy. 
 
As Michael Warner and others point out, lyric short-circuits the trajectory of discourse 
through the public, emphasising "voice" (that is, the poet's own vocabulary, syntax, 
subject matter) as something individualised, a personal property that grows out of 
their experience (erlebnis). It is of course arguable, as Benjamin did in the case of 
Baudelaire, that the lyric form provides an ersatz version of erfahrung, what is 
properly speaking erlebnis. It should be noted that in this scheme, not only is 
experience a personal property, it is also personal property, a currency. Warner 
quotes John Stuart Mill in 1833 describing lyric, as “overheard”, in opposition to 
rhetoric which is consciously heard; he also describes it as “[…] feeling confessing 
itself to itself, in moments of solitude” (Warner, 2002, p.81). This was, of course, an 
echo of Wordsworth’s famous "[…] spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings 
recollected in tranquillity"115, but Mill focusses on the role of the reader who is to 
eavesdrop, whereas for Wordsworth they are nowhere to be found. Both, however, 
emphasise the solitude of the poet, their distance from the social. These descriptions 
or prescriptions might seem at first glance uncontroversial, but they are rather 
strange. Identifying a form with the (assumed) privacy of self-communion, that is 
written to be sold in shops, published on blogs, reviewed in newspapers and online, 
to (hopefully) be read by an audience of unknown others, is strange. The fantasy is a 
powerful one, however. 
 
Rather than something produced by and vulnerable to history, the lyric speaker (or 
                                            
115
 Wordsworth (1798), quoted in Henrikson, Poem as Song: The Role of the Lyric Audience (2001). 
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singer) is ahistorical116, the result of perfected and self-contained moments that 
speaks directly to its readers across both time and space and so is the poem in 
which they manifest117. Thus also, by extension, is the individuality that produced it. 
The lyric voice can be seen as the avatar of a universalist version of private 
selfhood118, which is, not incidentally, as Michael Warner states in the quote opening 
this section, the legitimating figure of liberal democracy (when “The Family” is not 
invoked for this purpose). Especially under neoliberalising systems — whether its 
roll-back or roll-out forms — the provision of “choice” to individuals, figured as utility- 
maximising units (car drivers), is presented as the ultimate public good and the goal 
of good governance. The ostensible privacy (that is simultaneously displayed to the 
public) of the lyric voice, its distance from the social in its reflection upon its carefully 
curated personal experiences, is suggestive of the privacy of the bourgeois domestic 
interior. 
The mutual reserve and indifference, and the intellectual conditions of life in 
large social units are never more sharply appreciated in their significance for 
the independence of the individual than in the dense crowds of the metropolis, 
because the bodily closeness and lack of space make intellectual distance 
really perceivable for the first time (Simmel, 2002, p.16, my emphasis). 
I have imagined the Bike Cemetery’s bricoleur as standing before the wall, intent on 
their work. I cannot see their face. I have arrived after them, untimely. In this, I have 
associated them with the trope known as the rückenfigur — literally, “back-figure”; I 
use the German term as there is no suitably compact equivalent in English — who 
has populated much visual culture since the Romantic period, even down to 
                                            
116
 The title of this present work, And I Half Turn To Go, derives from a poem that displays an 
exemplary form of this: Christina Rossetti’s Remember, in which the speaker detaches herself from 
the present to foresee the world, and the addressee, without her. 
117
 As Virginia Jackson puts it: 
Whereas other poetic genres (epic, poems on affairs of state, georgic, pastoral, verse 
epistle, epitaph, elegy, satire) may remain embedded in specific historical occasions or 
narratives, and thus depend upon some description of those occasions and narratives for 
their interpretation […], the poetry that comes to be understood as lyric after the eighteenth 
century is thought to require as its context only the occasion of its reading. (Jackson, 2005, 
p.7, my emphasis). See also Henrickson, 2001. 
118
 I have utilised (and somewhat ironized) this notion in performance; see appendices 2 & 3. 
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blockbuster film posters119 and individuals’ private holiday snaps. The rückenfigur is 
always turned away from the viewer, very often apparently lost in contemplation of a 
sublime view before them. The most familiar example for me is Caspar David 
Friedrich’s 1818 painting Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog120  (Fig. 16) which I have 
used on several occasions (see Fig. 17). It has been reproduced on the covers of 
numerous books121 as a shorthand for various ideas loosely associated with 
Romanticism. 
 
It depicts a figure stood on a rocky outcrop staring out into a deep valley filled with 
an expanse of fog which is pierced in the near middle ground by the tops of smaller 
crags, and in the far distance, by large mountains. He is evidently having an 
experience (of the erlebnis type). The turned back and proprietorial stance dominate 
the centre of the image. What is not clear — perhaps it could never be made clear — 
is whether there is an invitation for us, as viewers, to share vicariously in it. Is the 
figure a surrogate viewer into whose place the spectator can project themselves, or 
is our purpose to be witnesses of a closed circuit formed between the wanderer and 
what they look at? If they are looking, that is. We could be presented, as observers 
here, with an image of an ideal inwardness, but also an image of self-reflexivity, the 
turn that turns away at the same time as it presents — the torsion of the subjected 
self, watching their own subjection. 
 
In Root (2015) (see Appendix 2), I described the encounter with the rückenfigur 
thusly: 
 
And it was always anterior. You walk down the street and you see it ahead of 
you; you see its back receding round the corner. Along the crags, it got 
                                            
119
 See the piece by Ryan Britt on the science fiction and fantasy website tor.com. 
http://www.tor.com/2013/01/07/the-19th-century-painting-that-most-blockbuster-movie-posters-are- 
based-on/ Accessed: 10 December, 2015. 
120
 See also Appendix 3. 
121
 The website goodreads.com lists 18 examples — which I suspect underestimates it — a caption 
perceptively describes its use as intending to “[…] signal […] that the contents are a Deep exploration 
of some dead European or another”. They range from the relatively obvious — Thus Spake 
Zarathustra — and three different tomes simply entitled Romanticism; to Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Regulatory Competence Over Online Activity, and suggestively, White Identity: Racial Consciousness 
in the 21st Century. http://www.goodreads.com/list/show/76292.Wanderers_Above_the_Sea_of_Fog 
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And there - at the edge of the city in the city where the city sputters out into sparks, flakes  
and ashes [staccato rattle and chimes]…into industrial estates and landfills…into hospitals and 
prisons…Where the streets unravel into nets to catch blown detritus and flightpaths. Outside  
the city, in the city, this is where we find our route…our root. [Rattle] And it was always anterior 
 [chime, and delay on dais contact mic audible as a dull beat]. You walk down the street and you 
see it ahead of you; you see its back receding round the corner [chime]. Along the crags, it got  
there before you…at the vantage, its face occluded; just taking it all in. Pure anteriority –  
always ahead of you and always there when you've left [Chime, dais contact delay sound, drum 
 being dropped].  
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there before you…at the vantage, its face occluded; just taking it all in. 
Pure anteriority […]. 
 
The figure is foundational, as the trope of an idealised subjectivity that has 
always already arrived. As I see them, the bricoleur of the Bike Cemetery in their 
untimely waste ground with their disjointed incantations on the wall, their turned 
back represents an opacity; of the stranger-citizen, protected by the anonymity of 
universal rights but also of some bourgeois privacy – the “creativity” one 
assumes of Florida’s “creative class” - from out of which poetry (or art) is 
produced. 
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Scalies 
Can't miss it mate — Just a step up the road, through the freshly privatised 
out-patients' clinic without walls, the result of a recent merger with the 
debtors' prison. Cemetery gates on the left, 24 hour offy on the right, and all 
the bright new, shining, glass, playschool clad, buy-to-let cash-farms, 
gleaming like an advert for the transparency and self-presence of the well-
lived life. It's just there — yeah, next to those hoardings displaying gym-
zombies with bodies like well sculpted CVs and posters exhorting 
responsible citizens to do something wild and life-affirming — go shopping 
— there's pictures of them gurning like giro day122. 
The absent crowd that Baudelaire and other lyric poets could not process returns in 
the visualisations produced by architects’ studios and design agencies of projected 
buildings. These are disseminated online in printed brochures and, most importantly, 
laminated onto the hoardings that surround the sites where those buildings are to 
appear (see Fig. 18, Fig. 5). The figures are pasted into the envisioned spaces of the 
development — small digitised groupings and individuals engaged in “typical” 
activities: strolling, cycling, shopping, sitting and reading a newspaper, tapping at a 
smart phone, or listening to a personal stereo. In the trade they are called, variously, 
“scalies”123 (referring to their practical usefulness in giving an idea of the scale of the 
new structure), “people textures” and “populating images”124 (see Fig. 19 for some 
scalies in their “raw” form). As the latter of the names suggests, their purpose is to 
give the impression (with some obvious poetic license) that the development and its 
users are already present. The future has already happened, as such it is “[…] 
beyond critique; it’s already part of our city”125 and should be embraced, or at worst, 
sullenly accepted as a fact of life that one can do nothing about. They represent a 
fantasy future public that these new buildings are to conjure into existence, perhaps 
by dint of their very newness. The term “regeneration” was often applied to this 
process. It is less current than it was, probably due to the state’s abandonment of 
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 From St. James’ Infirmary; appendix 5. 
123
 Free samples are available from various companies online. I found immediate entourage.com had 
a good selection. http://www.immediateentourage.com/category/free-cutout-photos/people/ Accessed: 
May 25, 2016. 
124
 See Walker, Rob; Go Figure (2011). 
125
 Geoff Manaugh of the speculative architecture blog BldgBlog, quoted in Walker (2011). 
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these kinds of projects under the Tories with the concomitant abandonment of the 
kind of social-mission rhetoric wafted around by New Labour126. But the Christian 
connotations of the word remain in the process that is visualised in these images; it 
denotes the escape from an unsaved life of subjection to sin and death and the 
beginning of a new life in God. For some Protestant sects, it comes with baptism and 
being “born again”; leaving the old behind and becoming a new person — precisely 
what seems to be depicted in these architect’s visualisations. It should be noted, 
however, that the placement on the hoardings does not advertise the sort of rupture 
with the old that a conversion (or re-conversion) experience might be predicated 
upon. The figures on the hoardings are there to reassure that nothing has changed 
and the gap — between present and future — was never there or has already been 
smoothed over. 
 
The style of these buildings is invariably, in Owen Hatherley’s coinage, “pseudo 
modernist”, vaguely optimistic and futuristic, fetishising ostensible transparency with 
open plazas (patrolled by private security) and a lot of glass. These people on the 
hoardings do not appear to march, riot, or picket, or piss in doorways. They neither 
drink nor smoke and appear to have banished physical disability and obesity from 
amongst themselves. 
 
Fig. 20 is a still image from a promotional “lifestyle” video for a development called 
“Vibe” in Dalston, east London. It depicts a young woman enjoying the shops and 
amenities of the area (including, strangely, a café in Paris — one assumes that the 
promo is not aimed at anyone too acquainted with local geography) shot in an 
arbitrary mix of colour and black and white with, for the main part, a very narrow 
focal depth. The version of the area that this video presents has recently caused a 
minor controversy on Twitter — although it was produced early last year — which 
was then picked up by the Evening Standard website127. It is justly accused of 
“whitewashing” Dalston, which it undoubtedly does, blatantly so. The Dalston that 
this young (white) model blithely skips around appears to be remarkably denuded of 
                                            
126
 See Raco, Mike; Securing Sustainable Communities (2007). 
127
 Londoners criticise "whitewashed" vision of Dalston in "nauseating" property advert. Available at: 
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/londoners-hit-out-at-whitewashed-vision-of- dalston-in-
nauseating-property-advert-a3202866.html 
Last updated: March 14, 2016; accessed: May 17, 2016 
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anyone with black or brown skin. It also seems to be an uncannily litter-free area 
that, in addition, lacks any inhabitants or passers-by who are older than their early 
‘30s. It is undeniable that it takes an area that has remained in the face of rampant 
gentrification such as the “Vibe” development, notably ethnically and culturally 
diverse, and makes it look like a fantasy city dreamed of by a wealthy racist. 
 
It does something else as well, however. The accusations of racism are well placed 
when levelled at the monochrome cast of the video, but the reason for the absence 
of black and Asian passers-by in the street and café scenes is because there aren’t 
any passers-by at all. The city is deserted except for the protagonist and a few 
others. One can make some reasonable inferences as to the motivations behind the 
decision to denude the normally busy streets in the area of their population; tacit 
racism on the part of the film makers or those who commissioned the piece is one, 
antipathy to un-photogenic poor people is certainly another, in a film that is meant to 
be selling the place. But it is notable that not even other wealthy, white people 
accompany the protagonist in her wanderings. The narrowness of the focal depth 
means that the young woman, along with the other few subjects who appear in the 
video, such as the cyclist shown in Fig. 21, are isolated within a blur like a specimen 
under a glass dome. This is reminiscent of Benjamin’s perceptive comments on 
Baudelaire’s relationship to the city crowd and Adorno’s discussion of the exclusion 
of the social in lyric poetry more generally. For Benjamin, the apparent absence of 
the city crowd in Baudelaire’s poems meant that it was present as a “hidden figure” 
(Benjamin, 2013, p.165). For Adorno, the relationship of the individual to society 
appears most strongly as an unspoken sediment in proportion to how far it is 
apparently absent from the poetry (Adorno, 1991, p.42). Both maintained that the 
self-contained subjectivity “thrown back on itself” (ibid. p.42) bore the marks most 
strongly of the disavowed material support of that subjectivity. Like an ideal lyric 
poet, these characters in the video exist alone, sealed within their experiences 
(which are usually shopping) in a city where other occupants are absent or oddly out 
of focus, except for the hand that proffers the coffee cup or plate of food. The crowd 
do return in a sense; the comments left below the video express the commenters’ 
views (see Fig. 22) on the version of the city — and its citizens — that it presents. 
 
The public is a matter of representation — that is, of who is allowed as 
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representative, and therefore part of the public. In a discussion of the highly 
contentious 1989 “regeneration” of “People’s Park” — a park adjoining the University 
of California (which owned the land) in Berkeley that had historically been the site for 
festivals, riots, protests and provided a safe haven for encampments of homeless 
people — Don Mitchell quotes Milton Fujii, the University director of community 
affairs: "The park is underutilized. Only a small group of people use the park and 
they are not representative of the community" (Mitchell, 2003, p.122). 
 
Leaving aside for a moment Fujii’s use of the word “community” which carries its own 
weighty baggage, it is interesting to dwell on the concept of “representative”. The 
homeless people that the UC Berkeley were intent on evicting were not part of the 
rather more well-heeled public that the park was meant to provide for because they 
weren’t representative of it — by having no homes or money, one assumes. There is 
an unspoken norm at work here which is frequently in play in political discussion and 
legislative action in the UK. 
 
A rather sinister trend in legislation that was started by New Labour with the 
introduction of the notorious Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)128 has recently 
borne further fruit in the shape of the Public Spaces Protection Orders (PSPOs)129, 
applicable in England and Wales. A government-produced factsheet explains them 
thus: 
Public spaces protection orders are intended to deal with a particular nuisance 
or problem in a particular area that is detrimental to the local community’s 
qualify of life, by imposing conditions on the use of that area which apply to 
everyone130. 
It is worth stressing that the amorphous term “anti-social behaviour” covers a range 
                                            
128
 These were orders applied for by local councils and granted by civil courts against specific 
individuals. They were introduced by the New Labour government under provision in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998. 
129
 Section 59, chapter 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (HM Gov, 2014). 
Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/12/part/4/chapter/2/crossheading/public-
spaces- protection-orders. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
130
 Fact sheet: Environmental anti-social behaviour (Part 4) (HM Gov, 2014). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251313/01_Factsheet_ 
Environmental_ASB_—_updated_for_Lords.pdf. Accessed: May 22, 2016 
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of behaviours that are not illegal in themselves. For example, several councils have 
prohibited young people gathering in groups of more than three. What this legislation 
does is introduce a form of summary justice for infractions — fixed notice payments 
(fines) that can be handed out, not just by police, but also by anyone that the council 
decides can do so — including private security guards. Not paying the fixed notice 
fine (the law allows for a special lower rate for prompt payment) will result in 
prosecution131. The fines are paid to the local authority responsible for the order. In 
the face of what was revealed about the workings of the US city of Ferguson in the 
aftermath of the rioting there in 2014, it might not seem too cynical to wonder about 
the possibility that these fines could eventually be used to fill the large gaps in local 
authority funding in the face of central government cuts. A report into policing in the 
city132 after the events revealed that officers were urged to increase “productivity” 
(i.e. imposing fines predominantly on Ferguson’s black population for very minor 
infractions of byelaws, such as traffic offences and not cutting their lawn)133. A 
perceived subaltern population were used as a resource from which to extract 
revenue and this was achieved through effectively criminalising them. 
 
An innovation introduced by the ASBO in the UK was that individuals were given the 
order by a civil court to desist from activities which were not in themselves criminal 
offences. However, breaking the terms of the ASBO by persisting in those 
behaviours led to criminal charges, not for the activities in themselves, but by 
breaching the (civil court) order. Unlike ASBOs, PSPOs are not applied to individuals 
but rather to particular geographic areas, and local authorities do not need to apply 
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 Section 68(2), chapter 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (HM Gov,2014). A 
fixed penalty notice is a notice offering the person to whom it is issued the opportunity of discharging 
any liability to conviction for the offence by payment of a fixed penalty to a local authority specified in 
the notice. 
132
 Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (2015). Available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf 
March 4, 2015; accessed May 21, 2016. 
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 The report notes that: 
The February 2011 report to the City Council notes that the acting prosecutor — with the 
apparent approval of the Police Chief — “talked with police officers about ensuring all 
necessary summonses are written for each incident […]”. The prosecutor noted that “[t]his is 
done to ensure that a proper resolution to all cases is being achieved and that the court is 
maintaining the correct volume for offenses occurring within the city”. Notably, the “correct 
volume” of law enforcement is uniformly presented in City documents as related to revenue 
generation, rather than in terms of what is necessary to promote public safety (Ibid, p.11). 
98 
 
to a court to impose one134.  Geographer Bradley L. Garrett wrote in The Guardian135 
about one proposal for central Croydon that appeared to coincide — geographically 
and in its timing — with the development of a new shopping centre. The developers 
and council denied that this was a precursor for the passing over of Croydon town 
centre into private ownership; a representative of the developers claimed that both 
the new shopping centre and the PSPO were simply part of a scheme of 
“regeneration”. This incipient newness, both the quasi-public space of the Westfield-
Hammerton development and the PSPO, under which signature136 it would appear, 
would be dedicated to the protection and service of the Public. 
 
The thing that I wish to stress here is that although the name “Public Space 
Protection Order” seems to border as much on meaningless tautology as its 
preceding incarnation — both being applied to places that are already ostensibly 
public — what is being “protected” or “designated” in the “Designated Public Place” 
is not the place; it is an idea of who the public is. These clean and happy individuals 
on the developer’s hoardings (See Fig. 5, Fig. 15) or in the Vibe advertisement, the 
future citizens invoked, are representative — if not of who is actually there, but who 
these spaces and amenities are intended for. This is a piece with the strain of 
neoliberal policy and thinking that is overtly hostile to the state as a guarantor of 
rights; marketised mechanisms (note that these are not the same as “markets” but 
are prized for also generating differentials in outcome) are considered a more 
objective and reliable means of sorting out who should be allowed to go where. 
 
Richard Florida’s “creative classes” loom large here and have done so in many UK 
cities since the first New Labour government in 1997. I would argue, in fact, that the 
New Labour project was led by people who identified with (and as) the creative 
classes. 
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 The Fact sheet Environmental anti-social behaviour (Part 4) (HM Gov, 2014) explains that whilst 
no court order is required before making an order, councils […] must consult with the chief officer of 
police, the Police and Crime Commissioner and any representatives of the local community they 
consider appropriate thereby leaving any consultation or democratic accountability completely 
discretionary. This is further spelt out further on: This follows feedback in the consultation from local 
authorities that the current processes for consultation outlined in secondary legislation are costly and 
time-consuming. 
135
 Garrett, B.L. (2015) PSPOs: the new control orders threatening our public spaces. Available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/sep/08/pspos-new-control-orders-public-spaces-
asbos-freedoms(Accessed: September 8, 2016. 
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 “Signature” in the sense of the trace of an authorising presence. 
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[…W]ith its dynamic arts vibe, fashion trend-setting and close proximity to The 
City […] the area is increasingly attracting a rich mix of creatives, media 
executives, fashionistas, style leaders and young city professionals […]137. 
Florida’s model treats the city crowds as a kind of set-dressing. Whilst he maintains 
that a “good street scene” will be ethnically diverse (he avoids mentioning class), 
they are not to impinge beyond that on the young creatives’ hermetically sealed 
existences beyond, perhaps, providing “inspiration”. 
 
Another larger part of the background to the Bike Cemetery and its writer is the 
London 2012 Olympics, the main site of which was just down the road and is now 
known as Queen Elizabeth Park. If I have chosen to treat that site and its bricoleur 
as representative of something — some form of arrested temporality, subjectivity and 
citizenship elided or repressed within our current dispensation — then the athletic 
spectacles and the park and arena built for them represents what it is invoked in its 
place. 
 
Both are spaces set aside, intentionally in one case, inadvertently in the other. The 
Bike Cemetery was the home of the untimely, a caesura in teleology in the form of 
the rubbish that was dumped there and the ephemera that made up the collage on 
the wall. In addition, it was surrounded by the disavowed presence of a collectivity 
manifested through diffuse and pervasive noise (traffic). The Olympics, in contrast, 
was promoted as the site of a national becoming, of an identification of the nation 
with specific bodies, and specific idealised models of progress. In a previous section, 
I briefly discussed the commonplace use of increasing speed as a metaphor for 
historical progress and the addition of the competitive element of the race; the 
Olympics provided that. 
 
The London Legacy Development Corporation has overseen the repurposing of the 
buildings built for the games — the media centre now houses a branch of 
Loughborough University and the stadium has been leased to West Ham Football 
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 The text is superimposed on a photograph of the city skyline combined with an architect’s 
visualisation, giving the impression of having been taken from the balcony of one of the — at that time 
unbuilt — flats. Available at: http://www.telfordhomes.london/microsites/vibe/brochure/index.html#p=1 
Last update: 2013; accessed June 10, 2014. 
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Club (at remarkably preferential rates)138. This repurposing is, unsurprisingly, an 
enormous transfer of publicly-funded assets into private hands. Thomas 
Heatherwick, the designer of the Olympic cauldron that was lit at the opening 
ceremony, has won the tender to design the "Garden Bridge"139 project — a vanity 
project providing yet more pseudo-public space140 in central London. About the 
scheme, Heatherwick was recorded as saying in 2014 that "[i]t feels like we're trying 
to pull off a big crime"141; a sentiment that it is easy to see the logic in, but probably 
just meant that the designer felt the project was a brave, visionary gambit conducted 
in the face of hidebound bureaucracy, or something. This is commonplace in the 
“disruptive” world of late capital. The contract was awarded to him under 
circumstances142 which make his comment seem prescient. Back at the Olympic 
2012 site (now called Queen Elizabeth park), the self-consciously "iconic" twisted 
scarlet intestine/tower/folly of ArcelorMittal Orbit143 by Anish Kapoor and Cecil 
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 The taxpayer will foot most of the bill for the Olympic Stadium deal, paying for stadium costs down 
to goal posts and corner flags, at a price of £272 million — of which just £15 million will be paid by 
West Ham. Daily Telegraph: West Ham's £12, 500 donations to the Conservative Party raises 
"serious questions" over "dubious stadium deal". Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/football/2016/05/27/west-hams- 12500-donation-to-the-conservative-party-
raises-seriou/ Updated: May 27, 2016. Accessed: May 27, 2016. The Telegraph, predictably, 
emphasise the unfailingly splenetic opinion of the Tax Payers’ Alliance. What they delicately skate 
over is the political relationship between the Conservative Party and West Ham FC Vice-Chair Karren 
Brady. She was appointed a Conservative life peer in 2014 as Baroness Brady of Knightsbridge. The 
stadium deal was negotiated by the London Legacy Development Corporation, chaired by 
Conservative ex-London Mayor, Boris Johnson. 
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 See: https://www.gardenbridge.london/ Updated: May 2016. Accessed: May 28, 2016 
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 Though receiving public funds of up to £60 million (£30 million from central government and £30 
million from Transport for London) the bridge will be owned and administered by the Garden Bridge 
Trust and will only be open daily until midnight. Private security, called “Visitor Hosts”, will monitor for 
crime and the perennial favourite “anti-social behaviour”. This can include: sleeping, playing music, 
cycling or skateboarding. 
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 Quoted in: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/jun/24/garden-bridge-london-thomas- 
heatherwick-joanna-lumley . Updated: Accessed: May 27, 2016. 
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 The bridge and its designer were both championed by the actress Joanna Lumley, spokeswoman 
for the Garden Bridge Trust, who is also apparently a lifelong friend of the ex-mayor Boris Johnson. 
The design was decided through a competition, though there are strong indications that Heatherwick 
Studios, the eventual winner, were favoured from the start despite having little to no prior experience 
in building bridges. The person who made the decision, Richard de Cani of Transport for London, has 
since left TfL to work for Arup, the engineering firm tasked with building the bridge. 
For a brief summary see: Moore, Garden Bridge: a project promoted and sold with half-truths, 
deceptions and evasions. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/feb/14/garden- bridge-half-truths-deceptions-
evasions-thames-london-rowan-moore . Updated: February 14, 2016. 
Accessed: May 27, 2016. 
143
 The ArcelorMittal part of the title was not used over the duration of the actual games due to the 
International Olympic Committee’s draconian rules on un-approved trademarks and logos in the 
Olympic Park. It was added to the name — it is the sponsor’s steel company — after the games had 
finished. 
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Balmond (predictably with help from Boris Johnson’s contacts144) now has, in the 
inevitable phraseology, a "slide experience"145 — a ticketed helter-skelter slide 
encircling it, by the artist Carsten Höller. The site is now to be a huge pleasure 
garden, owned and underwritten by international capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
144
 Boris Johnson got sponsorship from Lakshmi Mittal, the UKs richest man and the owner of the 
company that provided the steel (and part of the name). In a telling anecdote, Johnson described their 
meeting thus: 
I happened to be in the cloakroom at the World Economic Forum in Davos, getting my coat 
and I bumped into Lakshmi Mittal. It was the first time in my life that I’d met him. I said hello 
and we had a very friendly conversation that lasted approximately 45 seconds. In that time, I 
explained the idea and he said: ‘Great, I’ll give you the steel’. […] ArcelorMittal gave 
considerably more than the steel […]. 
Interview available at: http://corporate.arcelormittal.com/who-we-are/arcelormittal- 
orbit/perspectives/boris-johnson . Accessed: May 27, 2016. 
145
 This description is from the Orbit website. Available at: http://arcelormittalorbit.com/whats-on/the- 
slide/ Accessed: May 26, 2016. 
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The Athlete 
The universal (albeit bounded) does make its way back, however, as the Nation. The 
Olympics promised an event that would provide an image of it in the valorised form 
of competitive sporting prowess as a set of trained bodies. These bodies are 
freighted with a variety of ideas about the nation, and even humanity itself, that their 
public146 are encouraged to identify with. Whilst the neoliberal “relational turn” might 
ignore the existence of the public as an entity that can be separated from presence 
— that is, from the category of “everyone”147 — there still exists a hunger to manifest 
society aesthetically as a body that can be seen and (theoretically) touched. Claude 
Lefort characterised democratic states as being “disincorporated”: 
The ancien regime was made up of an infinite number of small bodies 
[…T]hese small bodies fitted together within a great imaginary body for which 
the body of the king provided the model and the guarantee of its integrity. The 
democratic revolution […] burst out when the body of the king was destroyed, 
when the body politic was decapitated and when, at the same time, the 
corporeality of the social was dissolved. Then there occurred what I would call 
a "disincorporation" of individuals148. 
Obviously, Lefort was referring to France as the UK has a constitutional monarch. 
However, the UK monarchy has not been entirely successful in providing a body for 
the social. The (surprising) outbreak of public mourning149 on the death of Princess 
                                            
146
 In the case of an international franchise event like the Olympics, it is not the case of simply a 
presentation to those present in that particular space at that particular time, in Michael Warner’s 
definition (I have previously argued that audiences already include more members than that). It is an 
event intended to transcend the stadium and even, to some extent, nations themselves, in the 
identifications that it solicits from those who watch, listen to or read about it (or even those who don’t). 
147
 “Everyone” is a group whose membership can be determined, even with some difficulty. Contrast 
this with “anyone”. 
148
 Lefort, Image of the Body and Totalitarianism (1986, p.303). 
149
 The intensity of this varied wildly from place to place and no doubt the tabloid narrative of a “nation 
in mourning” was part fabrication. But I can attest that, to my shock (and horror) it was very real in the 
town of Penzance in west Cornwall where I was living at the time. There were shrines in shopfronts 
along the high street and at my workplace — a public gallery — we were warned to strictly observe 
the one minute’s silence. This was not excessive caution, the people I talked to there were, it seemed 
to me, genuinely distraught. I also noticed that it became a focal point for long-standing local grudges. 
A member of the family who owned the local fish docks — and therefore the livelihood of local 
fishermen — were already deeply unpopular and had been for a long time, but several gallery 
volunteers and visitors told me that what was worst about them was that “they didn’t even mourn 
Diana”. 
103 
 
Diana in 1997 demonstrated that the Queen was widely considered too remote to 
represent “us” by not shedding a tear or expressing anything beyond very formal 
regret. That this is not a constitutional monarch’s job seemed to escape the tabloids. 
In the absence of a monarchy that is acceptable to fulfil this function, other 
surrogates are sought. In this, no less than in the communitarianism of relational art, 
the abstraction of the public is literalised into a determinate body, and just as in the 
“scalies” discussed in the previous chapter, this body also models acceptable modes 
of citizenship, or being public. As it does with the Romantic concept of erlibnis, the 
symbol reappears, an instantaneous melding of the transcendent and the discrete 
particularly when the winner ascends the podium. 
No casting agent could have better chosen three people to represent modern 
Britain: a mixed-race heptathlete with a British mother and Jamaican father; a 
ginger-haired long jumper from Milton Keynes, and a Somalian refugee150. 
In the case of the Olympic athlete, this body makes tangible within itself such 
(suitably capitalised) abstractions as the Nation, Health and Competition, and acts as 
a vehicle for them151 through the mobilisation of the athlete’s will to win. The kind of 
gushing journalism that the UK successes in the games, and the perceived national 
success in hosting it inspired, are a clear indication of this152. The successes of the 
distance runner Mohammed “Mo” Farah (originally from Mogadishu) made him an 
                                            
150
 This quote is a fairly representative example of the sort of thing that commentators were publishing 
in the newspapers at the time. It comes from an editorial (unattributed) in the Evening Standard from 
2012. Available at: 
http://www.standard.co.uk/comment/mo-farah-has-sent-a-message-of-hope-to-all-migrants- 
8009509.html 
Last updated: August 6, 2012; accessed: May 21, 2016. 
151
 From the same Evening Standard editorial: 
For as so often in the past, the skill and successes of sporting heroes symbolise something 
far more profound than just the longest jump or fastest run […] Britain has discovered that far 
from being broken or bog-standard, the country remains world-class. Almost to our surprise, 
we have cause to feel good about ourselves and permission to feel patriotic. 
One is led to wonder by this, what does a country that is not “world-class” look like? This usage is 
informed by the lens of international relations defined as competition, in sport and beyond. 
152
 The following is from an unattributed leader column in the usually relatively sober New Statesman, 
lauding the game’s manifestation of a “new patriotism” that would be different from the old, chauvinist 
and imperialist variety: 
But the Games have been much more than a distraction — they have created a sense of 
national unity and purpose and, at times, a kind of ecstatic sociality. […] In an age when our 
lives have become so atomised, the yearning for the shared experience clearly runs deep. 
Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/08/leader-london-games-and-rise-
new- patriotism 
Last updated: August 8, 2012; accessed: July 15, 2016. 
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emblem for the hoped for “integration” (a vague term, with slightly unsettling 
implications) of Somalis — and other immigrant groups — into UK society153. 
Photographs of Farah wrapped in the flag have been a notable staple of UK 
newspaper front pages (see Fig. 23). 
 
An interesting sidelight is shone on the issue of perceived foreignness (foreign 
bodies, strangers), integration, will and foreign substances by the decision the UK 
Home Secretary (now Prime Minister) Theresa May made a year after the Olympics, 
which was to ban the mildly stimulant herb, khat (sometimes also spelled qat). May 
took this action against the advice of the government’s own Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), who reported that a ban was not justified by detriment to 
health or wider social damage154. Khat is apparently popular amongst UK citizens of 
Somali, Ethiopian and Yemeni ancestry. A Guardian article published before the ban 
was announced contains the following quote from a campaigner and self-described 
“former addict”, Abukhar Awale: 
For the Somali community, qat is the biggest barrier to our integration. It's 
segregating Somali youngsters from wider society. They are in the marfashes 
[social clubs for Somali men155, where khat is consumed]. They do not 
                                            
153
 For example, in a Daily Mail article from the time by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Mo's joyful embrace of 
Britishness and why these Games mark a truly historic watershed (2012), there is this: 
But these two weeks have been a watershed of true significance. There has been a visceral reaction 
among black and Asian Britons to what we have seen. For some, it has been perhaps the first time 
they have really felt a part of this country. For others, the promise of tolerance and integration has 
come true. 
Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2187469/Mo-Farahs-joyful-embrace-
Britishness- Games-mark-truly-historic-watershed.html 
Updated: August 12, 2012; Visited: June 11, 2016. 
154
 Travis, Theresa May ignores experts and bans use of khat; 2013. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/03/theresa-may-bans-khat Updated: July 3, 2013; 
accessed: June 11, 2016. 
155
 Howard Swains, writing in The Independent in 2012 offers an interesting insight on the gender 
politics aspect of this dispute: 
Typically, women and children settled in Britain before their husbands after leaving the East 
African refugee camps during the turmoil of the 1990s. Thus Somali women tend to be better 
integrated and can often be the principal source of income. An unemployed man's khat habit 
can be seen as an abandonment of familial responsibility and an inversion of societal norms. 
Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/features/khat-fight-harmless- 
recreational-drug-or-a-recruitment-tool-for-terrorists-7893373.html 
Updated: June 29, 2012; accessed: June 12, 2016. 
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contribute, they don't speak English, they don't feel they are part of the society 
[…]156. 
Awale says that whilst previously it was only consumed by the older generations 
within the Somali community — who presumably brought the habit with them to the 
UK — he was concerned that use was becoming more prevalent amongst younger 
people. There is a clear link being made here between the cultural practices of the 
“old country” and failure to “integrate” signified by a return to those practices figured 
in the trope (the physical posture) of the purported drug addict. This addict 
segregates themselves from wider UK society in the marfash, continually called back 
to another place and identity through their addiction. This is a part of the temporality 
of addiction, the persistent return to a substance and its associated behaviours157, an 
obstinate refusal to mobilise the will in order to “move on” with life. 
 
It is worth noting that the ACMD did not mention any addictive properties of the drug. 
They also debunked purported links (thought to be the rationale behind the bans in 
force in the US and much of Europe) between the khat trade and the Somali Islamist 
terror group Al-Shabaab158. Awale has admitted his opportunism in exploiting the 
(unproven) link to further his cause, telling an interviewer in 2012,  
                                            
156
 Quoted in: Sample, Khat ban divides opinion among UK’s Somali community; 2013. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/03/khat-ban-uk-somali 
Last updated: July 3, 2013; accessed: June 11, 2016. 
157
 Recovering addicts are frequently urged to avoid friends and places connected to their addiction as 
it is believed that reviving old associations — social and spatial — will lead to relapse. Addiction is a 
compulsion of memory — or a fault in memory. 
158
 Dr Axel Klein, writing in the left-ish blog Left Foot Forward, suggested that Awale’s motivation in 
advocating and pursuing the ban was, in fact, to increase the influence of Islam in the UK Somali 
community. The marfash provide a space outside of the more controlled or “traditional” home or 
mosque for young men and provide a counterbalance to that control, Klein claims. 
Mafrishes are public spaces, where discussion ranges widely and freely, as friends gather to 
relax and enjoy. At a time of rising hostility and nationalism making the assimilation for even 
second or third Generation British Somalis more difficult, such spaces come at a premium. In 
Somali neighbourhoods like Tower Hamlets of Lambeth these mafrishes were the strongest 
organised opposition to the grip held by Islamic organisations over the community. 
Available at: http://leftfootforward.org/2013/07/islamist-extremists-score-their-first-political-success-in- 
the-uk/. Updated: July 3, 2013; accessed: June 11, 2016. 
Awale also told the Mail on Sunday in 2013 that an allegedly radical Islamist preacher was attempting 
to recruit young men to jihad in a marfash in Woolwich, prior to the murder that same year of the 
young soldier Lee Rigby in the same area of London. The same article claims that one of the killers, 
Michael Adelbolajo, was a chewer of khat. 
Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2334499/Police-war-extremists-khat-houses-
amid- fears-recruiting-grounds-Islamic-extremists.html. Updated: June 1, 2013; accessed: June 13, 
2016. 
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This is the tool for me, I will put this on the table and say, 'Now you must act'. 
And they will act. When this country hears terrorism, they will act159.  
This is astute, and he was proven right. Terror is another contemporary anxiety 
frequently and deliberately linked to immigration in the face of the fact that most of 
those who have conducted attacks in the UK were born here; Islam-inspired terror is 
persistently treated as if it were an alien phenomenon, a strange visitor from other 
shores. The fact that one faction of Islamists in the areas of the Yemen that they are 
in control of have declared khat use to be contrary to sharia law has not given the 
UK government pause. 
 
Muhamed Ibrahim, another anti-khat campaigner from the London Somali youth 
forum, explicitly linked chewing the herb to another form of supposedly malignant 
dependency — that of claiming benefits. He is quoted as saying he had seen young 
users’ lives "wasted in the wilderness of benefit dependency"160 as a result of using 
the drug (Quoted in Travis, 2013). Khat is not only posited as addictive, its use is 
causally associated with another pernicious form of dependency — the claiming of 
benefits. Dependency is something that clouds the lucid self-presence of the 
choosing subject and breaks the hermetic seal that protects that core from the 
contingency of need, thus undermining the legitimating function of choice. We shall 
return to this later. 
 
The athletic body and the athletic nation state that is celebrated in the Olympics are 
both assumed to be self-identical and self-similar. That is, immune from outside 
incursion such as infiltration by “immigrant” drugs and terror groups. This can be 
seen in the furore that “doping” scandals cause. Steroids and other substances are 
regarded as bestowing unfair advantages on those that use them, in the same way 
that winning a hundred metre sprint by driving a car would be. 
 
                                            
159
 Interview with Howard Swains in The Independent. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/life- 
style/health-and-families/features/khat-fight-harmless-recreational-drug-or-a-recruitment-tool-for- 
terrorists-7893373.html. Updated: June 29, 2012; accessed: June 12, 2016. 
160
 Another state supposedly characterised by passivity and the shirking of social responsibilities. It is 
also often described as marked by a similar kind of “stuck” temporality. In a society where work is 
assumed to be the ultimate social good and only legitimate route to self-realisation, the unfurling of 
the self along a trajectory incremental improvement, it is not surprising that unemployment would be 
regarded as a form of stasis. 
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A performance enhancing drug161 is a prosthesis, something extra added to the 
body, a “foreign” substance that alienates it from its “true” being as manifested in that 
performance. There is necessarily an ambiguity in this formula; whilst “drugs” such 
as khat sap the will of their users, in sport the problem is seen as the possibility of 
sufficient enhancement such that the user can ignore pain and fatigue to secure 
victory. The presence of controlled substances in the athlete’s blood, whether or not 
they could be proved to have materially assisted, invalidates their performance which 
is no longer considered to be authentically theirs. That is, the performance is the 
result of the drug, and not the athlete’s own individualised striving. Jacques Derrida, 
in a published interview entitled The Rhetoric of Drugs (1995), describes this as one 
of the defining features of social disdain (and worse) towards drugs and their users: 
[D]rugs, it is said, make one lose any sense of true reality. […] We do not object 
to the drug user's pleasure per se, but to pleasure taken in an experience 
without truth. Pleasure and play (now still as with Plato) are not in themselves 
condemned unless they are inauthentic and void of truth (Derrida, 1995, pp. 
235–6, my emphasis). 
It is arguable that the arena of international competition that is the Olympic games 
also attempts to present an idealised and formalised version of the workings of 
capitalism. It manifests several of the key justifications of neoliberalism in dramatic 
form: meritocracy, and equality of opportunity, the idea that individuals freely 
compete on a “level playing field”162 and succeed through a combination of will and 
talent. It attempts to present “the global race” beloved of David Cameron and others 
as a fair competition, whilst sidestepping larger questions about whether there 
should be a competition at all. Doping destroys the impression of fairness, in that 
particular individuals or countries are assigning to themselves an advantage which 
other participants can’t (or won’t) avail themselves of. That, however, does not in 
itself explain why the logical solution to this — that any and all drugs are permitted, 
                                            
161
 The term “drug” is not, in itself, neutral; doctors prescribe medicines, unauthorised individuals 
abuse drugs — even when the substance itself, pain killers, for example, is exactly the same in each 
case. See Keane, 2002. 
162
 Stefan Collini’s (2010) tart observation on this metaphor is apposite here: 
Sports that are contested on a ‘playing field’, we might point out, are nearly always between two 
teams; indeed, the metaphor suggests something as old-fashioned as class conflict. More important, 
what happens on the playing field, however level, is heavily determined by things that happen off it. 
Recruitment, wealth, facilities, time, training — there’s almost no end to it. 
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thereby evening things out again — is not pursued. That it is not pursued tells us a 
great deal about the ideas at stake in this matter; as Derrida said, it is a question of 
truth, of authenticity. Not only must the competition be seen to be fair, it must also be 
seen to be authentic. Starting from a base of apparent formal equality of opportunity 
(to win) the unequal outcome (producing both winners and losers) of the competition 
must be seen to clearly be the result of qualities emanating directly from the 
competitors themselves163. As a morality tale where individual persistence, 
resilience, skill, effort and focus receive their just rewards, the awarding of victory to 
protagonists who achieved it through means apparently external to themselves 
would tend to invalidate the message. Sport is assumed to provide a model of “fair” 
competition with outcomes achieved through the merits (or otherwise) that are 
inherent in the competitors; a meritocracy, in other words. 
 
The retrospective discovery of doping amongst a number of Russian athletes was 
described as not merely a scandal for the individuals involved, but also for Russia 
itself. The UK long-distance runner Jo Pavey speaks to this sense (whilst also 
articulating the most revealing cliché in sport and politics): 
As a clean athlete you want to go out there and feel like you are competing on 
a level playing field and the thought that a nation itself would be systematically 
doping its athletes is absolutely shocking164. 
A “clean athlete” is only themselves, just as dirt, or being “dirty”, would add a 
supplement of misplaced matter165 to the essential core; there is nothing supposedly 
artificial added to what is given. When one considers that athletes are allowed 
                                            
163
 The place of competition in sport as an idealised analogue of competition in wider economic and 
social life is the subject of an illuminating discussion — to which I am much indebted — in sociologist 
Will Davie’s The Limits of Neoliberalism (2014). In it, he describes the fundamental anxiety concerning 
the bases of value which characterises neoliberal thought. In the place of subjective, evaluative moral 
and “ideological” modes of assessing social outcomes and formulating values, neoliberals prefer to 
prioritise the supposedly “objective” language of economics as being empirically verifiable. The 
language of sport, or sport as a metaphor, becomes pervasive in politics. The existence of “league 
tables” for schools and universities is one such example. 
For more on neoliberalism’s hermeneutic anxiety, see also Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to 
Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown (2013). 
164
 Quoted in The Guardian, London Olympics were sabotaged by Russia's doping, report says 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/09/london-olympics-russia-doping-report 
Updated: November 9, 2015; accessed: June 21, 2016. 
165
 See Mary Douglas Purity and Danger (2002) for the idea of dirt as “matter out of place”. 
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specialised diets and such practices as training in high altitudes to achieve an 
advantage when competing at lower ones, there is obviously some reliance on 
categories of the “natural” and the distinctions made could scarcely be described as 
stable. The emphasis is on what is whole and given, as opposed to what is meant to 
supplement. The body with prosthesis is something that is constructed and 
composite; the drug experience is achieved by illegitimate means — something 
added — as opposed to a process of drawing out innate qualities. Drugs are a 
means of making, of shaping an experience as well as in part being their content. It 
is “cheating” in the widest possible sense because whilst it is arguably self- 
fashioning, it is a short-cut or counterfeit of the “true” process. In the case of a 
competition like the Olympics, it is no longer just the athlete who is tainted by the 
foreign substance, but the nation that they represent; in Pavey’s statement, Russia 
itself is, by implication, not “clean”. 
 
The closed perfection of the Olympian body has neither surplus or lack; the writ of its 
focussed will runs all the way up to its borders. The parallels with the image of the 
nation state are obvious here. A recent example would be the successful campaign 
for the UK to leave the European Union in the recent referendum. This success 
seemed to me to be ascribable in large part to its clear appeal to fears of 
“foreignness” infiltrating the national body, as opposed to some notion of a cohesive 
and organic “sovereignty”. This manifested discursively in the constantly repeated 
slogan of “take back control” — both of borders (immigration) and of sovereignty (the 
supposedly large quantity of UK legislation that originated in Brussels). The question 
of whether “we” ever had the control (or ever would have, regardless of the result) or 
that we would be ostensibly “taking back” was not addressed. The full political impact 
of the fact that neither of these purported ills look likely to be addressed by leaving 
the EU is something which has yet to manifest. 
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Addiction 
And why are you so firmly, so triumphantly convinced that only the normal and 
the positive — in other words, only what is conducive to welfare — is for the 
advantage of man?... Does not man, perhaps, love something besides well- 
being? (Dostoyevsky, 2003, p. 261, my emphasis). 
 
Temperate derives from the Latin temperare, itself deriving from tempus, 
meaning the proper time or season (Brown, 2005, p.137 n). 
In an illuminating essay, Epidemics of the Will (1993), Eve Sedgwick discussed the 
strange dialectic between the concepts of will and attributions of addiction, which, 
she claims, had reached “epidemic” proportions in the 1990s. As the concept of 
addiction moved beyond its previous medical/psychiatric territory into commonplace 
speech, an ever-widening range of activities, substances and even affects, were 
drawn into its remit. In a society predicated on the ostensible freedom of the subject 
who manifests that freedom through the exercise of their sovereign function of 
choice, any implication that choice might be determined by external forces is deeply 
troubling. 
[…A]ny substance, any behavior, even any affect may be pathologized as 
addictive. Addiction, under this definition, resides only in the structure of a will 
that is always somehow insufficiently free, a choice whose voluntarity is 
insufficiently pure (Sedgwick, 1993, p.132). 
"Choice" is the legitimate path of self-forming, but only in the choices of the 
neoliberal subject who, by definition, will always choose more choices, thereby 
increasing the possibilities of self-fashioning. This is what addiction forecloses: it 
limits the choices of the self to that which will best feed her addiction, which is 
always figured as something (as the addictive substance has been in standard 
accounts) a foreign body introduced into herself. The self that is formed via addiction 
— and it most assuredly does form a self — is predicated on a lack, or refusal, of 
choice. The addiction, which is by definition a foreign body, must be fed before the 
native body's desires can be catered to. 
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In her history of alcoholism, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of 
Freedom (1998) Mariana Valverde echoes Sedgwick in situating the construction of 
the problem of addiction, more latterly “dependency”, as a problem of the will. She 
points out that there has not been an orderly progression in the definition, diagnosis, 
legislation and treatment of alcoholism from the eighteenth century to the present 
that might be expected; for example, a progression from Foucaultian disciplinary 
methods (the clinic or sanatorium, for example) to forms of governmentality (such as 
self-help or talking therapies). Her history loops back on itself; it seems to have a 
compulsion to keep returning to the same point. It resembles the pattern of addictive 
behaviour: there is something that it cannot (generations of campaigners, legislators, 
psychologists, divines and medics) “get past”166. This place of repetition or the place 
that repetition is, is always the same: the knot formed by will and desire, freedom 
and compulsion. As Wendy Brown points out at the head of this section, temperance 
is about time, about the right time and a particular attitude towards time. 
 
Valverde links this inextricable knot to a struggle of ideas concerning free will and 
determinism within both moral philosophy and Protestant theology. The determinism 
of Calvin confronted the believers in the freedom of souls to choose salvation 
(Valverde, 1993, p.2). The question was (and is) “how far are our actions determined 
by external factors; how free are we to choose?” The obvious corollary to which is 
“how responsible are we for our choices?” It might be noted that in a society that 
holds the idea of meritocracy as a shibboleth, the purview of these questions 
extends well beyond the realm of “deviant” choices. Both Warner and Valverde167 
draw attention to the fact that older conceptions of excessive indulgence viewed it as 
a choice made by the individual, or a bad habit which could be broken if desired. The 
original etymology of “addict” comes from a verb form (an act) derived from the Latin 
addicere, meaning to “deliver, yield, devote”168, which implies a voluntary surrender; 
                                            
166
 Valverde points out that “[…] the contemporary genre of addiction-recovery literature overlaps a 
great deal of abuse survivor literature […]” (1993, p.16). There is a point or place of trauma that 
effectively cannot be left behind or integrated into a sequential (biographical) narrative, which 
recovery provides. 
167
 See Warner, 2002, p.273; Valverde, 1998, pp.14-15. Both quote the same eighteenth-century 
divine (Johnathan Edwards) in support of this view. 
168
 Chambers Dictionary of Etymology (1988). The derivation also reveals it as a speech act, dicere 
meaning “to say”. The voice is implicated here, as an index of the will; in this case the will to 
submission. 
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it only later became an involuntary state. 
Addiction had been a legal term, describing the performative act of bondage, 
before it was metaphorized to describe a person's self-relation (Warner, 2002, 
p.272). 
Valverde cites the extraordinary fact that, in the case of defining alcoholism, the 
actual quantity of alcohol the patient drinks is not an issue169. Definition and 
diagnosis revolve around the feelings of the subject towards their consumption; 
whether it has caused them social or marital problems, whether it causes them 
concern170. This medicalisation of indulgence was facilitated by a splitting of the 
subject’s volition into will and desire. As described by Michael Warner, the early 
discourse of the temperance movement played a large part in formulating the 
category of addiction: 
In temperance rhetoric, the concept [of addiction] loses the sense of an active 
self-abnegation on the part of the will. Desire and will became distinct […] 
(2002, p.273). 
Those who fall prey to addiction have an insufficiently strong will to overrule their 
compulsive desire or that desire takes the place rightfully occupied by will. As the 
example given by Valverde of the place of individual affect in diagnosis 
demonstrates, the true target for intervention is the subject’s relation to their will — 
can they, or do they fear that they cannot control themselves? Insofar as the subject 
is identified as their will or their ability to exercise it to resist the demands and 
blandishments of desire, then the failure to resist is a significant falling short from full 
subjecthood. 
                                            
169
 Among the dozens of conflicting psychological, biological, spiritual, and common-sense definitions 
of alcoholism that I have collected over the past years, none made any reference to the amount of 
alcohol ingested (Valverde, 1998, p.28, original emphasis). 
170
 Valverde observes that despite attempts to wrest diagnosis and treatment away from the realms of 
moral judgement and into empirical (medical) science, it has been impossible to find adequate 
diagnostic criteria that work in purely empirical terms. Personal affect (of the patient and clinician 
both) still find their way back in. Especially in the area of expressed concern about one’s own drinking 
as a diagnostic tool. 
The inclusion of emotional and ethical criteria has a peculiar effect: people who drink 
extremely heavily without ever trying to cut down will be less likely to be pathologised than 
those individuals who for one reason or another worry more about their drinking (Valverde, 
1998, p.27). 
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In this way, the use of khat by men of Somali descent in the UK is figured as 
“addiction” and therefore as the barrier to becoming part of the wider society171. 
“Wider society”, the public in this scheme, is situated as composed of subjects who 
control their desire, who take part in a larger narrative of nationhood and normative 
political action. Demands of integration aimed at immigrant populations have often 
been couched in temporal as well as spatial terms, to be here now, rather than there 
in an assumed then. Telling people to “go back home” contains a temporal element. 
The desire that is khat can be characterised, in this scheme, as an inability (if 
addiction) to let go of the culture and rituals of the “old country”, and thus 
disqualification from partaking of the will that constantly unfurls itself out into the 
future, towards winning the “global race”172. Addiction is stasis, a constant circling of 
an abiding desire; recovery and temperance is the reassertion of narrative, teleology. 
It is an attitude towards time. 
 
The nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Temperance movements173 (more 
properly described as “prohibition” movements in their latter stages) in the UK and 
US sheds an interesting light on publics, politics and the construction of addiction as 
failed will. In the UK, Temperance was one of the first (and perhaps the longest 
lasting) mass social movements174 in Western history. It came after (and shared 
personnel) with the campaigns against slavery, for the repeal of the Corn Laws and 
the democratic agitation of Chartism. For temperance campaigners who were 
increasingly drawn from the more prosperous parts of the working classes over the 
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 This is the argument of UK Somali “ex-addict” and anti-khat activist Abukhar Awale, cited above. 
172
 Doreen Massey discusses the tendency to treat all places as existing at various points along a 
unified trajectory of “development”. This enables countries and cultures to be treated as “backward”, 
or “developing” and reifies the idea of a single and inevitable historical teleology. It also means that 
the challenge, explicit or implicit, is defused from peoples who have an entirely different ambition for 
themselves and different ways of being. They are not simultaneous with "us", they belong to the past 
(see Massey, 2005, p.71). 
173
 Virginia Berridge, in her book Demons: Our changing attitude to alcohol, tobacco, and drugs 
(2013), quotes historian Brian Harrison: 
The general impression conveyed is that by the 1860s there existed an influential and literate 
minority in the country of ‘opinion makers’, numbering well under 100,000 teetotallers. The 
efforts of this minority affected the personal habits of at least a million adult teetotallers, and 
probably influenced the conduct of many others who did not join tee- total organizations 
(Berridge, 2013, p.40). 
174
 Michael Warner describes the scale of distribution for Temperance tracts in the US: 
The American Temperance Society from its beginnings in 1826 drew on a tradition of tract- 
distributing reform groups, especially the American Tract Society, and pushed the publishing 
trade to an unprecedented outreach. Temperance tracts • five million copies by 1851 - 
dominated the American Tract Society's output (Warner, 2002, p.270). 
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course of the century, it was a method of demonstrating “respectability” (Berridge, 
2013, p.37) and perhaps asserting a claim to equal valuation as subjects as that 
given to the upper bourgeoisie. Signing “The Pledge” was a performative act that 
dramatized the will of the signer, the free placing of themselves — or their desire — 
within strict bounds and in a voluntary association of similar others. Oddly enough, 
this sounds a lot like the original verb meaning of “addict” as noted above. This was 
ostensibly a demonstration of freedom, similar to that performed by Nietzsche’s 
“animal with the right to make promises”175, who promises because they can and 
because they choose to. A promise binds the promiser to a futurity, a teleological 
unfolding of action; this is contrasted with the stasis and circularity of addiction. 
 
Possessing the will to govern oneself (one’s desire) conferred the ability to be free 
from the despotism of compulsive desire (drink being the emblematic example here). 
This self-mastery was also a demonstration of being a fit subject for liberal freedom, 
as dramatized with the pledge. Just as Temperance was one of the first consciously 
non-state movements, it was arguably an important factor in the formation of what 
we now call (or did call in the ‘90s) “civil society” or “the public sphere”. Over the 
course of the century, the movement also moved from individualised “moral suasion” 
(Berridge, 2013, p.45) — appeals to the better nature of drunks — to advocating 
legislative change from central government176. 
Within the Liberal Party, the radical Liberal caucus organization, particularly 
strong in northern cities, saw local option and the local veto [on restricting 
licensees or outright local prohibition] as a way of asserting their overall 
demands for the mobilization of the will of the people ‘from below’. So the tactic 
of prohibition gained power through its association with these wider political 
objectives (Ibid). 
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 Nietzsche, 1989, p.57. See also the first chapter of this work for a discussion of promising and 
shame in performance and the formation of subjectivity. 
176
 Berridge describes how the tactics have changed over the course of the century: 
From the 1870s onward, political tactics came to the fore and the movement aimed to infiltrate 
the Liberal Party as the likely vehicle of licensing reform. The aim was the so-called 
Permissive Bill, which would have allowed local preferences to decide what the drink situation 
should be in a particular neighbourhood. Voters would have to vote for or against the ‘local 
veto’ or local prohibition. The high point of this tactic was in the 1890s when the policy was 
central to the Liberals’ Newcastle political programme (Berridge 2013, p.38. See also pp. 44-
8). 
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Eve Sedgwick, in her essay “Epidemics of the Will” (1993) draws attention to the 
construction of the addict who is figured as someone who has imbued a supplement 
be it substance or activity — with qualities that compensate for a corresponding lack 
in themselves. In contrast, the possessor of the "good will" sees themselves, their 
own bodies, like an un-doped athlete or the proper subject of a meritocracy, as 
already potentially containing whatever it is that needs bringing out (Sedgwick, 1993, 
p.132, original emphasis). This is assumed to be possible with sufficient aspiration, 
hard work and self-belief, and all the other nostrums of contemporary self-fashioning. 
She describes the explosion of “addiction attribution” that occurred in the latter part 
of the twentieth century as covering most activities and substances. As Valverde 
(quoted above) notes in relation to alcohol, the diagnostic emphasis is placed, not so 
much on substance in question as on the subject’s relation to it. 
Under this view, which indeed is by now a staple of medicalized discourse both 
lay and clinical, not the dieter but the exerciser would be the person who 
embodied the exact opposite of addiction (Ibid, p.132). 
The ultimate form that the exerciser can take would surely be the champion athlete. 
These are people who through the exercise of their will on their own substance have 
drawn from themselves qualities of strength, grace and endurance. With fine irony, 
Sedgwick points out the appearance of the “exercise addict” in the early ‘80s: 
In the absence of any projective hypostatization of a ‘foreign’ substance, the 
object of addiction here seems to be the body itself. But more accurately the 
object of addiction is the display of those very qualities whose lack is supposed 
to define addiction as such: bodily autonomy; self-control; will power. The 
object of addiction has become precisely enjoyment of ‘the ability to choose 
freely, and freely to choose health’ (Ibid, p.132). 
And, as Sedgwick goes on to point out, these are the antinomies of neoliberalism. 
The valorisation of the will leads to what could be described as an almost hysterical 
tendency to try to root out the "insufficiently free" choice, to pathologise the chooser. 
It is as if the autonomous utility-maximising unit of economic theory, who freely 
chooses the options that offer the best utility (the origin of such utility somehow 
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arising in their own, mysterious depths) might not exist, and the best way to hide this 
scandalous fact is to create it. So, working and shopping, the two founding activities 
of this consumer democracy, become minefields of potentially impure choices — as 
the apparent existence of "workaholics" and "shoppaholics" attests (Ibid, p.133). The 
will is "propagandised", in Sedgwick's terms; it is promoted, propagated, written as 
an historical imperative — as in Whig histories that tell us that a will for freedom has 
been the engine of development. But as it gets ever more pervasive, more vital to 
our understanding of what it means to be a subject, it withdraws; anxieties about its 
purity proliferate; it becomes discernible through its lack. 
 
Earlier, I discussed Judith Butler's description of how we are subjected both through 
and against power, how in order to become subjects we must repudiate the 
dependency that first sustained us. I borrowed the image of a human figure in torsion 
from Butler's text — a human pretzel, perpetually turned against itself. This turn 
away from dependency is predicated on an exercise of will, of self-forming towards 
freedom from external authority. As the act of signing the pledge demonstrated in the 
nineteenth century, this movement towards independence is often framed as a 
simultaneous move towards appropriate or “deserving” citizenship. As Sedgwick 
persuasively argues, the proper will is a constantly receding goal and anxiety 
abounds as to whether subjects can be truly free. As the proliferation of addiction- 
attribution demonstrates, the stakes are by no means trivial; liberalism as a 
philosophy and political dispensation is predicated upon the freely choosing 
individual. Just as doping scandals in elite sports are assumed to have a corrosive 
effect on the authenticity of the competition and its result, a public that is feared to be 
in the grip of addiction is not a political entity to be trusted. 
These abject figures are ideological conductors mobilized to do the dirty work of 
neoliberal governmentality. They are symbolic and material scapegoats, the 
mediating agencies through which the social decomposition effected by market 
deregulation and welfare retrenchment are legitimized (Tyler, 2013, p.9). 
Dependency is the lurking menace behind the unfree will, the spiritual state of which 
the figure of the addict is the allegorical representation. To be a subject is to 
repudiate dependence; it is to be self-realising, self-forming. It is ultimately for this 
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reason that drug use is proscribed — to protect the addict from their own inadequate 
or absent will; drug treatment is to re-instantiate it. However, when we think of the 
pharmakos, we are also thinking of something that is also, potentially, a cure. It is 
telling how sick or unemployed recipients of state benefits are often labelled 
“dependent” (which obviously they are), but this dependency is purported to stem 
from their own moral failure, rather than systemic factors; this economic condition is 
often conflated with addiction in the more usual sense. It is also worth noting that the 
double form of the pharmakon appears here, too; that what the claimant is 
dependent on — money — is the same thing that work provides as a wage. It seems 
to be implied that money from an employer is healthy money, whilst that from the 
state is harmful. Of course, it can be argued that all money is state money. 
 
As Fig. 24 shows, the figurehead and the symbolism of the state (of the whole) co- 
exist on either side of the coin. The stand-in for the sovereign subject (as a 
constitutional monarch) — Elizabeth II in this case — stands in relation to the 
crowned portcullis, the castle gate. Rather than utter complicity, the design of a coin 
suggests a tension between the two; perhaps an allusion to the doctrine of the King’s 
“two bodies”, mortal and immortal. However it is read, the coin (or note, of any 
denomination) is a state artefact in constant circulation. 
 
As a representative example of the conflation of addiction and state benefits, in a 
2011 article for The Daily Telegraph, Iain Duncan Smith (then Secretary of State for 
the Department of Work and Pensions) described the “causes of poverty” as 
Welfare dependency, educational failure, addiction, debt, and family breakdown 
— these are the five pathways to poverty […]177. 
Two of his five “pathways” (note Smith describes them as causes, not indicators of 
poverty) fit into the model we are discussing. In the same article, he describes 
claimants as being “parked” on benefits, a telling metaphor that describes its 
subjects as if they were entirely lacking in agency, as merely inert objects to be 
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 Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8329315/Its-time-to-end-this-addiction-to-benefits.html 
Updated: February 16, 2011; accessed: August 30, 2013. 
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moved out of the way and left. In this scheme of things, claimants are the immobile 
victims of a welfare state that has supported them in this condition. 
 
Negative discourse on benefits (or claimants) usually takes care to point out that the 
system of unemployment benefits was introduced with the best of intentions but has 
been abused. There is a clear parallel here between an analgesic that can be "used" 
and "useful" when prescribed by a doctor to treat the pain of an injury or disease, but 
which can also be "abused" when used un-prescribed, for pleasure. There is the 
ghost of pharmakon, too — the figure of the scapegoat who must be ejected from the 
city state in order to ensure its health. 
 
The term "welfare", as used to denote state benefits, has an affective charge; this is 
entirely deliberate. It moves the object away from a discourse of rights and 
citizenship into the realms of discretionary charity. It shifts the subject who receives it 
into the space of guilty supplicant. Welfare has connotations of health or "well- 
being", but its recipient is not expected to feel anything of the sort; in fact, they are 
expected to demonstrate constantly that they do not desire or enjoy their condition. 
Displaying any sort of desire to retain that status, or signs of enjoyment of it will lead 
to withdrawal of benefits. Their existence can only be tolerable if they are seen to be 
not enjoying it. In fact, what they are condemned to must not be life, exactly. Benefits 
must not be a "lifestyle choice”. 
 
In the same way as an athlete, monarch or dead politician can be seen as providing 
an allegorical form to the whole, the benefit claimant can also fulfil this function; 
although with vastly different connotations. The fantasised ideal unemployed, or 
disabled person, bears the stigmata of the state, of citizenship, more clearly than any 
other citizen. The state visibly supports them in a way that “hard-working tax-payers” 
are not. They have taken full advantage of the rights of citizenship. In the way that a 
drug can be a prosthesis in the case of doping athletes (an unfair advantage) or a 
supplement for some internal lack, the prosthesis of benefit claimants is not so much 
money, as time. They receive time (without working for it, because they do not work), 
but the time received is illegitimate because they supposedly can make nothing of or 
from it. They have spare time, but this time must be seen as empty; it is both poison 
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and cure — “leisure”, weekends and evenings for the workers178, the endless null 
time of the claimants. 
The neoliberal formulation of the state and especially of specific legal 
arrangements and decisions as the precondition and ongoing condition of the 
market does not mean that the market is controlled by the state but precisely 
the opposite. The market is the organizing and regulative principle of the state 
and society […] (Brown, 2005, p.41). 
As Wendy Brown describes above, as markets are (re)defined as the sole means of 
self-realisation through selling one’s labour, the sole legitimate arbiters of value and 
distributors of wealth, the welfare state and its provisions are positioned as an 
obstacle to this dominance. The target for neoliberal critics of social provision is not 
claimants as such, but the mechanism that allows them to subsist — the state. The 
benefit claimant, abjected in the press, hounded by the Department of Work and 
Pensions, is a surrogate for a state that is presented as simultaneously being too 
indulgent, but also cynical in creating and supporting a class of clients, captive 
voters. These people need to be freed from their harmful dependency on benefits, 
state money and time, encouraged to embrace the limitless possibilities for 
autonomous expression and legitimate growth that markets offer. 
[…] neoliberalism is grounded in the ‘free, possessive individual’, with the state 
cast as tyrannical and oppressive. The welfare state, in particular, is the arch 
enemy of freedom. The state must never govern society […]. State-led ‘social 
engineering’ must never prevail over corporate and private interests (Hall, 
2011). 
On a visit to the House of Commons to see the Artangel commissioned piece, The 
Ethics of Dust (2016) by Jorge Otero-Pailos at Westminster Hall in the summer of 
2016, I visited the souvenir shop there. I was amused by the multiplicity of things 
available with the same portcullis motif as on the penny piece, from tote bags and 
mouse mats to bottles of gin and Rioja. I purchased the bottle of beer, “Portucullis 
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 Though due to the increasing prevalence of casualization, zero-hours contracts and generalised 
precarity, workers’ time is now for many, the time of anxiety, of waiting. 
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IPA” seen above (Fig. 25). I placed it in juxtaposition with another bottle, Strongbow, 
a popular cider. The latter has based its television advertising for some time on 
depictions of working class tradesmen (exclusively men) enjoying the product at the 
end of a day's work as a just reward for their labour. The advertisement I have used 
was for a new berry-flavoured line. The product was depicted on posters as being 
surrounded and partly obscured by a hallucinatory thicket studded with exaggerated 
thorns. The strapline exhorts the viewer in two words: "Earn It". The drink is 
presented, rather like sleeping beauty immured behind thorn walls, as an exemplary 
prize that can only be achieved through arduous trials. 
 
Whilst obviously trying to insist on the rarity and preciousness of what is an overly 
sweet, widely available, carbonated alcoholic beverage, I believe it is doing 
something other than simply adding value. Whilst it might be an illustration of the 
kinds of more oblique approach to marketing that is becoming increasingly required 
by industry guidelines and clamoured for by an anti-alcohol/health lobby that would 
like to impose a form of iconoclasm, no actual people shall be seen to drink in 
advertisements; it can also be seen as a means of warding off association of 
intoxication with inauthenticity. It links consumption of the product — and perhaps 
getting drunk on it — with the idea of "earned" experience, earned time. 
 
In contrast, the Portcullis IPA (and the other branded alcohol available in the gift 
shop) unashamedly links the insignia of Parliament with an addictive, intoxicating 
substance. The “brand” of Parliament, after all, needs no advertising. I use that term 
advisedly; luxury goods labels ("luxury" here denoting quality of materials and 
manufacture), for instance in fashion, have long understood that their logo generates 
value when placed on perfectly ordinary items — sunglasses or t-shirts, for example. 
The trademark which first acquired its meaning by its physical association with a 
particular quality of facture179 takes on a meaning of its own, which can endow other 
objects with mana by contact. This is a process that could easily be categorised as a 
form of magical contagion; its workings are most clear in the coins that we carry 
around with us and exchange with each other. This image presents the dual face of 
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 Chambers Dictionary of Etymology (1988) tells us that ‘fetish’ is most probably derived from the 
Portuguese feitiço, which is “an adjective with the meaning of made artfully, artificial, derived from 
Lating facticius made by art, artificial, from facere make”. Chambers (1988). See Taussig (1992) on 
state fetishism, or the state as fetish (meaning “bad” making). 
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the pharmakon, the correct, refreshing after-work drink and the debilitating magic of 
state dependent alcohol. The temporality of the welfare state is that of the “addicted” 
claimant — a null time of stasis or intoxication, Viney’s “waste time”. This is 
something that it shares with the Bike Cemetery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
There's an empty space in the middle of the city, there's an empty space at the 
centre of the state…I have marked an empty space in beer and graveyard dirt 
here… 
 The example and the exception are related…the example and the exception 
bear some relation…[shouting] the example and the 
exception bear some relation…the 
example and the exception bear 
some relation. 
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Three Spaces 
 
There are three empty spaces which I wish to draw attention to and attempt to 
superimpose, one upon the other. The quality of this emptiness should be 
considered. In all three cases, this emptiness fulfils the function of placeholder that 
enables something else to happen. The last is Claude Lefort's concept (See Lefort, 
1988) of the space that occupies the place of sovereignty in liberal democracy. The 
first is the empty space of performance and it contains the others and so it was at the 
beginning of this writing. 
 
The Pomerium180of the Bike Cemetery: The Bike Cemetery: it is not empty in any 
obvious sense. It is full of undergrowth, trees, dumped rubbish. In places, it is 
congested with brambles that clutch at the visitor and nettles that sting them. In a city 
that is understood and constructed as legible, however, where zones of commerce 
and leisure are clearly labelled and festooned with security cameras, there is an 
emptiness to it. It is an equivalent to Walter Benjamin’s conception of holidays and 
festivals as “blank spaces” on the calendar, spots that have fallen out of the orderly 
progress of properly demarcated days and have therefore fallen out of time, 
becoming places for remembrance. The Bike Cemetery lacks a name beyond the 
one that I have given it and has no cameras or an explicit function in the economic 
circuits of the city. It is disconnected; beyond the thick undergrowth, there is no fence 
that would explicitly articulate its boundary with the surrounding area, nor a gate to 
mark the passage in or out. In the semiotic fullness of the city, with its street and 
shop signs (that which precedes and guides an army on the move) and ubiquitous 
advertising, the Bike Cemetery is a comparatively blank space. It is un-walled and yet 
secret, utterly open yet rarely visited (it is not a short cut to anywhere; I believe that it 
is where one inevitably ends up). It is arguably peripheral to the business of the city, 
having no official function. 
 
But I would say that this lack of function, this unprivatised privacy, makes it central. It 
was there that a stranger came and left their mark181, the nomos being the law, the 
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 This term refers to the ritually inscribed borders of the ancient city in Rome. This will be discussed 
further below. 
181
 The etymology of “mark” comes from Old English mearc, a trace, boundary, sign or limit. See: 
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territory, or the order, but also the name182. In the same way that the sovereign in 
Karl Schmitt’s description183 (also used by Giorgio Agamben184) is simultaneously 
both inside and outside the law and this ambivalent position founds the law, or rather, 
the order which the law requires to function. This marking is both evidence of, and a 
structuring device for, another order. 
 
I would argue that in distinction from the status of words being regarded as labels 
and thereby as separable from the thing that they attached to (which Walter Ong 
described as a feature of typographic cultures), the words of the Bike Cemetery 
writer are obviously more of the nature of inscriptions, or even concrete poetry. That 
is, in the first place, they are not separable from the physical context that they were 
placed in. Unlike an electronic file, a book or a clay tablet, they mark and are 
imbricated in a physical territory. Whether painted or engraved, they are placed on 
something relatively durable and immovable, such as stones, or buildings. They 
have a tendency towards the public, in the sense of being visible. Short of erasure, 
they cannot be concealed or closed and taken elsewhere as a book can be. It could 
be argued that they are the voice of the lawgiver, made solid185. 
 
Boundary stones fulfil this function. The Roman emperor Claudius, in enlarging the 
city of Rome, set up stones around the new limits of the city, bearing his name and 
ancestry. Text and territory come into being simultaneously, the stones and the 
decree that they enacted (Fig. 27). But the texts referred backwards; for Claudius, as 
for many others, the text itself refers to antecedents186. This is both in the sense of 
                                                                                                                                        
Chambers, 1988. I would like to stress the senses of “sign” and “limit”, as aspects of something 
temporally prior; some idea of origin. 
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 See Schmitt, 2003, pp.336–350. 
183
 See Schmitt (1984). Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 
184
 See Agamben (1998). Homo Sacer. 
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 A recent, and much derided, example of this, notable in that its failure to achieve the desired effect 
of both authority and permanence was to draw attention to its author’s perceived ineffectuality and 
precarious hold on power — the so-called “Edstone”. This was a two and a half metre tall limestone 
inscribed with a series of “pledges” signed by Ed Miliband, the leader of the Labour Party, during the 
2015 UK election campaign. Miliband’s prop, despite (or because of) how ill-fated it was, highlights 
the enduring power that the metaphor has. 
186
 The stone illustrated says: 
Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, son of Drusus, Supreme Pontiff, vested with 
the Tribunician power for the ninth time, Consul for the fourth, Censor, Father of his Country, 
upon the enlargement of the territory of the Roman people increased and delimited the 
pomerium. 
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lineage (“son of Drusus”) and in the use of the archaic term pomerium, which was a 
deliberate anachronism intended to link Claudius’ contemporary edict with an archaic 
ritual dating back to the founding of the city itself187. 
 
This writing of the Bike Cemetery is in Derrida's famous term, a pharmakon. A drug, 
both poison and cure. It is a cure for bad memory or the absence of one who would 
have spoken in its place, but a poison for memory, a prosthetic supplement that will 
lead to dependence and the atrophy of its “proper” and “natural” function. It takes the 
place of the majesty of the sovereign word, spoken from the throne of the one who 
has the right to speak (to command, promise). Writing repeats without authority 
because it is divorced from presence, as Ong says — separated from the speech 
event. The Bike Cemetery writer is long gone, vanished to some unknown 
destination, but they left words behind them. I arrived at the space and it was already 
marked. Derrida was responding to Plato who provided the critique of writing from a 
position within a society of relatively few writers (and readers), where it was at least 
relatively plausible that if a writer was living, they could be met with and talked to in 
person. This is not the case now. The writer is a stranger, leaving their words behind 
them, but those words, when read, mark the margins of a space that divides private 
from public. The Bike Cemetery has this nature for me as it shares the fracture in 
space and time that performance creates. I have described it as a hole in the city, or 
an analogue to Walter Benjamin’s “days of remembrance” that are left as blank 
spaces on the calendar. It is exiled from apparent officially sanctioned use, which is 
a rare thing in contemporary London, and has been left as an open-ness to 
whichever stranger passes. It has a temporal disconnect from its status as a “waste” 
place, somewhere apparently lying fallow; unlike the imaginary associated with 
wilderness, it is not an a-historical “untouched” zone — that particular imaginary of 
the wilderness bears some comparison with so-called “urban frontiers” and their 
populations188. Waste grounds are places that have been marked by (usually 
industrial) history and then abandoned, for whatever reason. They are stasis points 
outside of narrative of nation, of biography, but not as wilderness is assumed to be, 
                                                                                                                                        
Translation by classicist Tyler Lansford, on his blog, Rome Inscribed. Available at: 
http://romeinscribed.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/claudian-boundary-stone.html Updated: January 21, 
2014; accessed: July 29, 2016. 
187
 See MacRae, Legible Religion, 2016, pp. 108–9. MacRae asserts that the ancient authority for the 
ritual, and therefore the legitimacy of Claudius’ edict was a “convenient invention”. 
188
 See Gray and Mooney (2011). 
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that which provides an external boundary to (Western) history, either at its beginning 
or end. 
 
Labyrinth and cippus: the second of these spaces is Claude Lefort’s concept of the 
empty space that is a central structural feature of liberal democracy. As Lefort 
argues, for democracy to function the place of sovereignty cannot be held by anyone 
in particular because it is supposed to be held by all189 — that is, the demos, or 
“people”190. 
Power was [once] embodied in the prince, and it therefore gave society a body. 
And because of this, a latent but effective knowledge of what one meant to the 
other existed throughout the social. This model reveals the revolutionary and 
unprecedented feature of democracy. The Iocus of power becomes an empty 
place.[…I]t cannot be occupied — it is such that no individual and no group can 
be consubstantial with it — and it cannot be represented (Lefort, 1988, p.17). 
Once the prince has been deposed or decapitated in the name of the rule of the 
demos, there is a void created at the centre of the polis. This void is the result of a 
fundamental paradox: if the people (voters) are sovereign, how can they be ruled? 
How can they be sovereign and subject simultaneously? The space is, therefore, left 
empty for the impossible ruler who is simultaneously sovereign and subject (Van 
Boxsel, 2004, p.124). 
 
Lefort was obviously thinking of his own country, France, which is a republic. In the 
case of a constitutional monarchy such as the UK, the monarch ostensibly remains 
sovereign (and it is worth noting that the loyalty of the armed forces is legally owed 
to the Queen rather than parliament), but insofar as the UK is a democracy, cannot 
be said to “rule”. In rituals such as the opening of parliament, in which the Queen 
reads a speech outlining the prospective legislative program of “her” government and 
in the signing of bills in order to turn them into law, the performance of Royal assent 
is made as the placeholder for an ideal and abstract citizen — a stranger — whose 
approval must be sought for the actions of the government that they elected. As the 
                                            
189
 Quite who this “all” is, or how it is defined, is a somewhat more complicated matter. 
190
 Again, who the “people” are is not a straightforward matter. 
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Dutch historian Matthijs Van Boxsel puts it in his Encyclopaedia of Stupidity (2004), 
[t]he coronation of a monarch does not fill the vacuum of power. Anomalously, 
the monarch keeps free the space in which democracy can arise. Unlike the 
Jacobin, who occupies the centre of power by keeping it vacant, the monarch 
protects the empty space by occupying it (Ibid, p.133). 
Van Boxsel likens this position to “King Log” in Aesop’s fable. This unsatisfactory 
king was given by Jove to a group of frogs who prayed for a ruler. Jove sent them a 
log, which the frogs felt was insufficiently active and king-like. On praying a second 
time for a real ruler, they were sent a stork, which ate them. This can variously be 
seen as a critique of authority, or of people’s desire for rulers and laws, or 
alternatively a cautionary tale about human hankering for something better than the 
status quo. 
 
A real king, Louis XIV of France, included this fable in the emblematic labyrinth191 he 
had built at Versailles between 1672 and 1677. It contained sculptural 
representations of many of Aesop’s fables in the form of fountains192 (see Fig. 28). It 
is worth contemplating this space briefly. It was created for the purpose of 
wandering, perhaps getting lost, but also for the purposes of instructing those who 
wandered in it. It was built by an absolute monarch who spared no expense in its 
creation, as, in common with the rest of the palace and gardens of Versailles193, a 
demonstration of his power194. But as a space, it presents unusual features. As 
opposed to the boundary stones discussed earlier, the maze/labyrinth does not aim 
                                            
191
 In a purist sense, it is not a labyrinth, but a maze. A labyrinth, properly speaking, has a single path 
through it (monocursal), whereas a maze can have multiple branching paths, dead ends, etc. 
(multicursal). The words were often used interchangeably in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, 
when there was a vogue amongst the powerful for building garden mazes/labyrinths, along with the 
suggestive term “wilderness”. See Matthews, 1922, p.131. 
192
 Unfortunately, it cannot now be visited, as it was destroyed by the unfortunate Louis XVI in 1778, 
citing the cost of upkeep as a reason. I rely here on two contemporary guide books. 
193
 Chandra Mukerji (2012) describes the function of the gardens and palace as whole as intended to 
cement Louis’ power over both nobles and church by presenting a centralised, absolutist France as 
being a direct descendent of and heir to Imperial Rome. The palace and surroundings were designed 
to combine classical allusion in the architecture and sculpture with “Roman” engineering prowess in 
the landscaping and mechanisms of the fountains. 
194
 Mukerji also points out the pedagogical intent of the emblematic fountains and appended texts; it 
was intended to teach courtiers their place in Louis’ order, by analogy to the fables ranking of animals 
according to their “nature”: The labyrinth was constraining, teaching lessons in subordination to a 
higher power. But it was also entertaining because it turned powerlessness into pleasure. 
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to impose homogeneity on the area that it encloses. 
 
On the contrary, it folds its space in on itself, eschewing the most direct path from 
one side to the other and forces the wanderer to navigate narrow pathways in which 
visibility of the way forward or back is strictly limited. In this way, it affords privacy, or 
secrecy195. It is an apparent contrast or opposition, to an imperial ambition that wants 
to extend straight roads from the centre out to the horizon, to unify space under a 
single name (that of the king, and his law); but these are twinned aspects of the 
same power. Whilst the roads, the clear lines of sight, the milestones (like boundary 
stones, also called cippi) and the legal code applied consistently across the territory 
express the rationality of power that makes things (population, territories, 
economies) visible and measurable, the maze expresses its converse: irrationality. In 
a maze, there is no near or far, no centre or margins. The space turns back upon 
itself, creating strange paradoxes of proximity and distance, equations of time and 
distance such as those that milestones and reliable roads make possible have no 
meaning. Wandering a maze is an embodied experience (as all experiences must 
be, but some in a far more marked way than others), of spatial disorientation, a game 
of deliberate confusion. Whilst it can create the experience of besiegers trying to 
break into a walled city196, or the detailed and painful progress of urban guerrilla 
warfare, it is also an experience of powerlessness; the wanderer gives themselves 
over to the twists and turns, the blind alleys. Louis placed emblematic instruction in 
the Versailles maze to inculcate in his courtiers a sense of their place in the wider 
scheme of things197. 
                                            
195
 In the early twentieth century, the idea that clandestine romantic meetings were intimately 
connected with the setting of the garden maze was strong enough for a writer to introduce the subject 
with it: 
Many a tender intrigue has been woven around its dark yew alleys. Mr. Compton Mackenzie, 
for example, introduces it most effectively as a lovers' rendezvous in "The Passionate 
Elopement," and no doubt the readers of romantic literature will recall other instances of a like 
nature (Matthews, 1922, p.1). 
The erotic connection speaks strongly to the idea of power as that which dazzles and disorientates, 
where that disorientation is associated with both pleasure and fear. 
 
196
 Matthews tells us that 
A topiary work […] ‘The Siege of Troy,’ was one of [King] William's pet horticultural 
adornments at Kensington Palace. It is said to have been a verdant representation of military 
defence works, cut yew and variegated holly being ‘taught,’ as Walpole says, ‘to imitate the 
lines, angles, bastions, scarps and counter-scarps of regular fortifications.’ (Matthews, 1922, 
p.130). 
197
 These are strangely similar to milestones. Whilst milestones in a maze would have no conceivable 
function, from where, and by what route, could they measure the distance from anywhere? The Aesop 
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The maze was a pleasure garden with all the playful erotic stratagems of secrecy, 
intrigue, exploration and contrasts in revelation and concealment; but it was a threat, 
as well. The king can disorientate the subject’s senses and cause them to lose their 
body, but also provide landmarks and advice, that if followed, would re-orientate to 
the correct attitude (a trope meaning direction, posture, inclination), bodily and 
intellectual. It is no surprise that the main entrance to the maze was flanked by 
sculptures of two allegorical figures: Eros and Aesop. This might seem to contrast 
with the boundary stone discussed earlier. One form, the maze or labyrinth, encloses 
and convolutes the space within its territory. The other, the boundary stone, marks 
out the margins of the territory, whilst the space contained is assumed to gain the 
homogeneity conferred by being inscribed under the presiding name, for instance the 
Emperor Claudius in the example cited above. The cippus gestured backwards to the 
ancestry of the emperor and, simultaneously, to the presumed archaic nature of the 
ritual as part of the founding of Rome. This originary power came from the centre, 
which is itself an origin. It is not enough for Claudius to sign “Claudius, Emperor” at 
the new limits of the city. Someone must always be standing behind him, and behind 
them, and so on in turn until one arrives back at a plough marking a single furrow, 
turning the previously unbroken ground over upon itself. 
 
The most direct expression of this, one might even call it direct to the point of crass, 
is Brussels Palais de Justice (see Fig. 29). This is a vast structure, spread along a 
hillside that once hosted public executions, boasting over twenty large courtrooms 
and several hundred smaller offices, making one wonder what mid-to-late 
nineteenth-century crime wave necessitated this, although it might not have been 
domestic concerns that prompted this arguably hysterically compensatory edifice 
complex. The unconscious source of the guilty conscience that the building gestures 
toward placating might have been rooted in the Congo Free State of that time. It is, 
however, equally possible that the source of this over-compensation lay in the 
newness of the Belgian state and its accompanying lack of shared national myths 
that might provide an origin rooted in antiquity. The Palais hunches beneath a dome 
                                                                                                                                        
fountains do provide a form of orientation. The didactic intent of the fables was to indicate the proper 
hierarchy of the world, expressing it in the relations of species between one another. The maze 
thereby gave the visiting courtiers a sense of their relative position in relation to power, and the best 
way to comport themselves towards it; also, the behaviour that they had the right to expect from their 
inferiors. 
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— bigger than Rome’s St. Peter’s — the top of which is formed as a crown, 
combining law and monarchy in one material gesture. It also echoes the crowned 
globes and animals of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century emblem books; Aesop’s 
Crane King was a popular subject and was very often depicted as crowned. The 
novelist, W. G. Sebald has one of his characters, the mysterious wanderer Austerlitz, 
describe it fancifully thus in his eponymous novel: 
[…T]his huge pile of over seven hundred thousand cubic meters contains 
corridors and stairways leading nowhere, and doorless rooms and halls where 
no one would ever set foot, empty spaces surrounded by walls and 
representing the innermost secret of all sanctioned authority (Sebald, 2011, 
p.39). 
The unspoken irony is, of course, that Austerlitz claims to have been wandering in 
search of a “secret” basement where the Masonic rituals of power are conducted, 
whilst this quest takes place in an actual labyrinth built in plain view of an entire city, 
in which the law works in public. 
 
Joseph Poelaert, the architect of the Palais de Justice, also designed the Colonne du 
Congrès (Column of Congress) in Brussels. This 47 metre-high monument was built 
in 1859 to celebrate the founding of Belgium as an independent state with a liberal 
constitution under a constitutional monarch. A sculpture of the monarch, Leopold I, 
stands at the top of it. It is a cippus, in two of the word’s other senses: column and 
(later) a gravestone. The column is inscribed with the names of the members of the 
Provisional Government and National Congress who framed the new state’s 
constitution after seceding from the United Netherlands in 1832. Perhaps out of a 
lack of confidence in the efficacy198 of the names alone, and the addition of passages 
                                            
198
 That is, the efficacy to ground, or found, the state. Belgium has often been described as an 
“artificial” state, being created by treaty and consisting of three distinct language groups that are 
situated in separate geographical areas; the French speaking Walloon in the south, Dutch speaking 
Flemings in the north and a smaller group of German speakers in the east. This tendency to denigrate 
Belgium is especially marked on the anti-EU right, partly because the EU is headquartered in Brussels 
and partly because the supposed “artificiality” of the country is seen as a model for the federal Euro-
state that is (or was) supposedly being planned there. Nigel Farage of UKIP articulated this view, as 
quoted by the BBC. 
"The country was an artificial construction and we're now at a point where the Flems and the 
Walloons are barely on speaking terms. Belgium is a prototype for the entire European Union. 
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from the constitution inscribed upon it, four female allegorical sculptures sit around 
the base, representing the four important liberal freedoms the constitution enshrined: 
Freedom of Education, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of the Press and Freedom of 
Association. After World War I, an Unknown Soldier was interred at the base. This 
act, which was also carried out in other countries after the war, is a rhetorical device 
aimed at creating a universal figure (or corpse) that stands in for the nation as a 
whole. Instead of a name, the Unknown Soldier is buried under the name of nation; 
in the case of this column, the corpse takes on nation and constitution as its epitaph. 
It creates a pairing between its anonymous grave (and presence of the corpse within 
it199) and the bronze sculpture of King Leopold I at the top of the column, named and 
represented as a singular figure, surveying his capital. This can, of course, be read 
as a diagram of hierarchy, requiring the sacrifice of innumerable unknowns to 
perpetuate the grandiose nomenclature of those at the top, but I think it also 
materialises the relationship between the many and the monarchical figurehead. 
Benedict Anderson, in his Imagined Communities (2006) argues that the figure of the 
Unknown Soldier is used by nations as one way of demonstrating a secular kind of 
immortality for the individual within the nation-state200. He suggests that the decline 
of religious certainty after the enlightenment created a vacuum in transcendent 
meaning (in life, in mortality) and that the idea of the nation, of nationalism, provided 
some sense of an afterlife. 
 
In Boxsel’s scheme, the constitutional monarch (as in Boxsel’s own Holland and the 
UK) remains a log, stubbornly occupying the central place of power whilst refusing to 
use it. Van Boxsel perceptively argues that the hereditary principle is an extremely 
useful guarantor of the gap between the sovereign’s role and their personal qualities, 
                                                                                                                                        
Belgium is going to split, it'll do it within the next few years... and when you criticise Belgium, 
you criticise the flawed European Union model, and that's why they're really upset with me”. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8538281.stm Updated: February 26, 2010; accessed: August 
3, 2016. 
A right wing European blog, Brussels Journal, published a long article arguing the same point as 
Farage expressed more pithily, but with more care in trying to tease out the meanings of “artificial” in 
relation to nations and states. The Belgian politician Jules Destrée wrote, in a letter to King Albert I in 
1912, “Sire, allow me to tell you the truth, the large and horrifying truth: il n’y a pas de Belges,” (“There 
are no Belgians”). 
199
 That this one, along with other tombs of its type, might in fact be empty, does nothing to reduce its 
allegorical impact. 
200
 […I]f one tries to imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals. Is 
a sense of absurdity avoidable? The reason is that neither Marxism nor Liberalism is much concerned 
with death and Immortality. If the nationalist imagining is so concerned, this suggests a strong affinity 
with religious imaginings (Anderson, 2006, p.10). 
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in that it supplies a large degree of randomness into selection and no one can 
choose (or be chosen) for the job (Boxsel, 2004, p.137). If there was appointment 
based on merit and abilities, the role would no longer be a placeholder for the absent 
people because it would give evidence that the one who holds it needs to be 
someone in particular rather than anyone (who gets born to it)201. This is also the 
logic behind the figure of the Unknown Soldier mentioned above; no one knows the 
particular individual characteristics of the soldier in life, his heroism or otherwise. His 
qualification is simply that he was killed, just as, symmetrically, all the hereditary 
sovereign has to do is be born. That idea, I feel, is what is lost in democratic systems 
that replace hereditary sovereigns with an appointed or elected President, who takes 
a more ceremonial (one could reasonably say “magical”) role, as opposed to a more 
“political” Prime Minister. That president has to be someone who wants the job and 
is (at least theoretically) suited to it. They are, by definition, a known quantity. The 
current monarch of the UK has, on the whole, maintained a stolid silence on matters 
of state, confining herself to ceremonial and diplomatic duties. Her public lack of 
charisma and apparent political efficacy has maintained the institution of the 
monarchy, and arguably, the UK’s particular form of democracy. 
 
It would seem anachronistic, to say the least, for a contemporary politician to speak 
of the legitimacy of a particular government as deriving from the monarchy. Instead, 
the current piety is that it stems from the infinitely elastic abstraction “the People” 
who have voted for it. This space is empty because if it has content, that content 
cannot be described or legislated. It exists as a space of privacy in the sense of not 
being accessible to scrutiny, in the same way as a locked room is private. At the 
same time, this space does not have walls and needs to be seen to be empty for 
democratic pieties to have purchase. King or Queen Log ensures this by being 
themselves, empty — a mere outline of a subject (a profile on a stamp or coin) that 
waves and smiles, gives assent. But what is the quality of this emptiness — is it a 
medium within which relations, of juxtaposition, simultaneity can form, or is it a given 
that is external to these relations? If we are to say as Lefort does, that this space 
                                            
201
 None of this is to say that there is any requirement for a sovereign to be possessed of vast 
quantities of land or treasure to fulfil their role. A decent council house tied to the job would be 
sufficient. Neither is it to say that random selection via the same sort of system used for jury duty 
would not also achieve the same results as the hereditary principle. 
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must remain empty in order to function202, is this emptiness a product of history, a 
particular outcome of it, or is it the ground of history, a sort of anterior terra nullius203 
upon which history gets written? If it is the space of sovereignty it can be held by 
none because sovereignty belongs to all who are subjects. As this sovereignty 
consists of a will that is undetermined204, then it must exist outside all other 
determinations, including that of history: in fact, outside of society itself. This places 
the centre of power in society outside society and history; it is not caused. In a liberal 
democracy such as the UK, the electorate exercises choice (though not collectively) 
of rulers, the legitimacy of this choice derives from its freedom; it is assumed to be 
arbitrary and undetermined. In other words, it must come from a mysterious zone of 
voluntarism that exists outside potential scrutiny or coercion. It is purported to be 
from this place, rather than a transcendent power channelled vertically downwards 
through a monarch. The contemporary notion of legitimacy (in experience as much 
as politics as the rise of lyric poetry demonstrates) derives from an “authentic” self-
communing within individuals. This is why, as I showed previously, the figure of the 
addict has become a trope for an inauthentic because it is an insufficiently sovereign 
subjectivity. 
 
But then, if it is a discernible space, where are its edges? In law, various spaces can 
be designated private: the (heterosexual) marital bedroom or heterosexual sex more 
generally, according to Lauren Berlant, is accorded legal status as a private zone 
where the state cannot interfere or legislate (1997, p.59). The European Convention 
on Human Rights grants citizens a (qualified) right to a “private life”205; in this case, 
an individual’s life itself is granted the status of privacy. The empty space that no one 
can occupy is mirrored and guaranteed by a privacy in which one, and only ever one, 
is accepted as sovereign in perpetuity — the space of a subject’s own body and 
                                            
202
 Here I think of the unspoken (and unspeakable) territorial struggles conducted over shared spaces 
in shared houses. These corners, hallways and half-landings can only remain “communal” insofar as 
no one uses them. A plant pot or pair of shoes, or a simple “tidying” or “organising” of these spaces by 
one of the tenants can spark a silent civil war. 
203
 “Nobody’s land”: if, of course, there has ever been such a thing. 
204
 See my discussion of Eve Sedgwick’s Epidemics of the Will elsewhere in this work. 
205
 Interestingly, the ECHR differentiates between “family life” and “private life”, with some 
relationships falling under the protection of the right to “family life” and others being “private”. Same- 
sex relationships are treated as falling into the category of “private” whilst heterosexual ones are 
protected as “family life”. The reproduction of the social through child bearing and rearing (this law 
seems to assume that this is the sole preserve of heterosexual couples) occupies a different space: 
“family” as opposed to mere “sex”. 
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consciousness. 
 
The space of exception, in Giorgio Agamben’s formulation, given in Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) provides an internalisation of that which is 
placed outside of the law (of exchange, of the usual case), by the suspension of the 
law. It is not that “the law will apply here, to this, but not yet”. He writes: 
The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. 
The state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the 
situation that results from its suspension (Agamben, 1998, p.18, original 
emphasis). 
The law cannot legislate without a general case — which is what “order” is — upon 
which law is founded. This order is also a spatial order-ing; the establishment of a 
territory which is empty, or rather, into which emptiness can be permitted without 
destabilising the whole. 
 
As a waste ground, the Bike Cemetery exists outside circuits of commerce and 
authorised leisure. These are, however, not in total abeyance, but suspended, also 
through its function as an unofficial tip. Rubbish, as William Viney describes it, has 
an untimely presence — an “already and not yet”. The bricoleur who left their mark 
on the wall in disjointed inscriptions and collaged imagery, is a part of this.  
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The Neighbour 
 
Michel Serres memorably described noise as a “third man” (1982, p. 67), an 
interruption or that which interrupts the scene of communion/communication. It is 
something, or someone, who is always at least potentially present as a disruptive 
force. This tends to place the interlocutors on the same side, united against this force 
in their quest for mutual understanding, as opposed to older ideas of dialectic that go 
back at least as far as Plato. If, in speaking, we are on the same side, then 
“meaning” as such is not immanent to and resulting from our exchange, our 
individual positions; it comes from outside it. We are trying to see, or hear past the 
noise of our individual vocabularies, modes of expression, accents, stutters, etc. to 
apprehend a meaning that is a priori shared; if is not “shared”, how could we 
recognise it as such? 
[...] it is one and the same act to recognize an abstract being through the 
occurrences of its concrete, standardized form and to come to an agreement 
about this recognition. In other words […] the attempt to eliminate noise, is at 
the same time the condition of the apprehension of the abstract form and the 
condition of the success of communication (Serres, 1982, p.68). 
Serres' idea is that a successful dialogue or communication arises in the process of 
the parties involved eradicating as much as possible the incidental noise which 
would muddy the signal. This process of extracting signal from noise is what he 
would call agreement. He uses the example of abstract mathematical symbols which 
when drawn by hand on a blackboard, for example, can take all sorts of strange 
shapes through which one can see the figure intended. Douglas Kahn has very aptly 
described this noise as “[…] that constant grating sound generated by the movement 
between the abstract and empirical” (1999, p.33). 
 
Steven Connor, in a lecture on noise: 
Sound has always had associations with the sacred. Any sound that has been 
detached from its source, whether by concealment, technological mediation, or 
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by amplification, will carry a sense of unseen power, power that is the greater 
for being unseen.206 
Nikkai, a brand of audiovisual cables, display the strapline “Pure Connectivity” on 
their packaging as if this was possible, or even desirable. It begs the question of 
what pure connectivity would sound like — it would sound like nothing, which is the 
point of the advertising; there would be friction-free exchange between particularities 
and universals. It would have the effect of immediate (and unmediated) 
presence/communion. To attempt communication at all, however, involves the 
recognition — the starting point is the recognition — that the sender and the receiver 
of the message are not the same. If they were, then communication would be 
redundant. A channel must be opened between them, and this channel must, as far 
as is possible, be kept free of noise. 
 
The following is a description of a 2016 performance in which I along with several 
others was invited to perform and improvised “duet” with a very well-established 
performer. Neither party was to have any prior information on what the other would 
do. I was acutely aware of the power differential between us, as relatively  unknown 
and un-named versus the well known name on the bill. 
 
A didn't want any of us to meet with them beforehand. This was made quite clear. We 
were to be strangers, to each other and to A, who was calling the shots, it was their 
reputation; their capital. I turned up early, to see what the set up was going to be. I 
asked if the lights could be adjusted and asked where A would be. They could adjust 
the lights the way I wanted, but they couldn't say where A would be at the time. I said 
that I'd like to come in from the back so no one would see me arrive, and they said 
that could be arranged. When the time came, very much later, we were taken into a 
side room to wait. There were five of us there, strangers. Mostly, they weren't very 
chatty; two were very concerned about getting their last train home and so we agreed 
they could go first. Those two were especially nervous, the first one said that this was 
not her thing at all; she'd volunteered to do something completely different, but they'd 
asked her to do this and she'd agreed. She rattled the papers she'd brought, and 
                                            
206
 Steven Connor, from the Radio 4 broadcast, Noise (1997). Available at: 
http://www.stevenconnor.com/noise/. Updated: February 24, 1997; accessed: February 28, 2012. 
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scanned them repeatedly in preparation. The second one was fussing with her 
equipment and said she was unsure that she would know what to do when the time 
came. The third was quiet and seemed very young; he was polite. The fourth was the 
oldest of us and the only one who knew A at all; just as a passing acquaintance, he 
said. No, he didn't know why he'd been asked; he seemed slightly irritated by our 
questions. The first one was called out. We could hear what was going on from the 
side room. She was interrupted with strange noises as she tried to read out her 
prepared statement. We could hear laughter, then A, whose room it was, began 
interviewing her. We could hear A, putting the other off balance, allowing her to 
recover, then interrupting again, then laughter. 158 The second went with it. She 
went out playing a tune on her equipment. Then A, whose room it was, sang along; 
and after a while requested another tune, the second played it, as A, whose room it 
was, reminisced. The third, who was polite, did the same, but he sang, also. He sang 
questions about love to A, whose room it was. A sang back questions to him, about 
love. They sang a duet about love, on A's territory. The fourth had already left his 
equipment in A's room. He went through the door. I heard a piano play, on A's 
territory. A started to sing, the piano stopped. A talked, there was no reply, except 
some isolated chords. Then a different tune, which A started to sing to, again – until it 
stopped, abruptly. Then silence. I was the last. As arranged, I didn't go in through the 
door that the others had. I did not intend to step straight out onto A's floor. I left 
through the other door and entered their room through the back. I made no sound, at 
first. I stood behind the others who were sitting down in rows looking towards A, who 
was leaning, relaxed, against the wall at the far end, looking towards the door the 
others came through. After a moment, I started moving behind the back row of 
people, scratching the inside of my drum with a fingernail. It was not too loud, but 
was tense, abrasive. A moved forward slightly, not too far, I could see their stance 
become straighter, more tense. The lights had been set as I requested. They shone 
directly in A's direction. A squinted and shielded their eyes to see what was 
happening. I said nothing, but carried on, scratching the drum skin. I moved down the 
aisle, beating the drum sometimes, and scratching its skin, saying nothing. Halfway 
up the aisle towards A's zone, I took a pair of red plastic lips from my pocket and 
clenched them between my teeth, holding them over my own lips. They were a pound 
shop purchase, with a built-in whistle. I paused and blew through them. They 159 
produced a wheezing glissando (Fig. 30). There was some laughter from those sitting. 
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A responded by making a whooshing sound into the microphone. I allowed a silence 
to build, then took the plastic lips off and said “I'm trying to channel the spirit of my 
grandad. He was a right cunt.” There was some nervous laughter from those sitting... 
 
I was intending, in my response to the invitation to “duet” with the quite apparent host 
of the space, to play the part of awkward neighbor, rather than ingratiating guest. 
Neighbours are universally unavoidable. Unlike the guest, they have no need of 
hospitality; we cannot eject them if they speak out of turn or become tiresome. They 
do not have a visa that can be revoked. Equally, we do not have to laugh at their 
jokes or effusively appreciate their generosity to placate them. As anyone who lives 
in a flat will know, the neighbour is constantly present but usually unseen; the 
relationship is mostly auditory. We can hear their footsteps, smell their cooking, pass 
judgement on their taste in music or sex lives, know how often they use the toilet and 
when they go out to work. They will know just the same about us; their judgement 
cannot be appealed against any more than our own can and there is nothing that can 
be done about them. Unlike the other, whose position is always at a safe distance 
from which we can turn away from them — or invite them over — the neighbor is 
almost as close as our own skin. 
 
The neighbour disturbs the self-similarity of the home, a place where supposedly no- 
one comes in and stays without our say so. The home is a private, discrete space, 
separated from the outside (the outside, as well as being weather, is also 
predominantly other people) by walls and doors with locks, the keys to which only 
known and named individuals have access. The key is a tesserae hospitalis, the 
token from the ancient world described by Georg Gadamer as a physical token that 
would be divided in half, each half carried by an individual to denote the claims of 
hospitality that existed between their families. Gadamer used this as an example of 
the strong connection between notions of the symbol and a sense of simultaneous 
presence (2004, p.63) of the “sensible and the nonsensible” (Ibid, p.64). 
Obviously a symbol is something which has value not only because of its 
content, but because it can be "produced"—i.e., because it is a document by 
means of which the members of a community recognize one another; whether it 
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is a religious symbol or appears in a secular context—as a badge or a pass or 
a password […] (Ibid, p.63, my emphasis). 
The key is a manifestation of this same idea. It has jagged teeth that fit the tumblers 
of the lock in order to turn them, in the same way that the broken halves of the 
ceramic tesserae would, when presented, match each other. In both cases, the 
coming together of the parts — their being presented to one another — temporally 
and spatially, activates (or invokes) a power (to ask for hospitality, to unlock a door) 
that is otherwise latent207. A whole is created from heterogeneous parts; a key and a 
lock are separate components (each one theoretically belonging to only one other) 
until joined. Once this happens they form a single system, the purpose of which is to 
move a barrier or set it in place. This opening or closing controls the space and 
bestows power upon the one, or ones, who hold the key. 
 
I have a key, and through this, I have a home. This is my piece of territory that I can 
— theoretically — control. The compromises of social life, of imposed hierarchies 
that exist outside, stop at these walls. Here is the space of my unhindered volition, 
just as my body is the house of my spirit, the seat of my will, in which I struggle 
against my appetites and desires, so in my house I must struggle against noise. 
The private (from privatus, deprived) was originally conceived as the negation 
or privation of public value. It had no value in its own right. But in the modern 
period, this has changed, and privacy has taken on a distinctive value of its 
own, in several different registers: as freedom, individuality, inwardness, 
authenticity, and so on (Warner, 2002, p.28). 
Whilst Warner emphasises the variety of registers and conceptual sedimentations 
left over the course of history in the pairing (not always strictly an opposition) of 
public/private, one of the oldest is that of a claim on territory. We still use private in 
that sense: private land, private space, private room or house. 
 
                                            
207
 Michael Warner points out that for medieval thought, the difference between “public” and “private” 
was “almost solely a spatial concept” defined by whether something was open or closed. See: 
Warner, 2002, p.26. Whilst the contemporary distinction is considerably more complex, it retains 
elements of this. 
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One of the traditional symbols of the papacy is the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, 
metaphorically given by Christ to St. Peter. Christ also takes the trouble to name 
Peter; the name, the foundation of a territory (the Church) and the keys are all 
placed together. This territory is enclosed, as territory must be, with a definable 
inside and out. Order must always be smaller than the matter it orders. In the scene 
that establishes the Church and its authority: 
And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my 
church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. 
 
And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever 
thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt 
loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven (Matthew, 16: 18–19; King James 
version). 
By this action, St. Peter becomes the first Pope and the holder of the keys to the 
territory; the Church became, as much as it was anything else, an empire when it 
became the Church of Rome. The keys that were presented in metaphor to Peter still 
appear on the arms of the Holy See and are associated with territory — supernatural 
as well as natural — and the ability to impose order within that territory. The key 
holder is given the power to allot, say, portions of land, or portions of salvation or 
damnation, to delegate power to others in his dominion.  
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Sphinxes patrol the precincts. Blank, archaic smiles and unreadable eyes.  
Demanding the Shibboleth kept under the tongue.  
It's passed from mouth to mouth, like a kiss.  
Fits the serrations of their teeth  
like the ragged ceramic edge  
of the tesserae hospitalis,  
that met its mate  
in a presence,  
a promise. 
  
[Footsteps come behind, and pass. Traffic noise flows above.] 
  
The ground is strewn with bones 
And travel cards. 
  
[Footsteps, traffic, fade out.] 
 
 
(Extract from Invocation, transcript in Appendix 1 and Audio Disc 1) 
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Lastly 
 
In order to gather field recordings for a short podcast about the place, I went to the 
Bike Cemetery in the summer of 2015. I hadn’t been back there for a year or so and 
each previous visit had revealed the effects of rain and wind on the inscriptions and 
collage that covered the wall. What had been preserved for many years unseen 
behind a screen of young trees had been left exposed by the highways department 
felling those trees when they grew tall enough to overhang the motorway slip road 
running across the top of the embankment that the wall held in place. The emblems 
were fading, the pasted elements decaying or falling off to join the rest of the detritus 
that not only lay on, but constituted a large part of, the ground beneath it. The 
previous year I had noticed that some local kids had found it and practiced a bit of 
inept spray can tagging on a small part of the wall. It was tentative and badly done, I 
noted that it had been abandoned after the first letter had been formed. Either the 
can had run out of paint or propellant or the tagger had decided that it wasn’t worth 
the bother to tag a place where their peers weren’t likely to see it; there is kudos in 
tagging somewhere inaccessible but public, visible. The Bike Cemetery is a hidden 
place, turned in upon itself. 
 
On my 2015 visit, I was prepared to find further weather damage and perhaps some 
more disparate and inept tagging. I didn’t expect nearly the entirety of the wall 
inscriptions and bricolage to be gone. I pushed through the usual undergrowth and 
followed a narrow path between brambles and nettles, reaching the small clearing in 
front of the wall, where I was confronted by the word “costume”, painted very 
carefully and very large using a tasteful range of subdued greens in a curly cursive 
style script with a drop shadow (see Fig. 32). The calligrapher had stripped a great 
deal of the collaged material from the wall, presumably to give themselves a more 
even surface to work on. They had painted straight over the texts already there. Off 
slightly to the right, there was a small iteration of the word “Concrete” in another 
cursive style script with a drop shadow again (Fig. 33). 
 
The care with which the work was done coupled with the meaninglessness of the 
words in context made me think of the sort of mood board that designers use when 
developing ideas for a client; sometimes these vapid but supposedly evocative 
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words find their way into the final product. Wall friezes with words like “fresh” or 
“stimulating” regularly find their way into coffee shops, for instance. I thought that 
perhaps the wall had been used for some aspiring young creative’s calligraphy 
practice, perhaps as a page or two in their portfolio. It reminded me most strongly of 
the hand-painted signage that has become popular in the cities of the UK for a 
particular kind of business, largely purveyors of the “artisanal” kind of food and drink. 
This has become something of a shorthand signifier for a place offering some 
description of an “authentic experience”. During the run up to the Olympics, as part 
of the generalised sanitisation of the Hackney Wick area, a design firm called the 
Bread Collective won a commission to design and paint what they called a 
“community mural” along White Post Lane, a street that was going to be one of the 
main approaches to the Olympic Park. It displayed 
[…] words and phrases that pay homage to the area's industrial past. The 
typographic aesthetic also references traditional signage found on old factories, 
shops and canal boats208. 
These were re-presentations of the names of various products once produced in the 
area. It also had short phrases, alluding to local landmarks or memories including 
“fridge mountain”; a small alp of obsolescent fridges that languished for some years 
in a yard next to the railway line. This remarkable landmark was cleared away near 
the beginning of the Olympic preparations. The factories that once had produced the 
products being memorialised had mostly closed in the late 1970s and the coming 
Olympics would lead to obliteration of the carapaces of the buildings. Combined with 
this would, of course, be a spike in rental values and the inevitable exodus from the 
area of those who could no longer afford it. 
 
Much of this neatly matches Celeste Olalquiaga’s definition of kitsch that she 
explored in The Artificial Kingdom: A Treasury of the Kitsch Experience (1998) in  
experience that is unmediated by industrial capitalism. It is the fragmentation or 
                                            
208
 From documentation of this project by Bread Collective. Available at: 
http://www.breadcollective.co.uk/work/#/the-walls-have-ears-olympic-site-murals-hackney-wick/ 
Last update: 2013; last accessed: September 27, 2016. 
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ruination of what Benjamin called “the aura”. The same impulse desires hand- 
painted calligraphy to commemorate industrial “heritage” (once the factories and 
those who worked in them are gone) and post-industrial landmarks. It is, as 
Olalquiaga says, marked by an indelible melancholy, a subliminal sense of being 
caught in a double-bind; it is the mechanism of industrial capital that enables the 
production of even the ersatz “artisanal”, just as much as the mass-produced. It is 
the class relations that are an integral part of that system that creates the appetite for 
it. 
 
I inserted some still images of the Bread Collective’s mural project The Walls Have 
Ears (2012) into the video that documents my performance Twat Graffiti 
(2015)209(see Fig. 31). The performance took place very close to White Post Lane, 
which was the site for the Bread Collective work. It was this piece, and the effacing 
of the Bike Cemetery wall, that I was referring to as “twat graffiti”. The ethos behind 
Costume and Concrete, along with the work of the Bread Collective, belong in an 
entirely different category from teenagers’ tagging, or whatever the unknown 
bricoleur of the Bike Cemetery was doing. The supposed nostalgia that might be 
evoked by such painstaking handcraft is perhaps intended more as invocation, 
bearing in mind the distinctions between the two terms that I outlined earlier; 
invocation is a calling on of something that is available but locally or temporarily in 
abeyance210. The word “heritage”, just like the word “tradition”, plays on the idea of a 
continuity between then and now, just as invocation relies on the implicit sense of 
some shared language or identity between the one who invokes and that which is 
invoked; there is no gap between them. It is fairly common for new developments — 
most often but not exclusively those refurbishing old factories and warehouses as 
flats — to nod at “heritage” at least in the names that they give those places. A 
development on the site of the Haggerston Estate in Hackney has called itself “City 
Mills” after the industry that existed in the area in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth 
centuries, thereby eliding the social democratic post-war years when there was 
public housing there211. 
                                            
209
 See Disk 3 and online for documentation. 
210
 It is interesting to consider where the “control” that the Leave EU campaign wanted to take “back” 
had been, or whether it is even possible to take something “back” that you never had in the first place. 
The implication is that a long-standing tradition will be re-instated. 
211
 Tellingly, the brochure for City Mills describes the change that has occurred in the following terms: 
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I associate the Bike Cemetery writer (despite, or rather because, I have no idea of 
who they were) specifically with the post-war consensus as the archetype of the 
rights-bearing citizen, the one whose act of negation — their work — was facilitated 
by a state that maintained somewhat of a boundary between public and private. It did 
this in terms of spaces, certainly, in contrast to the pseudo-public privately owned 
“public realm” that too many streets and squares are becoming by stealth, but also in 
terms of boundaries within the subject; the separation of “citizen” and “subject” 
creates a necessary dyad for what we can broadly call liberalism. I have identified 
the space of the Bike Cemetery (its borders) with the neutral container of the 
citizenship offered by what was called the welfare state. It provided the space — the 
empty space — for the negative. I believe that like a Kantian solitary scholar, s/he 
performed a subtraction of themselves from whatever their context was, their specific 
historical and cultural determinations to partake in a universal negation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
The old East End street markets have reinvented themselves and now offer artisan produce, original 
designer fashion and hand-crafted artefacts alongside the standard fruit and veg. Industry is 
reconfigured as heritage and “artisan produce” and “hand-crafted artefacts”. 
 
169 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They took a city and rebuilt it, exactly; down to every last ledge and cornice. 
 And they called it  
"Heritage". 
 
Bright, sandblasted facades. They called it "Heritage". Except,  
the shadows don't fit. 
They called it "Heritage".  
Except, the shadows don't fit. 
 
THE SHADOWS DON'T FIT! THE SHADOWS DON'T FIT! T! T! T! T! t! t! t! t! t! t! t t t t t! t t t t t 
tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt 1 
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Conclusion – Reflections on Brexit 
 
As I have been engaged in this study, public services and spaces are being run 
down and privatised, the public as a totality, bounded by particular identity, has 
become more dominant in UK and US politics and beyond. I nearly wrote that it has 
returned, because this is the autocthonic fantasy being purveyed; that some innate 
national being has been roused from somnolence after years of enervation and is 
alert for further “betrayal” from above or a contagion of estrangement from parts of 
society considered inherently estranging. An argument has been made for some 
time, from parts of the right, that mass immigration weakens the will of the “native” 
population to support the mechanisms of the welfare state (for a random example, 
see Goodhart, 2013). The state, like the fantasy of the nation, is assumed to have or 
need a determinate, symbolic, content that must be fiercely identified with, or not at 
all.  
 
On 23 June 2016, the UK referendum on exiting the European Union returned a 
narrow margin (51.9% to 48.1%) in favour of leaving. Since then the negotiations 
have gone on inconclusively; at each stage the unpreparedness of the UK 
government, which chose (the referendum was not legally binding) to implement the 
result, has been exposed as woefully unprepared and incoherent in its intended 
outcomes. Despite the whole exercise — come to be known by the portmanteau 
“Brexit”, appearing ill-advised at the very best — it has not yet been abandoned as 
impossible or as impossibly damaging.  
 
From my perspective, neither side in the referendum had anything politically 
compelling to offer: the “remain” side couched their appeal in the recognisably 
neoliberal/managerialist terms that have dominated political discourse in the UK 
since the 1990s. As such, it could not be other than an offer to maintain the status 
quo. Put bluntly, I could see nothing more appealing in the likes of Tony Blair or 
David Cameron’s vision of the polity and the public than in Boris Johnson’s or Nigel 
Farage’s on the other side. Those who led the leave campaigns presented it as a 
brave insurgency against “the establishment”. It looks more like the denoument of a 
power struggle between two factions of the financialised ruling class. However, as 
Dominic Cummings of the Vote Leave campaign admitted in a 2017 blog post, the 
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“trade babble” that some wanted the campaign to emphasise was not going to 
convince on its own: 
Would we have won without immigration? No. Would we have won by spending 
our time talking about trade and the Single Market? No way […]. (Cummings, 
2017) 
As Cummings acknowledges, the most emotive subject during the referendum 
campaign was the right of EU citizens to live and work wherever they chose within 
the union. This was deliberately conflated (by both the “leave” campaigns) with 
immigration from the rest of the world along with asylum seekers and refugees, 
although non-EU migration is a matter for individual states and the UK has 
international obligations towards refugees. It is for this reason that many have 
derided all those who voted ‘leave’ as racists or xenophobes. Whilst I don’t believe 
this can be true for all cases, the vote has been seized upon as expressing a fervent 
desire for the more ethnically homogeneous polity that is believed to have once 
existed — as a loud, gleeful riposte to the “cosmopolitan elite” and their sensibilities, 
just as the election of Donald Trump in the USA has been treated, not least by 
Trump himself. In fact, the campaign may well have been influenced, funded, if not 
driven (Cadwalladr, 2017) by parts of the American right. It is beyond the scope of 
this present work to cover the questionable nature of those funding and their 
ideological connections. It seems more probable to me that profits from picking the 
bones of a manufactured economic and social catastrophe (Klein, 2007) are likely a 
stronger motive for them than creating ethnic or “cultural” homogeneity.  
 
Brexit is simply the latest manifestation of what I have been describing throughout 
this study: the replacement of an arguably liberal idea of being-in-public as space, 
crowd or institution predicated on the opacity of the stranger or citizen form in a 
dialectic relation with the privacy of the individual subject, by a differentially 
constructed set of degrees of access defined by individual particularities. In the case 
of Brexit, this essentially neoliberal formation is masked by, or allied with, a nativist 
communitarianism.  
 
The public as polity is at best tenuously linked with any particular group or positive 
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content and so more logically “called out” by evocation than “called on” in an 
invocation. It has been retroactively called out by the result; the 17,410,742 people 
who voted to leave rhetorically identified with the country as a whole, constituting 
“the People” (see fig.34) whose monosyllabic “will” as expressed by that single vote 
must not be thwarted. Insofar as it was (or represented as) a singular “voice”, there 
was little coherent beyond a bare negation. Theresa May stumbled upon this reading 
of the result as pure performative with no tangible object beyond its own saying in 
her much-derided clarification (disguised as evasion) that “Brexit means Brexit”. The 
Peoples’ will is to now make the public sphere a reflection of the fantasies it has 
about itself. Arron Banks, co-founder of the Leave EU campaign told the Guardian 
not long after the referendum that  
 
The remain campaign featured fact, fact, fact, fact, fact. It just doesn’t 
work. You have got to connect with people emotionally. […] The first thing we 
did was poll everybody and we found that if immigration wasn’t the issue, the 
issue was schools or education, proxies for immigration (Booth, Travis and 
Gentleman, 2016). 
One can add the NHS to the list of proxies — all standing in for fears of a public 
sphere being “swamped” by strangers. As a randomly chosen example of an 
incessantly repeated trope, in 2013 an audience member of BBC Question Time 
enjoyed a brief tabloid celebrity through her retort to “out-of-touch” panellist, the 
Classicist Mary Beard:  
There are hardly any locals there any more […]. You go down Boston high 
street and it’s just like you’re in a foreign country. It’s got to stop (Bull, 2013). 
It was an archetypal face-off between a supposedly remote, liberal elite and the “real 
concerns” of the “ordinary public” who find their public space estranged by the mere 
presence of strangers. 
 
An impromptu speech by Nigel Farage early in the morning of the day after the 
referendum when first reports came of a probable victory for leave echo this: 
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This […] will be a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a victory 
This […] will be a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a victory 
for decent people (Farage, 2016). 
It was an unguarded remark, despite his carefully cultivated reputation as someone 
who will say the supposedly unsayable. It gives an insight into the sort of fantasies at 
play in the referendum. Reality — some form of epistemic density, perhaps — is 
achieved insofar as subjects align with the “ordinary”, the supposedly familiar-yet-
unspoken substrate of the social. The role of the emblematic “real” in this has been 
assigned by many national haruspices to the “white working class”, a demographic 
supposedly hitherto ignored and despised. However, contrary to the frequent blithe 
assumptions about the identity of the 52% who voted to leave, overwhelmingly they 
were not people who lived in the North of the UK. Neither were they exclusively, or 
even mostly, working class (Dorling, 2016). They were predominantly white. The 
majority of BAME people were not in favour of Brexit, with the exception of UK 
citizens of Indian background (Begum, 2018), though the latter seem missing in the 
popular imaginary.  
 
The favoured figures of the fantasy are “the left behind” which purport to designate 
those who have been condemned to the waste-time and stasis of obsolescence, 
additionally suffering from the loss of “the disappearance of a distinct working-class 
culture and the marginalization of their views in the public conversation” (Goodhart, 
2016). It is not clear what this “distinct culture” entailed but considering those who 
have lost it are regularly described as “older white working class men with little 
education” (Goodhart, 2016), it might seem safe to say that part of it was a level of 
entitlement based purely on the status of “white” and “male”. Notably, the version of 
class being retailed is remarkably light in regards to any specific relationship to the 
means of production (which would include women and people of colour), preferring 
instead a definition relying on a vague idea of “culture”. 
 
As Lauren Gail Berlant points out (Gail Berlant, 2005), political fantasies aren’t 
powerless or a substitute for power, but a necessary part of any political thinking. In 
this case the fantasy was one of self-similarity, belonging. This appeal to the 
normative-mundane as an exemplification of clear-sightedness and practical virtues 
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is what Joe Kennedy, a literature scholar, calls “authentocracy”. Crucially, political 
and journalistic authentocrats are not usually speaking on their own account, but on 
behalf of a reified other. Kennedy defines authentocracy as […] an economy of truth 
in which rightness is not immanent in a claim but is instead supported with reference 
to personal origins (2018; loc. 456). 
 
Kennedy points out that this phantasmal “white working class” are very rarely, if ever, 
depicted in any of their actual located and variegated specificities. Rather, their role 
as those invoked — whose “legitimate concerns” should be listened to is — as 
Kennedy aptly puts it, allegorical (2018; loc. 1134). On one level, it is a strange 
spectacle for a purported national abject to become lauded as essential, but as 
previously noted, the exception from a given order can become an allegorical 
exemplar of it. The role assigned those “left behind”, “forgotten” or excluded by a 
cosmopolitan globalised capital (mediated and enabled by national governments) 
has switched from exception to exemplar, becoming Farage’s “real” — the People 
elevated as epitome of nation, models for the public and the validators of the state.  
 
In my previous discussion about the Emily Thornberry “flag” tweet, I pointed out that 
symbolic readings provide the comfort that there is something tangibly there with 
which to underwrite fantasies of public self-similarity. In another anecdotal example: 
while speaking with someone who voted to leave, he reasoned that the EU is an 
“artificial construct” — a substitution of something overly rarefied, arid and etiolated 
for the (assumed) organic and living presence of the “real” (“ordinary”) nation state. 
For him the EU served as allegorical antithesis to the symbol.  
 
The term “populism” has been attached to the anti-EU campaigns by both sides. 
Ernesto Laclau defines this as the development of apparently simplistic dichotomous 
positions within social space, articulated via rhetoric he describes as “metaphorical 
reaggregation” (2005; p.19) which establishes an equivalence between the 
grievances of different groups at one pole against an (assumed) oppressive force at 
the other: 
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the unification of a plurality of demands in an equivalential chain; the 
constitution of an internal frontier dividing society into two camps; the 
consolidation of the equivalential chain (Laclau, 2005, p.77). 
This reaggregation operates through tropes: images, metaphors, phrases and bodily 
dispositions. Laclau calls these “empty signifiers” because their lack of particular 
content enables their function, which is to “give successive concrete contents a 
sense of temporal continuity” (2005, p.76). Even the speechwriters of the Tory Prime 
minister, Theresa May, were aware of this when they had her say “[T]he referendum 
was not just a vote to withdraw from the EU. It was about something broader – 
something that the European Union had come to represent” (May, 2016). 
 
By Laclau’s definition, this falls a long way short of constructing “a popular identity 
which is something qualitatively more than the simple summation of the equivalential 
links” (2005, p.77). There is no suitably stable empty signifier around which to 
aggregate disparate grievances. Kennedy perhaps puts it most accurately when he 
describes authentocrats as being engaged in “not straightforward populism, but an 
[…] attempt to filigree its terms” (2018, loc. 649).  
 
What has happened is that the irreconcilable differences between democratic and 
liberal strands of governmental rationality are exposed. Although often casually 
treated as virtual synonyms, the tension between them is, as Chantal Mouffe 
describes it, the foundational liberal democratic “paradox” ( 2000, pp. 2–5). The two 
strands are not independent of one another but locked into a productive dialectic. 
The current ascendency of the idea that “democracy” was embodied forever in the 
result of a single plebiscite, rather than the plebiscite itself, is a step towards the 
emergence of a form of illiberal democracy, or what Wendy Brown has called in 
relation to Donald Trump’s appeal, “libertarian authoritarianism”, an apparent 
oxymoron which she sums up thusly: 
 
Its sensibility is: ‘I can say anything, do anything, be anything I want, I can call 
for a certain restoration of my former entitlements (among whites), insist on my 
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libertarian rights and at the same time demand statist protection of my country, 
property, and racial and sexual entitlement’ (Brown, 2018). 
Theresa May carried this logic through with her “hostile environment” policies aimed 
at preventing undocumented migrants from accessing healthcare, working or renting 
accommodation. Predictably, this has ended up with UK citizens being deported, 
interned and refused medical treatment, housing and benefits.  
 
A population, or large part of it, who are caught in a moment that doesn’t end, which 
their exhausted “practical sovereignty” cannot meet or navigate, are encouraged to 
identify with the neoliberal state and its “performance of imperial autonomy” (Berlant, 
2005). This, I think, was the attempted hook in the “take back control” and “Leave” 
campaign slogan. The government was to performatively enact “control” as proxy. A 
fantasy of self-sufficient, buccaneering entrepreneurial spirit is resurrected and 
apparently expected to take the place of a “dependence” on the EU that is 
antithetical to the true interests of the nation. Presumably in the same way that 
removing benefits from unemployed and disabled claimants will help “free” them to 
independently navigate the market or starve.  
 
In my own audiences, which consist predominantly of other artists and academics, 
Brexit seems universally greeted with horror. In more recent performances that are 
outside the time frame of this study, I have clearly articulated the Vote Leave slogan 
“take back control” to see the reaction from my audience. It has mostly provoked 
nervous laughter; it seems as if the audience is uncertain about whether I am sincere 
and where they stand in relation to it or me. This is always the point. The reaction is 
undoubtedly due in part to the fact that they are members of a class that identifies 
itself as trans-national in outlook. The proliferating examples of self-penned artist 
biographies on flyers and websites, describing themselves as “based in London and 
Berlin” or similar (whatever their practical accuracy), for example, attest to that. It 
seems inescapable that part of the reaction to Brexit is a reaction to Brexiters — an 
element of class-based antipathy, or rather an uncritical acceptance of the assumed 
class characteristics of the leave vote. It may be a reflexive identification with its 
presumed antithesis. Whilst The Art Market (writ large) and Big Museums (again) are 
imbricated with Richard Florida’s ideas of a hyper-mobile “creative class” (Florida, 
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2002) most art made is distinctly local. However, as with the phantasmic Brexiter, 
that “local” is not easily situated or entirely coincident with itself. 
 
Not a single family in Europe I don’t know –– By that I mean families like mine, 
who owe everything to the Declaration of the Rights of Man (Rimbaud, 2001), 
p.213). 
In a future performance, in part a response to the lines quoted above from Arthur 
Rimbaud’s coruscating prose poem “Bad Blood”, I shall be combining verbal 
provocation about “taking back control” with wearing a mural crown (see Root 
appendix 2) and a “ceremonial” blanket inscribed with slogans from the Bike 
Cemetery wall (fig.35). This is intended to allegorically combine the exemplary 
sovereignty of the (head of) state with the abjected subjectivity, space and time of 
the Bike Cemetery. In this way, I hope to present the paradoxical strands of (welfare 
statist) liberal democracy in confrontation with the supposed autonomy of the empty 
space of performance. Rimbaud’s ambivalence in the poem towards both the 
bourgeois democratic society against which he lived and his role as artist within it 
and his tacit acknowledgment of their mutual complicity, appears apt to me. As 
Berlant remarked, […t]here are no unmixed political feelings, there is no 
unambivalent potentiality for the social (Berlant, 2010); this seems accurate and 
more useful than ever in the current situation. At this dangerous time, avowed 
ambivalence might seem a luxury, but it is, in my opinion, more perilous to throw 
one’s lot in with symbolic readings of commonality, even with one own self or one’s 
times.  
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…And then I arrive, so to speak. I got here before you and planted my flag here, in 
this place that, in order for my flag to have meaning (the name under which I claim it) 
must be inhospitable to all flags. I arrive and mouth the words that I find on the 
wall, the nomos of the place. I repeat them in a variety of other places, under differing  
jurisdictions1. I take them and place them in a journal article. I intone them on stage.  
I broadcast them on the radio. Their first instance (if it was or ever could be their first)  
occluded and multiplied by a maze of proliferating echoes. And I name the place which had  
no name that I knew before my arrival, which is not quite the same as having no name.  
In this (every this, including this), I give it my name and introduce it to you as mine; an  
outrageous gambit. 
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Appendix 1 
 
INVOCATION 
Throat singing. Fades into traffic sound 
 
[Sound of traffic. Crack of beer can opening, hiss of escaping gas] This — is for the 
good dead [sound of pouring beer on pavement] Who tucked us in at night — closing 
the door, softly 
Who gaze, calmly, back at us from the family shrine Whose eyes are doubled in the 
faces of friends, lovers. The good dead — who love us,— 
Because we're good. And we like to be good. 
 
This — [sound of beer being poured on pavement] Is for the bad dead — who we don't 
like to speak of Who implore us as we pass, whose voices — 
Are not quite voices, 
Whose language is not quite language — not quite — Who we've injured, or allowed 
to be injured 
Whose reproach is implacable — and infinite In their lost-ness to us. 
The bad dead; who we don't like to speak of. 
 
And this [sound of beer poured on pavement] Is for [shouts] Hermes! 
Who stole the cattle of the sun, 
Who licks the crumbs from the sacrificial table 
Who spits on honest labor 
Who casts his benediction on all who thieve their language Stumbling on broken 
tongues 
Between the platform and the train Between here, and there 
Between the piss thin rain and the nagging wind Between the railings and the gutter. 
For Hermes! Bless us. 
 
And this [sound of beer on pavement] is for us: Who await the bailiffs at dawn 
Who work the treadmills of addiction 
Who are, forever, double hearted, double breathed, And voiced. 
Who live under assumed names — and The assumptions of name; 
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Who fabricate our lives to officials — 
And cross our fingers when called to sign. Who never spoke a true word. 
For us, too. 
[Traffic fades into bass electric piano and phaser, drifts. Sound pans side to side 
Fades out. Drums start in the middle distance, and voices sound of tube train comes 
in closer by. Announcements, the train waits at the platform, then its doors close and 
it moves away down the tunnel. Drums continue, piano fades back in and then out 
again.] 
 
[Strange, baby-like choking spirit voice appears, close by.] 
 
Ghost has it's ectoplasmic finger, pulpy and questing… up my arse. [The baby is close 
by, but it is developing a nimbus of reverb] Probing my guts, tuning in to the thrum of 
my blood — 
[atonal guitar approaches from behind] 
It's trying to trace the umbilical back. It wants to come home. [Strangled baby voice 
softens slightly, comes slightly nearer ] The 'O' in "home", 
The same shape of pale lips curled round, sucking on emptiness, that's formed in 
"LOst" and "gOne". It mouths this silently, as if behind glass. 
 
[The strangled baby spirit voice moves off into a distant reverb, crosses behind and 
moves closer again, on the other side this time. Atonal guitar and bass still approach. 
Strangling spirit baby then circles like a released balloon] 
 
I have a city, somewhere beneath my solar plexus. A constant accretion. I am silting up 
with streets. Brimming with masonry, memory and alcohol. 
 
[Sighing, breathing voice appears, close.] 
 
The ghost finger elongates, feels overlaid edges; flicks through them, like an 
almanac…Or an A–Z. 
They took a city and rebuilt it, exactly; down to every last ledge and cornice. And they 
called it "Heritage". 
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[Breathing voice moves behind, side to side, bronchial, phlegmy. Guitar and bass are 
further in the distance, now.] 
 
Bright, sandblasted facades. They called it "Heritage". Except, the shadows don't fit. 
They called it "Heritage". Except, the shadows don't fit. 
 
THE SHADOWS DON'T FIT! THE SHADOWS DON'T FIT! T! T! T! T! t! t! t! t! t! 
t! t t t t t 
tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt 
[Spirit baby returns, swathed in reverb. Joined by another, as a wave of tape delay 
feedback builds, crests and dissipates. Other sounds appear, centre; perhaps footsteps. 
Then traffic manifests.] 
 
Sphinxes patrol the precincts. Blank, archaic smiles and unreadable eyes. Demanding 
the Shibboleth kept under the tongue. 
It's passed from mouth to mouth, like a kiss. 
Fits the serrations of their teeth like the ragged ceramic edge 
of the tesserae hospitalis, that met its mate 
in a presence, a promise. 
[Footsteps come behind, and pass. Traffic noise flows above.] The ground is strewn 
with bones 
And travel cards. [Footsteps, traffic, fade out.] 
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Appendix 2 
 
Root 
 
Performance. Middlesex University 2015 
 
There is a spot, focussed on the back wall stage left. Centre stage, there is a stool 
on which there is a mural crown constructed from brown paper. The stool sits on a 
wooden dais, which has a contact mic attached to it that connects to the house PA, 
via a delay effect. On the way in, the audience pass me, standing in the corridor 
next to the door that they pass through to take their seats. I face the wall with my 
back to them. I have the rusted head of a pickaxe lying next to me on the floor, it is 
attached to my ankle by an umbilical of string. 
 
[I move in the space behind the audience and the chairs that they sit in. I strike 
my hand chimes against each other and the walls and furniture. I hit my drum with 
a beater, or scratch its skin with my fingernails. I rattle a caxaxa. I have the head 
of a pickaxe tied on a piece of string around my ankle. As I move, it drags after me, 
making a hollow sound on the wooden floor, it loudly taps and grinds if it gets 
caught on an obstacle. The audience are facing the stage area, so they cannot see 
me.] 
 
[A verse of the vocal melody from Schubert's song Der Lieirmann, sung without words] 
Lalalalalala 
La la la la la la… 
 
 
…At some point around 1798, an idealistic young man who somewhat resembled a 
worried sheep in appearance…enjoyed an epiphany [chimes, rattle and drums, which 
carry on whilst I continue speaking. The pickaxe head can be heard dragging on the 
floor as I move around behind the audience]…walking somewhere…in the north of 
Scotland, perhaps…A young woman reaping. A young woman, in a field reaping and 
singing. [I start moving, the chimes sounding off each other and the pickaxe 
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dragging. I sing a verse of the vocal melody from Schubert's song Der Lieirman, 
without words]…Lalalalalala la la la la la… 
The beauty of this moment [drum] was that supposedly he couldn't understand a 
word that she was saying [drum]. It may have been Gaelic she was singing in [a beat 
on the drum], or of course, he may have been lying. [drum, and the chimes 
randomly tintinabullating] but the reason why the song was so pure [rapid scraping 
of pickaxe and drum] was that it had no words…like the birds sing, like the birds at 
evening sing [drum beats of decreasing tempo]…this [rattle] outpouring [chime, 
drum beat]…of spontaneous emotion that he heard. [scraping as I move again, 
behind the audience] I've watched birds, in the yard of my building, singing…They 
actually sing to keep each other at bay. Our sheep-like gentleman, [soft beats on 
drum] being transported by some fantasised peasant epiphany, [irregular drum 
beats] may have been being sung away….[loud drum beat] sung away [loud drum 
beat]… The poor girl seeing some Englishman, resembling something like a worried 
sheep [loud drum]…fresh-ish, as it happens, from Paris; just missed the Terror…[loud 
drum and scratching and scraping] And she may have thought: "he's creeping me 
out, how can I get him to go away?" 
 
[Drum fill with scraping and random chimes] He later described the experience as an 
encounter with a "Solitary Reaper"…She wasn't solitary — obviously. [lighter strike 
on drum] He was there. He abstracted himself out of the picture, and abstracted 
her voice into pure song; sans subjectivity. [Scraping, drum flourishes and rattle]. 
 
When the city was founded, and the monster was dead and the war was over — there's 
always a war, when the city is founded…Aeneas, buggering off from Troy as fast as he 
can; and then Carthage…Or the new city we find ourselves in…Post war…When the 
city was founded and the monster was dead [scraping as I move, drum beats, 
chimes]…an emblem was needed. [Drum beats] Of course, there can't be a beginning 
[drum, scraping]. Of course, there never was a beginning after the war [drum]. A 
beginning before the beginning [chimes and rattle]. 
 
You'll find them on city walls, coins…[scraping from pickaxe as I walk along the aisle 
between the audiences' seats to the stage area] The one figure set aside to protect 
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and embody the whole…[flourish on the rattle] The one figure crowned…in some 
place outside…time. There before the beginning was the beginning [rattle]…And 
they wear the walls on their head. 
 
[Rattle and chimes] They go shopping. They sing, for the hell of it… [kicking at the 
dais, which has a contact mic on it, rattle, chimes] just for the hell of it. 
 
[Singing] 
Barefoot on the snowbank Swaying to and fro — 
And his little plate 
Has not a coin to show 
 
 
And there — at the edge of the city in the city where the city sputters out into 
sparks, flakes and ashes [staccato rattle and chimes]…into industrial estates and 
landfills…into hospitals and prisons…Where the streets unravel into nets to catch 
blown detritus and flightpaths. Outside the city in the city this is where we find 
our route…our root. [Rattle] And it was always anterior [chime, and delay on dais 
contact mic audible as a dull beat]. You walk down the street and you see it ahead 
of you; you see its back receding round the corner [chime]. Along the crags, it got 
there before you…at the vantage, its face occluded; just taking it all in. Pure 
anteriority — always ahead of you and always there when you've left [Chime, dais 
contact delay sound, drum being dropped]. 
 
When poetry finally becomes the whole of art — the spontaneous outflow of 
emotion…When poetry becomes the whole of art…when we are — overheard, as Mill 
[J.S. Mill] said, not heard…Who or what then wears the mural crown? Monarchs and 
cars…driving round…circles. [Kicking the dais, rhythmic drum, chimes] 
 
[Singing] 
 
 
Strange ancient — Shall I go…with you? 
To accompany my songs On your lyre, too? 
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[Kicking the dais rhythmically, then dropping drum, chimes, rattle onto it, the sound 
of which is amplified]. 
 
He was always there before. His back — disappearing round the next corner…Taking 
it all in — his head obscuring the view… [Scraping sound of pickaxe as I pick up the 
mural crown from the dais and walk over to the back wall, where, with my back to 
the audience, I hold the crown in such a way that it projects its shadow onto the 
wall. I stand there, still, for a moment] 
 
Lights please. 
 
 
[The lights are turned off] 
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Appendix 3 
 
The following is a transcription of my improvised noise and spoken word 
performance Apostrophe212 to a Citizen, which was presented in a black box 
theatre space at Middlesex University on 31st March 2015. 
 
The performance space — a black box theatre — is lit by a single, focussed spot on the 
stage. Within the area demarcated by the spot is a lectern supporting a Korg Kaoss Pad 
(hereafter referred to as KP), which is an effects processor and sampler. A microphone 
lies on the floor. A can of Carlsberg Special Brew213 is placed at the edge of the spot. 
 
At the beginning, I walk onto the stage, into the spot and pick up the microphone; 
standing with my back mostly to the audience I press buttons on the KP and make 
noises into the microphone. I am attempting to make a low frequency growl in the 
manner of Tuvan throat singing, which generates harmonics to the base (sung) tone 
by using the mouth, throat and sinuses as resonators. I sample this and put a 
resonant low pass filter on it, creating a cycling drone. When I have achieved this, 
manipulating settings with my left hand and holding the mic in my right, I take a few 
steps towards the curtain that marks the back of the stage area and stand for a 
moment facing it. 
 
I look down at the floor as I turn and glance briefly up at the audience. I say 
 
Here we are again then, eh?214 
                                            
212
 The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms describes apostrophe as: 
A rhetorical figure in which the speaker addresses a dead or absent person, or an abstraction or 
inanimate object. In classical rhetoric, the term could also denote a speaker’s turning to address a 
particular member or section of the audience. (Baldick, 2008, p.22). 
My performance was intended as an apostrophe in both those senses. I believe that the idea of 
“citizen”, as a content-free bearer of rights, has been consistently denigrated under neoliberalism in 
favour of a subject with determinate content, who accesses conditional privileges dependent on their 
demonstration of appropriate market behaviour. 
213
 A super-strong lager (by UK standards), which enjoys the reputation of being popular with 
homeless alcoholics; this is not true (or no longer true), as it is considerably more expensive than 
other competing brands and also extra strong ciders. I have come to use it as a prop in part due to 
this association with what Imogen Tyler would call the “national abject” (Tyler 2013), those figures of 
semi-fantasy who play a part in shoring up, through their abjection, normative ideas of health, 
citizenship etc. 
214
 This was the formulaic phrase with which the clown traditionally introduced the transformation 
scene in the Regency Harlequinade, forerunner of English pantomime. Joseph Grimaldi is credited 
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I walk forward, towards the audience and look up at them. 
 
Michael Warner…said that at some point in the early nineteenth century…I'd be 
inclined to put it at the late eighteenth century, but there you go…The Lyric 
became the dominant mode of poetics. And then — by now — the Lyric 
becomes the entirety of poetry. That obviously excludes older genres — the 
epic, satire, Georgics, elegy…it excludes a lot. 
 
The lyric is based on a productive misreading, let's say — a productive 
misreading that creates a sense of presence. 
 
In a lyric, if I was to say "I", you'd think that means "you". And equally, if I was to 
say "you", you could easily place yourself in the position of "I". 
 
I turn to the KP and adjust something on it, standing sideways on to the audience. 
 
 
If you hear it now…if you listen…sssshhhhhh 
 
 
I have sampled the "ssshhhhhttt", I adjust the delay on it as it loops in 
accompaniment with the drone. 
 
There are others in this room with us. There are others in this room with us. If 
you listen…ssshhhhhhhh 
 
I reach out to the KP and sample this last "ssshhhhhhh" in addition to the first. I allow 
it to loop a few times then turn it off, leaving only the drone. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
with its origination. See Banham, The Cambridge Guide to Theatre 1995, p. 454. The phrase is also 
used as a somewhat sinister refrain in Peter Ackroyd’s novel, Dan Leno and The Limehouse Golem 
(1994). 
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There are others. The air is thick with them. When I say "you", which you do I 
mean? The you who sit out there invisible and mostly un-named — or the "you" 
that my voice actually passes through, that sits on the tip of my tongue that 
passes through my language. That is the Public215. 
 
I swap the mic to my other hand and stand facing the audience, with my right hand on 
the KP and the mic in my left to manipulate a tape delay effect as I speak 
 
Lyric…lyric became popular… 
 
 
I turn off the delay. 
 
 
As Michael Warner says, about the same time as the idea of the bourgeois 
public and of liberal democracy. Lyric — that transposition of my "I" directly to 
your "I"…whoever, and wherever you are…and that "you" directly transcribed to 
your "you"; without passing through 
 
I swap the mic over 
 
…that public. In fact, almost as an antidote to it. Sssshhhhh… 
 
I turn sideways on again, this time with my left hand on the KP and the mic in my right, 
and turn on the delay again, with a loop of the last "sssshhhhh" 
 
You can hear them…[whispering] crowds of strangers…crowds of strangers…[no 
longer whispering but sotto voce] the newspapers thick with them we read 
them through their eyes, the air is thick with them 
                                            
215
 Warner describes the specific type of public-ness that defines modern urban democracies as 
“stranger relationality”. A public might almost be said to be stranger-relationality in a pure form, 
because other ways of organizing strangers — nations, religions, races, guilds — have manifest 
positive content”. (Warner, 2002, p. 75, my emphasis). I would argue that this form of relationality is 
routinely disavowed. 
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I swap the mic and touch the KP with my left as I say 
 
It's their bodies …on the radio…as unknown bodies…[louder] The basis of 
the public 
 
Here I turn slightly to turn off the delay and drone on the KP, look directly at audience. 
 
Is the stranger. There is no public without the stranger. 
 
I pause slightly after this last, turn towards the KP and place the microphone on top 
of it. I pick up the can of Special Brew and step outside of the circle made by the spot, 
so I am in shadow. I open the can, it is quite audible. 
 
I then speak, without any amplification 
 
And outside that space, where am i? 
 
I step towards the circle with my left arm, holding the beer, extended into the light 
and leaving the rest of my body in shadow. I pour some of the beer on the floor. I walk 
around the edge of the circle and stop with my back to the audience at the nearest 
part to them and pour beer again. I then move around to the left-hand side and repeat 
the gesture and pour a line of beer whilst walking across the back of the circle where 
the curtains meet the floor. On reaching the edge of the light on the right-hand side, I 
drink a mouthful from the can and spit it into the circle. I take out an orange plastic 
bag that has been protruding from my pocket the whole time and retrace my steps in 
the opposite direction from the previous libation pouring, casting handfuls of earth 
["graveyard dirt"] from the bag around the edges of the circle with my left hand as I do 
so. As I return to my starting point, I drop the bag on the floor within the circle and 
pick up the mic from the lectern with my left hand. 
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Outside…this small circle of light and name…at what point do we pass back 
through the public? At what point is it lost, and the lyric becomes dominant? 
 
With my right hand I reach out to the KP and turn the drone back on. I then turn my 
back to the audience take a step back towards the curtain, swapping the microphone 
to my right hand and reaching out my left to the KP, though I think better of it and the 
gesture is not complete. 
 
In the early nineteenth century, the ruckenfigur came down from his mountain 
— you probably know him, he's stood here like that — walking stick, wasn't it? 
 
Still with my back turned I swap the mic to my left and hold out my right arm as if 
holding a cane in the manner of the figure in Friedrich's painting Wanderer Above the 
Sea of Fog. 
 
Admiring the vista. And rather than simply seeing him, or rather his or her back, 
vanishing up the next mountain pass or being swallowed into the mysteries of 
the forest, and being unable to catch up and see through those eyes that 
consumed the rocks and clouds… [unintelligible]…the sermons in babbling 
brooks, or whatever it happened to be. The ruckenfigur come down; attracted 
perhaps by the rustle of notes or the chime of coins216 — but, having a refined 
sensibility, it would never be that simple [Benjamin on the flaneur "searching 
for a buyer"]. Perhaps just to look around. Or maybe to find a buyer. 
 
I turn three quarters towards the KP and press a button with my right hand. "Maybe to 
find a buyer" repeats. 
 
                                            
216
 Here I equate the person of the ruckenfigur with the flaneur. “In the person of the flaneur, the 
intelligentsia becomes acquainted with the marketplace. It surrenders itself to the market, thinking 
merely to look around; but in fact it is already seeking a buyer”. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 21, my 
emphasis.) 
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And now our calls for intimacy217 [Delay: 
 
Andnowournowourcallsforcallsfornowourcallsforintimacycallsforintimacy] 
 
I reach out my right hand, still facing the audience and reduce the intensity of the 
delay 
 
are couched in the language of the lyric. The short circuit that loses the public 
of 
[inthelanguagethelanguageofthelangofthelyricofshortcircuitortcurcuitthatuitlosesthepubliclos 
Ghosts, the public of strangers. We want intimacy as a… 
Esthepublicofghoststheghoststhepublicghoststhepublicofstrangersofpublicofstrangerswewant 
“I” is “you”. 
strangersintimacyacyasaIasaIisyouisyou] 
 
I adjust the KP, then turn to the audience. 
 
You were groomed by the welfare state 
 
I turn back to the KP and adjust the reverb with my right hand By methadone clinics 
[cavernous reverb and delay] 
 
I turn back and adjust the intensity of reverb with right hand. 
 
And free dentistry. You were groomed by public service broadcasting… you 
were groomed by free milk…free glasses. You were groomed and corrupted by 
                                            
217
 “Intimacy” in performance has, in recent years, been touted as a panacea to the purported 
alienation (in a distinctly personalised sense, as opposed to the wider sense that might be evoked in 
Marxist critique) of contemporary society. I would maintain that the valorisation of this form of intimacy 
is a manifestation of the neoliberal drive to displace the concept of the citizen-stranger (and the 
concomitant sense of publicness) in favour of the known and knowable subject. It seems to me that 
the impetus towards intimacy, like the related vogue (now thankfully largely passed) for “relational” 
work inspired by Nicolas Bourriaud’s book (Bourriaud 1998), is the desire to replace the sense of 
public with private experience, along the lines described by Lauren Berlant as the “intimate public 
sphere”, which is: […A] condition of social membership produced by personal acts and values, 
especially acts originating in or directed toward the family sphere. No longer valuing personhood as 
something directed toward public life, contemporary nationalist ideology recognizes a public good only 
in a particularly constricted nation of simultaneously lived private worlds. (Berlant, 1997, p.5). 
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trade union membership — when it meant something. 
 
I turn back and adjust the KP with my right hand, I bring the reverb back in a milder 
form. Turn back to the audience. 
 
That interiority, bracketed between the shoulders, like an ellipsis. Vanishing up 
the mountain passes and into the mystery of the forest…And one never used to 
see through your eyes. 
 
I turn sideways on to the audience, extending my right arm to adjust the KP. As I do 
this, I whisper 
 
Wolf vanissssssssh… 
 
 
It loops 
 
Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf 
vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… 
 
COM - PEN - SATion! 
I pick up the can of beer 
 
Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf 
ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion 
BANKRUPSY! 
vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf  vanissssh 
ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY! 
ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…  ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion 
WOLF VANIssSH WOLF VANIssSH  WOLF VANIssSH 
vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf 
vanisss 
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ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY! 
ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…    ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion…ATion 
AL-SAY-TION-TON 
SAY-TION-TON SAY-TION-TON SAY-TION-TON SAY-TION- 
vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf vanissssh… Wolf vanissssh…Wolf 
vanisss ANKRUPSY!...  ANKRUPSY!...  ANKRUPSY!... ANKRUPSY!... 
GRITANT. GRITANT. GRITANT. GRITANT. 
Ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh...ssssh...ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…sssh 
NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU  NKRU 
 
CHRISTMAS DAY. NIL COMBAT. 
BAT BAT BAT BAT BAT BAT BAT BAT 
GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT. GRITANT. 
Ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh...ssssh...ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…ssssh…sssh  
AL-SAY…AL-SAY…AL-SAY…AL-SAY…AL-SAY…AL-SAY…AL-SAY 
 
LIGHTS! 
The lights go out, leaving the space in total darkness. 
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WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! W 
GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT. GRITANT.  GRITANT. 
GRIT 
Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…      
Ssssh…Ssssh…Sss 
BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPS 
 
 
There's an empty space in the middle of the city, there's an empty space at the 
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WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! W 
GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT. GRITANT.  GRITANT. 
GRIT 
Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Sss 
BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPS 
 
 
centre of the state. I have marked an empty space in beer and graveyard dirt 
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WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! W 
GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT. GRITANT.  GRITANT. 
GRIT 
Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh… Ssssh…Ssssh…Sss 
BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPS 
 
here… The example and the exception are related…the example and the exception 
bear some relation… 
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WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! W 
GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT. GRITANT.  GRITANT. 
GRIT 
Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh… Ssssh…Ssssh…Sss 
BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPS 
 
the example and the exception bear some relation… 
the example and the exception bear some relation. 
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WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! WOLF! WOLF!WOLF! W 
GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT.   GRITANT. GRITANT.  GRITANT. 
GRIT 
Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh…Ssssh… Ssssh…Ssssh…Sss 
BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPSY BANKRUPS 
 
Remember me, when I am gone away, Gone far away, into that silent land 
When you can no more hold me by the hand Nor I half turn to go, yet turning 
stay…218 
 
Gesture becomes posture. 
                                            
218
 Remember, by Christina Rossetti; mis-remembered and mis-quoted. 
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Appendix 4 
 
I went down to St. James Infirmary 
To see my baby there, 
Laid out on a cold steel table, 
So sweet, so cool, so fair. 
  
Let her go, let her go, God bless her; 
Wherever she may be 
She may search the wide world over 
And never find another sweet man like me 
  
When I die 
Just bury me. 
Put your small change to cover my eyes- 
To get me south of the river 
And get some drinks in when I arrive. 
  
Can't miss it, mate -Just a step up the road, through the freshly privatised out-
patients' clinic without walls, the result of a recent merger with the debtors' 
prison. Cemetery gates on the left, 24 hour offy on the right, and all the bright 
new shining glass, playschool clad, buy to let cash-farms gleaming like an advert 
for the transparency and self-presence of the well-lived life. It's just there - yeah, 
next to those hoardings displaying gym-zombies with bodies like well sculpted 
CVs and posters exhorting responsible citizens to do something wild and life-
affirming — go shopping  — there's pictures of them gurning like giro day. It's a 
small door. 
  
 There's a buzzer… 
  
…If they ask, say I sent you 
  
Now that you've heard my story 
My ashtray mouth and my piss stained shoes 
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No one will ask you - just tell them anyway 
I've got the St. James Infirmary blues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
